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THE SUPREME COURT’S THIRTY-FIVE OTHER GUN CASES: 
WHAT THE SUPREME COURT HAS SAID ABOUT THE SECOND 
AMENDMENT 
DAVID B. KOPEL* 
Among legal scholars, it is undisputed that the Supreme Court has said 
almost nothing about the Second Amendment.1 This article suggests that the 
Court has not been so silent as the conventional wisdom suggests. While the 
meaning of the Supreme Court’s leading Second Amendment case, the 1939 
United States v. Miller2 decision remains hotly disputed, the dispute about 
whether the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right can be pretty 
well settled by looking at the thirty-five other Supreme Court cases which 
quote, cite, or discuss the Second Amendment. These cases suggest that the 
Justices of the Supreme Court do now and usually have regarded the Second 
Amendment “right of the people to keep and bear arms” as an individual right, 
rather than as a right of state governments. 
Chief Justice Melville Fuller’s Supreme Court (1888-1910) had the most 
cases involving the Second Amendment: eight. So far, the Rehnquist Court is 
in second place, with six. But Supreme Court opinions dealing with the Second 
Amendment come from almost every period in the Court’s history, and almost 
all of them assume or are consistent with the proposition that the Second 
Amendment in an individual right. 
Part I of this Article discusses the opinions from the Rehnquist Court. Part 
II looks at the Burger Court, and Part III at the Warren, Vinson, and Hughes 
Courts. Part IV groups together the cases from the Taft, Fuller, and Waite 
Courts, while Part V consolidates the Chase, Taney, and Marshall Courts. 
 
          * Research Director, Independence Institute, Golden, Colorado, http://i2i.org; J.D. 1985 
University of Michigan Law School; B.A. in History, 1982, Brown University.  Author of Gun 
Control and Gun Rights (NYU Press, forthcoming, 2001).  I would like to thank Paul Blackman, 
Clayton Cramer, Brannon Denning, Billie J. Grey, David Hunt, Dolores Kopel, Glenn Harlan 
Reynolds, Eugene Volokh, and the Cincinnati Law Library Association for very helpful 
comments. Any errors in this article are the fault of society, and cannot be blamed on an 
individual. 
 1. See, e.g., Sanford Lewinson, Is the Second Amendment Finally Becoming Recognized as 
Part of the Constitution?  Voices from the Courts, 1998 B.Y.U. Rev. 127. 
 2. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
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But first, let us quickly summarize what modern legal scholarship says 
about the Second Amendment, and why the Court’s main Second Amendment 
decision—United States v. Miller—does not by itself settle the debate. 
Dennis Henigan, lead attorney for Handgun Control, Inc., argues that the 
Supreme Court has said so little about the Second Amendment because the fact 
that the Second Amendment does not protect the right of ordinary Americans 
to own a gun is “perhaps the most well-settled point in American law.”3 
Henigan argues that the Second Amendment was meant to restrict the 
Congressional powers over the militia granted to Congress in Article I of the 
Constitution—although Henigan does not specify what the restrictions are.4 
One of Henigan’s staff criticizes the large number of American history 
textbooks which “contradict[] a nearly unanimous line of judicial decisions by 
suggesting the meaning of the Second Amendment was judicially unsettled.”5 
Similarly, Carl Bogus argues that the only purpose of the Second 
Amendment was to protect state’s rights to use their militia to suppress slave 
insurrections—although Bogus too is vague about exactly how the Second 
Amendment allegedly restricted Congressional powers.6 This article refers to 
 
 3. Dennis Henigan, The Right to Be Armed: A Constitutional Illusion, S.F. BARRISTER, 
Dec. 1989, ¶ 19, available online at <http://www.handguncontrol.org/legalaction/C2/c2rtarms. 
htm>. The late Dean Griswold of Harvard, who was a member of the board of Henigan’s group, 
expressed a nearly identical thought: “that the Second Amendment poses no barrier to strong gun 
laws is perhaps the most well-settled proposition in American constitutional law.” Erwin N. 
Griswold, Phantom Second Amendment ‘Rights’, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1990, at C7 
 4. DENNIS A. HENIGAN ET AL., GUNS AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE MYTH OF SECOND 
AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR FIREARMS IN AMERICA (1995); Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. 
Henigan, The Second Amendment in the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 
15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 5 (1989); Dennis A. Henigan, Arms, Anarchy and the Second Amendment, 
26 VAL. U. L. REV. 107 (1991) [hereinafter Henigan, Arms, Anarchy] 
 5. Mark Polston, Obscuring the Second Amendment, 34 VIRGINIA RESOLVES, No. 32 
(Spring 1994), http://www.handguncontrol.org/legalaction/dockets/A1/obscure.htm. 
 6. Carl T. Bogus, Race, Riots, and Guns, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1365 (1993); Carl T. Bogus, 
The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 309 (1998). For a response 
to the latter article, see David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 
BYU. L. REV. 1359, 1515-29. 
  Some other scholarly sources rejecting individual rights are: ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE 
POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL (1995); George Anastaplo, Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States: A Commentary, 23 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 631, 687-93 (1992); Michael A. Bellesiles, 
The Origins of Gun Culture in the United States, 1760-1865, 83 J. AM. HIST. 425 (1996); 
Lawrence Delbert Cress, An Armed Community: The Origins and Meaning of the Right to Bear 
Arms, 71 J. AM. HIST. 22 (1984); Samuel Fields, Guns, Crime and the Negligent Gun Owner, 10 
N. KY. L. REV. 141 (1982); Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness 
and Dereliction of Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. REV. 57 (1995); Michael J. Palmiotto, The 
Misconception of the American Citizen’s Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 4 J. ON FIREARMS & PUB. 
POL’Y 85 (1992); Warren Spannaus, State Firearms Regulation and the Second Amendment, 6 
HAMLINE L. REV. 383 (1983). 
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the State’s Rights theory of the Second Amendment as the “Henigan/Bogus 
theory,” in honor of its two major scholarly proponents.7 
In contrast to the State’s Rights theory is what has become known as the 
Standard Model.8 Under the Standard Model, which is the consensus of most 
modern legal scholarship on the Second Amendment, the Amendment 
guarantees a right of individual Americans to own and carry guns.9 This 
 
 7. For an effort to trace the potential contours of a State’s Rights Second Amendment, see 
Glenn Harlan Reynolds & Don B. Kates, The Second Amendment and States’ Rights: A Thought 
Experiment, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1737 (1995) (arguing that a State’s Rights Second 
Amendment would give each state legislature the power to arm its militia as it saw best, and thus 
the power to negate—within the borders of that state—federal bans on particular types of 
weapons). 
 8. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 
461, 463 (1995): 
Perhaps surprisingly, what distinguishes the Second Amendment scholarship from that 
relating to other constitutional rights, such as privacy or free speech, is that there appears 
to be far more agreement on the general outlines of Second Amendment theory than exists 
in those other areas. Indeed, there is sufficient consensus on many issues that one can 
properly speak of a “Standard Model” in Second Amendment theory, much as physicists 
and cosmologists speak of a “Standard Model” in terms of the creation and evolution of 
the Universe. In both cases, the agreement is not complete: within both Standard Models 
are parts that are subject to disagreement. But the overall framework for analysis, the 
questions regarded as being clearly resolved, and those regarded as still open, are all 
generally agreed upon. This is certainly the case with regard to Second Amendment 
scholarship. 
 9. See, e.g., SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS (Comm. Print 1982); 
AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1998); Robert J. Cottrol, Introduction to 1 GUN CONTROL 
AND THE CONSTITUTION: SOURCES AND EXPLORATIONS ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT at ix 
(Robert J. Cottrol ed., 1993); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, Public Safety and the 
Right to Bear Arms, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA: AFTER 200 YEARS 72 (David 
J. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr., eds., 1993); Robert J. Cottrol, Second Amendment, in THE 
OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 763 (Kermit L. Hall et 
al. eds., 1992); CLAYTON CRAMER, FOR THE DEFENSE OF THEMSELVES AND THE STATE at xv 
(1994); 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1639-40 (Leonard W. Levy et al. 
eds., 1986); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1876 
(1989); STEPHEN HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE RIGHT TO 
BEAR ARMS: 1866-1876 (1998); STEPHEN HALBROOK, A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS: STATE AND 
FEDERAL BILLS OF RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES (1989); STEPHEN P. 
HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
(1984); Edward F. Leddy, Guns and Gun Conrtol, in READER’S COMPANION TO AMERICAN 
HISTORY 477-78 (Eric Foner & John A. Garraty eds., 1991); Leonard W. Levy, ORIGINAL 
INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 341 (1988); Leonard Levy, Origins of the Bill of 
Rights (1999); JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-
AMERICAN RIGHT (1994); Laurence H. Tribe, I American Constitutional Law 894-903 (3d ed. 
2000).  Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 
(1992); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1164 (1991); 
Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the Second Amendment, 
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45 EMORY L.J. 1139, 1141 (1996); Bernard J. Bordenet, The Right to Possess Arms: The Intent of 
the Framers of the Second Amendment, 21 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. 1, 28 (1990); David I. Caplan, 
The Right of the Individual to Bear Arms: A Recent Judicial Trend, 1982 DET. C.L. REV. 789, 
790; David I. Caplan, The Right to Have Arms and Use Deadly Force Under the Second and 
Third Amendments, 2.1 J. ON FIREARMS & PUB. POL’Y 165 (1990); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond 
T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. 
L.J. 309 (1991); Brannon P. Denning, Can the Simple Cite Be Trusted?: Lower Court 
Interpretations of United States v. Miller and the Second Amendment, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 961 
(1995-96) [hereinafter Denning, Simple Cite]; Brannon P. Denning, Gun Shy: The Second 
Amendment as an “Underenforced Constitutional Norm”, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 719 
(1998); Anthony J. Dennis, Clearing the Smoke From the Right to Bear Arms and the Second 
Amendment, 29 AKRON L. REV. 57 (1995); Robert Dowlut, Federal and State Constitutional 
Guarantees to Arms, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 59 (1989); Robert Dowlut, The Current Relevancy 
of Keeping and Bearing Arms, 15 U. BALT. L.F. 32 (1984); Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms: 
Does the Constitution or the Predilection of Judges Reign?, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 65 (1983); Robert 
Dowlut, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms: A Right to Self-Defense Against Criminals and 
Despots, 8 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 25 (1997); Richard E. Gardiner, To Preserve Liberty—A Look 
at the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 10 N. Ky. L. Rev. 63 (1982); Alan M. Gottlieb, Gun 
Ownership: A Constitutional Right, 10 N. KY. L. REV. 113 (1982); Stephen P. Halbrook, 
Congress Interprets the Second Amendment: Declarations by a Co-Equal Branch on the 
Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 62 TENN. L. REV. 597 (1995); Stephen Halbrook, The 
Right of Workers to Assemble and to Bear Arms: Presser v. Illinois, Last Holdout Against 
Application of the Bill of Rights to the States, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV (no. 4, 1999, 
forthcoming); Stephen P. Halbrook, Encroachments of the Crown on the Liberty of the Subject: 
Pre-Revolutionary Origins of the Second Amendment, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 91 (1989); Stephen 
P. Halbrook, Personal Security, Personal Liberty, and “The Constitutional Right to Bear Arms”: 
Visions of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 341 (1995); 
Stephen P. Halbrook, Second-Class Citizenship and the Second Amendment in the District of 
Columbia, 5 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 105 (1995); Stephen P. Halbrook, The Jurisprudence 
of the Second and Fourteenth Amendments, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (1981); Stephen P. 
Halbrook, The Right of the People or the Power of the State: Bearing Arms, Arming Militias, and 
the Second Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 131 (1991); Stephen P. Halbrook, What the Framers 
Intended: A Linguistic Analysis of the Right to “Bear Arms”, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151 
(1986); Stephen P. Halbrook & David B. Kopel, Tench Coxe and the Right to Keep and Bear 
Arms in the Early Republic, 7 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. (1998); David G. Hardy, Armed 
Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of the Second Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 559 (1986); David G. Hardy, The Second Amendment and the Historiography of the 
Bill of Rights, 4 J.L. & POL. 1 (1987); Nicholas J. Johnson, Principles and Passions: The 
Intersection of Abortion and Gun Rights, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 97 (1997); Don B. Kates, Jr., 
Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204 
(1983); Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment: A Dialogue, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
143 (1986); Don Kates, The Second Amendment and the Ideology of Self-Protection, 9 CONST. 
COMMENTARY 87 (1992); Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, supra note 
7; David B. Kopel & Christopher C. Little, Communitarians, Neorepublicans, and Guns: 
Assessing the Case for Firearms Prohibition, 56 MD. L. REV. 438 (1997); Stephanie A. Levin, 
Grassroots Voices: Local Action and National Military Policy, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 321, 346-47 
(1992); Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989); 
Nelson Lund, The Ends of Second Amendment Jurisprudence: Firearms Disabilities and 
Domestic Violence Restraining Orders, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POLITICS 157 (1999); Nelson Lund, 
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modern Standard Model is similar to the position embraced by every known 
 
The Past and Future of the Individual’s Right to Arms, 31 GA. L. REV. 1 (1996); Nelson Lund, 
The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to Self-Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 
103 (1987); Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms: The Common 
Law Tradition, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 285 (1983); Thomas B. McAffee & Michael J. 
Quinlan, Bringing Forward the Right to Keep and Bear Arms: Do Text, History, or Precedent 
Stand in the Way?, 75 N.C. L. REV. 781 (1997); Thomas M. Moncure, Jr., The Second 
Amendment Ain’t About Hunting, 34 HOW. L.J. 589 (1991); Thomas M. Moncure, Jr., Who is the 
Militia—The Virginia Ratification Convention and the Right to Bear Arms, 19 LINCOLN L. REV. 1 
(1990); James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the 
American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287 (1990); L.A. Powe, Jr., Guns, Words, 
and Constitutional Interpretation, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1311 (1997); Michael J. Quinlan, Is 
There a Neutral Justification for Refusing to Implement the Second Amendment or is the Supreme 
Court Just “Gun Shy”?, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 641 (1993); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical 
Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461 (1995); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The 
Right to Keep and Bear Arms Under the Tennessee Constitution: A Case Study in Civic 
Republican Thought, 61 TENN. L. REV. 647 (1994) (discussing the Second Amendment as related 
to the Tennessee Constitution); Elaine Scarry, War and the Social Contract: Nuclear Policy, 
Distribution, and the Right to Bear Arms, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1257 (1991); J. Neil Schulman, The 
Text of the Second Amendment, 4 J. ON FIREARMS & PUB. POL’Y 159 (1992); Robert E. Shalhope, 
The Armed Citizen in the Early Republic, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125 (1986); Robert E. 
Shalhope, The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, 69 J. AM. HIST. 599 (1982); 
William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 
1236 (1994); David E. Vandercoy, The History of the Second Amendment, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 
1007 (1994); Eugene Volokh, The Amazing Vanishing Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
831 (1998); Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793 
(1998); Scott Bursor, Note, Toward a Functional Framework for Interpreting the Second 
Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1125 (1996); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Fifth 
Auxiliary Right, 104 YALE L.J. 995 (1995) (reviewing JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND 
BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT (1994)); Brannon P. Denning, 
Professional Discourse, The Second Amendment, and the “Talking Head Constitutionalism” 
Counterrevolution: A Review Essay, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 227 (1997) (reviewing DENNIS A. 
HENIGAN ET AL., GUNS AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE MYTH OF SECOND AMENDMENT 
PROTECTION FOR FIREARMS IN AMERICA (1996)); T. Markus Funk, Is the True Meaning of the 
Second Amendment Really Such a Riddle? Tracing the Historical “Origins of an Anglo-American 
Right”, 39 HOW. L.J. 411 (1995) (reviewing JOYCE LEE MALCOM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: 
THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT (1994)); David B. Kopel, It Isn’t About Duck 
Hunting: The British Origins of the Right to Arms, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1333 (1995) (reviewing 
JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN 
RIGHT (1994)); F. Smith Fussner, Book Review, 3 Const. Commentary 582 (1986) (reviewing 
STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT (1984)); Joyce Lee Malcolm, Book Review, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 452 (1986) 
(reviewing STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (1984)); cf. Nicholas J. Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment: An 
Individual Right to Arms Viewed through the Ninth Amendment, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1992) 
(arguing that the Ninth Amendment supports an individual right to arms).  For a list of all law 
review articles of firearms policy or the Second Amendment, See David B. Kopel, 
Comprehensive Bibliography of the Second Amendment in Law Review, 11 J. Firearms & Pub. 
Pol. 5 (1999), http://www.Saf.org/ALLLawReviews.htm. 
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legal scholar in the nineteenth century who wrote about the Second 
Amendment: the Amendment guarantees an individual right, but is subject to 
various reasonable restrictions.10 
Both the Standard Model and the State’s Right theory claim that Supreme 
Court precedent, particularly the case of United States v. Miller, supports their 
position. 
Two other scholarly theories about the Second Amendment are interesting, 
but their theories have little to do with Supreme Court precedent. Garry Wills 
argues that the Second Amendment has “no real meaning,” and was merely a 
clever trick that James Madison played on the Anti-Federalists.11 David 
Williams argues that the Second Amendment once guaranteed an individual 
right, but no longer does so because the American people are no longer 
virtuous and united, and hence are no longer “the people” referred to in the 
Second Amendment.12 Neither the Wills Nihilism theory nor the Williams 
Character Decline theory make claims which depend on the Supreme Court for 
support, or which could be refuted by Supreme Court decisions. 
Like the scholars, the lower federal courts are split on the issue, although 
their split is the opposite of the scholarly one: most federal courts which have 
stated a firm position have said that the Second Amendment is not an 
individual right.13 The federal courts which follow the academic Standard 
 
 10. The nineteenth century scholars were (in roughly chronological order): St. George 
Tucker; William Rawle; Joseph Story (see infra text at note 354); Henry St. George Tucker; 
Benjamin Oliver; James Bayard; Francis Lieber; Thomas Cooley (see note 25 infra); Joel 
Tiffany; Timothy Farrar; George W. Paschal; Joel Bishop; John Norton Pomeroy; Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr.; Herbert Broom; Edward A. Hadley; Hermann von Holst; John Hare; George Ticknor 
Curtis; John C. Ordronaux; Samuel F. Miller; J.C. Bancroft Davis; Henry Campbell Black; 
George S. Boutwell; James Schouler; John Randolph Tucker; and William Draper Lewis. They 
are discussed in detail in David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the 19th Century, 1998 
BYU. L. REV. 1359. 
 11. Garry Wills, Why We Have No Right to Bear Arms, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 21, 1995 at 
62, 72. 
 12. See David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying 
Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551 (1991); David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and 
Second Amendment Revolution: Conjuring with the People, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 879 (1996); 
David C. Williams, The Unitary Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 822 (1998). 
 13. See, e.g., Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 101 (9th Cir. 1996) (“the Second Amendment is 
a right held by the states”); United States v. Nelson, 859 F.2d 1318, 1320 (8th Cir. 1988) (“Later 
cases have analyzed the Second Amendment purely in terms of protecting state militias, rather 
than individual rights.”); Quilici v. Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270 (7th Cir. 1982) (upholding 
city’s ban on handguns; “the debate surrounding the adoption of the Second and Fourteenth 
Amendments. . .has no relevance to the resolution of the controversy before us”); United States v. 
Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976) (“it is clear that the Second Amendment guarantees a 
collective rather than an individual right”); Eckert v. Philadelphia, 477 F.2d 610 (3d Cir. 1973); 
United States v. Johnson, 441 F.2d 1134, 1136 (5th Cir. 1971) (“the Second Amendment only 
confers a collective right of keeping and bearing arms”); United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266 
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Model are in the minority, although the ranks of the minority have grown in 
recent years.14 The courts on both sides, like the scholars, insist that they are 
following the Supreme Court. 
One approach to untangling the conflict has been to see if the lower federal 
courts have actually been following Miller. In Can the Simple Cite be 
Trusted?, Brannon Denning makes a persuasive argument that some lower 
courts have cited Miller for propositions which cannot reasonably be said to 
flow from Miller.15 But part of the problem with deciding whether the courts or 
the scholars are being faithful to Miller is that Miller is such an opaque 
opinion. 
Miller grew out of a 1938 prosecution of two bootleggers (Jack Miller and 
Frank Layton) for violating the National Firearms Act by possessing a sawed-
off shotgun without having paid the required federal tax. The federal district 
court dismissed the indictment on the grounds that the National Firearms Act 
violated the Second Amendment.16 Freed, Miller and Layton promptly 
 
(3d Cir. 1942) (“not adopted with individual rights in mind, but as a protection for the States in 
the maintenance of their militia organizations”), rev’d on other grounds, 319 U.S. 463 (1943). 
 14. See, e.g, Runnebaum v. Nationsbank of Maryland, N.A., 123 F.3d 156 n. 8 (4th Cir. 
1997) (en banc, plurality opinion) (“Neither gathering in a group nor carrying a firearm are one of 
the major life activities under the ADA [Americans with Disabilities Act], though individuals 
have the constitutional right to peaceably assemble, see U.S. CONST. amend. I; and to ‘keep and 
bear Arms,’ U.S. CONST. amend. II.”); United States v. Atlas, 94 F.3d 447, 452 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(Arnold, C.J., dissenting) (“possession of a gun, in itself, is not a crime. [Indeed, though the right 
to bear arms is not absolute, it finds explicit protection in the Bill of Rights.]”); Cases v. United 
States, 131 F.2d 916, 921 (1st Cir. 1942) (federal law restricting gun possession by persons under 
indictment “undoubtedly curtails to some extent the right of individuals to keep and bear arms.” 
Miller test rejected because it would prevent federal government from restricting possession of 
machine guns by “private persons.”); United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp.2d 598 (N.D. Tex. 
1999) (dismissing criminal prosecution of defendant for violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8) because 
the provision violates the Second Amendment; case presents the most thorough exposition of the 
competing views of the Second Amendment ever presented in a federal court decision); Zappa v. 
Cruz, 30 F. Supp. 2d 123, 138 (D. P.R. 1998): 
These individual liberties, aside from abridging the governments’ ability to impose upon 
individual citizens—e.g., by protecting freedom of religion, prohibiting the quartering of 
troops and the taking [of] property for public use without compensation, and guaranteeing 
due process of law—enhance the citizenry’s ability to police the government—e.g., by 
protecting speech, press, the right to assemble, and the right to bear arms. 
See also United States v. Gambill, 912 F. Supp. 287, 290 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (“an activity, such as 
keeping and bearing arms, that arguably implicates the Bill of Rights.”); Gilbert Equipment Co. v. 
Higgins, 709 F. Supp. 1071, 1090 (S.D. Ala. 1989) (Second Amendment “guarantees to all 
Americans ‘the right to keep and bear arms’”, but the right is not absolute and it does not include 
right to import arms), aff’d 894 F.2d 412 (11th Cir. 1990) (mem.). 
 15. See Denning, Simple Cite, supra note 9. 
 16. United States v. Miller, 26 F. Supp. 1002, 1003 (W.D. Ark, 1939) (sustaining demurrer 
to prosecution, because “The court is of the opinion that this section is invalid in that it violates 
the Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States providing, ‘A well regulated 
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absconded, and thus only the government’s side was heard when the case was 
argued before the Supreme Court.17 
Unfortunately, Miller was written by Justice James McReynolds, arguably 
one of the worst Supreme Court Justices of the twentieth century.18 The 
opinion nowhere explicitly says that the Second Amendment does (or does not 
guarantee) an individual right. The key paragraph of the opinion is this: 
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a 
“shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length” at this time has 
some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well 
regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the 
right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial 
notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its 
use could contribute to the common defense. Aymette v. State, 2 Humphreys 
(Tenn.) 154, 158.19 
This paragraph can plausibly be read to support either the Standard Model 
or the State’s Rights theory. By the State’s Right theory, the possession of a 
gun by any individual has no constitutional protection; the Second Amendment 
only applies to persons actively on duty in official state militias. 
In contrast, the Standard Model reads the case as adopting the “civilized 
warfare” test of nineteenth century state Supreme Court cases: individuals have 
a right to own arms, but only the type of arms that are useful for militia 
service; for example, ownership of rifles is protected, but not ownership of 
Bowie knives (since Bowie knives were allegedly useful only for fights and 
brawls).20 The case cited by the Miller Court, Aymette v. State21, is plainly in 
the Standard Model, since it interprets the Tennessee Constitution’s right to 
arms to protect an individual right to own firearms, but only firearms suitable 
 
militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear 
arms, shall not be infringed.’”) 
 17. Since a federal statute had been found unconstitutional, the federal government was 
allowed to take the case directly to the Supreme Court, under the law of the time. 
 18. See L.A. Powe, Jr., Guns, Words, and Constitutional Interpretation, 38 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1311, 1331 (1997), supra note 10. 
 19. Miller, 307 U.S. at 177. 
 20. See, e.g., English v. State, 24 Tex. 394, 397 (1859); Cockrum v. State, 24 Tex. 394, 397 
(1859). A typical formulation is found in the West Virginia case State v. Workman, which 
construed the Second Amendment to protect an individual’s right to own: 
the weapons of warfare to be used by the militia, such as swords, guns, rifles, and 
muskets—arms to be used in defending the State and civil liberty—and not to pistols, 
bowie-knives, brass knuckles, billies, and such other weapons as are usually employed in 
brawls, street-fights, duels, and affrays, and are only habitually carried by bullies, 
blackguards, and desparadoes, to the terror of the community and the injury of the State. 
State v. Workman, 35 W. Va. 367, 372 (1891). 
 21. Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840). 
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for militia use; in dicta, Aymette states that the Second Amendment has the 
same meaning.22 
While scholars can contend for different meanings, it is true that, as a 
matter of pure linguistics, the Miller decision does not foreclose either the 
Standard Model or the State’s Rights theory. 
And what is one to make of the opinion’s penultimate paragraph, stating, 
“In the margin some of the more important opinions and comments by writers 
are cited.”23 In the attached footnote, the opinion cites two prior U.S. Supreme 
Court opinions and six state court opinions, all of which treat the Second 
Amendment or its state analogue as an individual right, even as the opinions 
uphold particular gun controls.24 The footnote likewise cites treatises by Justice 
Joseph Story and Thomas Cooley explicating the Second Amendment as an 
individual right.25 But the same Miller footnote also cites a Kansas Supreme 
 
 22. Id. at 158. 
 23. Miller, 307 U.S. at 182. 
 24. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886) (Second Amendment not violated by ban on 
armed parades; see infra) text at notes 310-20; Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897) 
(Second Amendment not violated by ban on carrying concealed weapons, see infra text at notes 
290-96); Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455 (Second Amendment does not apply to the states; state right to 
arms not violated by ban on brass knuckles); People v. Brown, 253 Mich. 537, 235 N.W. 245 
(1931) (Michigan state constitution right to arms applies to all citizens, not just militiamen; right 
is not violated by ban on carrying blackjacks); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840) 
(Tennessee state constitution right to arms and U.S. Second Amendment right belong to 
individual citizens, but right includes only the types of arms useful for militia service); State v. 
Duke, 42 Tex. 455 (1874) (Second Amendment does not directly apply to the states; Texas 
constitution protects “arms as are commonly kept, according to the customs of the people, and are 
appropriate for open and manly use in self-defense, as well as such as are proper for the defense 
of the State.”); State v. Workman, supra note 20. 
 25. “COOLEY’S CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, VOL. 1, p. 729”: 
Among the other defences to personal liberty should be mentioned the right of the people 
to keep and bear arms. A standing army is particularly obnoxious in any free government, 
and the jealousy of one has at times been demonstrated so strongly in England as almost 
to lead to the belief that a standing army recruited from among themselves was more 
dreaded as an instrument of oppression than a tyrannical king, or any foreign power. So 
impatient did the English people become of the very army which liberated them from the 
tyranny of James II, that they demanded its reduction, even before the liberation could be 
felt to be complete; and to this day, the British Parliament renders a standing army 
practically impossible by only passing a mutiny bill from session to session. The 
alternative to a standing army is “a well-regulated militia,” but this cannot exist unless the 
people are trained to bear arms. How far it is in the power of the legislature to regulate 
this right, we shall not undertake to say, as happily there has been little occasion to 
discuss that subject by the courts. 
In a later treatise, Cooley elaborated on how the right to arms ensures the existence of the militia: 
  The Right is General. — It may be supposed from the phraseology of this provision 
that the right to keep and bear arms was only guaranteed to the militia; but this would be 
an interpretation not warranted by the intent. The militia, as has been elsewhere explained, 
consists of those persons who, under the law, are liable to the performance of military 
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Court decision which is directly contrary; that case holds that the right to arms 
in Kansas belongs only to the state government, and in dicta makes the same 
claim about the Second Amendment.26 
The Miller footnote begins with the phrase “Concerning the militia—” but 
several of the cases cited have nothing to do with the militia. For example, 
Robertson v. Baldwin (discussed infra) simply offers dicta that laws which 
forbid the carrying of concealed weapons by individuals do not violate the 
Second Amendment.27 
If Miller were the only source of information about the Second 
Amendment, the individual right vs. government right argument might be 
impossible to resolve conclusively. Fortunately, the Supreme Court has 
addressed the Second Amendment in thirty-four other cases—although most of 
these cases appear to have escaped the attention of commentators on both sides 
 
duty, and are officered and enrolled for service when called upon. But the law may make 
provision for the enrolment of all who are fit to perform military duty, or of a small 
number only, or it may wholly omit to make any provision at all; and if the right were 
limited to those enrolled, the purpose of this guaranty might be defeated altogether by the 
action or neglect to act of the government it was meant to hold in check. The meaning of 
the provision undoubtedly is, that the people, from whom the militia must be taken, shall 
have the right to keep and bear arms, and they need no permission or regulation of law for 
the purpose. But this enables the government to have a well-regulated militia; for to bear 
arms implies something more than the mere keeping; it implies the learning to handle and 
use them in a way that makes those who keep them ready for their efficient use; in other 
words, it implies the right to meet for voluntary discipline in arms, observing in doing so 
the laws of public order. 
THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 281-82 (Boston, Little, Brown 2d ed. 1891). 
The other scholar cited in the Miller footnote is “Story on The Constitution, 5th Ed., Vol. 2, p. 
646”: 
  The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been considered as the 
palladium of the liberties of a republic; since it offers a strong moral check against the 
usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers; and will generally, even if these are successful in 
the first instance, enable the people to resist and triumph over them. 
  And yet, though this truth would seem so clear, and the importance of a well 
regulated militia would seem so undeniable, it cannot be disguised that, among the 
American people, there is a growing indifference to any system of militia discipline, and a 
strong disposition, from a sense of its burdens, to be rid of all regulations. How it is 
practicable to keep the people duly armed, without some organization, it is difficult to see. 
There is certainly no small danger that indifference may lead to disgust, and disgust to 
contempt; and thus gradually undermine all the protection intended by this clause of our 
national bill of rights. 
For more on Justice Story, see text at notes 351 to 355, infra. 
 26. Salina v. Blaksley, 72 Kan. 230, 83 P. 619 (1905) (right to arms in Kansas Bill of Rights 
is only an affirmance of the state government’s supremacy over the militia; the Second 
Amendment means the same). Another cited case, Jeffers v. Fair, 33 Ga. 347 (1862), is a 
Confederate draft case. 
 27. Infra text at note 280. 
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of the issue. This article ends the bipartisan scholarly neglect of the Supreme 
Court’s writings on the Second Amendment.28 
The neglected cases are not, of course, directly about the Second 
Amendment. Rather, they are about other issues, and the Second Amendment 
appears as part of an argument intended to make a point about something 
else.29  Nevertheless, all the dicta may be revealing. If Henigan and Bogus are 
correct, then the dicta should treat the Second Amendment as a right which 
belongs to state governments, not to American citizens. And if the Standard 
Model is correct, then the Amendment should be treated as an individual right. 
Moreover, the line between dicta and ratio decendi is rarely firm,30 and one 
day’s dicta may become another day’s holding.31 
C.S. Lewis observed that proofs (or disproofs) of Christianity found in 
apologetic documents are sometimes less convincing than offhand remarks 
made in anthropology textbooks, or in other sources where Christianity is only 
treated incidentally. The Supreme Court cases in which the Supreme Court 
mentions the Second Amendment only in passing are similarly illuminating.32 
 
 28. One reason for the neglect of the cases may be mistaken claims that the cases do not 
exist.  “Issue Brief”, Handgun Control, Inc. website claims, “Since Miller, the Supreme Court has 
addressed the Second Amendment in two cases.” Actually, there have been 19 such cases after 
Miller.  The Second Amendment, http://www.handguncontrol.org/myth.htm. 
 29. That the Court has discussed the Second Amendment relatively rarely, compared to the 
First or Fourth Amendments, does not necessarily mean that the Second Amendment is 
unimportant. Until recent decades, there was almost no federal gun control to speak of (except for 
the 1934 National Firearms Act, which was upheld in Miller). That Congress hardly ever passed 
legislation which arguably infringed the Second Amendment (and which would generate a 
challenge invoking judicial review) is itself proof of the Second Amendment’s influence. “A 
principle of law is not unimportant because we never hear of it; indeed we may say that the most 
efficient rules are those of which we hear least, they are so efficient that they are not broken.” 
FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 481-82 (11th ed.) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Pr., 1948). 
  Similarly, the Third Amendment has received little attention from the Court, but that is 
not because the Third Amendment can be violated with impunity; to the contrary, the Third 
Amendment has needed little discussion because it is has been universally respected, and, except 
in one case, never violated. Engblom v. Carey, 677 F. 2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982), on remand, 572 F. 
Supp. 44 (S.D. N.Y. 1983), aff’d. per curiam, 724 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 30. Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2050 (1994) (“All the 
words used by a court to explain its result contribute to its justification, and parsing the opinion 
into holding and dictum attributes a degree to precision to the enterprise of judicial decision-
making that it lacks in actual practice.”) 
 31. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 75 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“These 
decisions do not justify today’s decision. They merely prove how a hint becomes a suggestion, is 
loosely turned into dictum, and finally elevated to a decision.”). 
 32. The technique of using broader context to understand isolated statements is not unique to 
analysis of Supreme Court cases. Biblical scholars, for example, often refer to many different 
parts of the Bible in order to explain a passage which is confusing or ambiguous in isolation. 
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Before commencing with case-by-case analysis, let me present a chart 
which summarizes the various cases. The columns in chart are self-
explanatory, but I will explain two of them anyway. A “yes” answer in the 
“Supportive of individual right in 2d Amendment?” column means only that 
the particular case provides support for the individual rights theory; although 
the part of the case addressing the Second Amendment might make sense only 
if the Second Amendment is considered an individual right, the case will not 
directly state that proposition.  If the case is labeled “ambiguous,” then the 
language of the case is consistent with both the Standard Model and with 
State’s Rights. 
The next column asks, “Main clause of 2d A. quoted without introductory 
clause?” The National Rifle Association and similar groups are frequently 
criticized for quoting the main clause of the Second Amendment (“the right of 
the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed”) without quoting the 
introductory clause (“A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security 
of a free State”).33 The critics argue that the introductory, militia, clause 
controls the meaning of the main, right to arms, clause. They contend that to 
omit the introductory clause is to distort completely the Second Amendment’s 
meaning. (And if, as these critics argue, the Second Amendment grants a right 
to state governments rather than to individuals, then omission of the 
introductory clause is indeed quite misleading.) On the other hand, if the 
Second Amendment is about a right of people (the main clause), and the 
introductory clause is useful only to resolve gray areas (such as what kind of 
arms people can own), then it is legitimate sometimes to quote the main clause 
only. As the chart shows, the Supreme Court has quoted the main clause alone 
much more often than the Supreme Court has quoted both clauses together. 
This Supreme Court quoting pattern is consistent with the theory Eugene 
Volokh’s article, The Commonplace Second Amendment, which argues that the 
Second Amendment follows a common pattern of constitutional drafting from 
the Early Republic: there is a “purpose clause,” followed by a main clause.34 
 
Because this article is only about the Second Amendment, it does not analyze Supreme Court 
cases involving gun control or the militia in which the Second Amendment was not mentioned 
 33. Handgun Control, Inc., The Second Amandment Myth & Meaning <http://www.handgun 
control.org/legalactiona/C2/C2amdbro.htm>: 
How many times have you heard an opponent of gun control cite the “right to keep and 
bear arms” without mentioning the introductory phrase “A well regulated Militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free state. . .”? In fact, some years ago, when the NRA 
placed the words of the Second Amendment near the front door of its national 
headquarters in Washington, D.C., it omitted that phrase entirely! 
  The NRA’s convenient editing is not surprising; the omitted phrase is the key to 
understanding that the Second Amendment guarantees only a limited right that is not 
violated by laws affecting the private ownership of firearms. 
 34. See Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793 
(1998). 
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For example, Rhode Island’s freedom of the press provision declared: “The 
liberty of the press being essential to the security of freedom in a state, any 
person may publish sentiments on any subject, being responsible for the abuse 
of that liberty.”35 This provision requires judges to protect every person’s right 
to “publish sentiments on any subject”—even when the sentiments are not 
“essential to the security of freedom in a state,” or when they are detrimental to 
freedom or security. 
Similarly, the New Hampshire Constitution declared: “Economy being a 
most essential virtue in all states, especially in a young one; no pension shall 
be granted, but in consideration of actual services, and such pensions ought to 
be granted with great caution, by the legislature, and never for more than one 
year at a time.”36 This provision makes all pensions of longer than one year at 
a time void—even if the state is no longer “a young one” and no longer in need 
of economy. Volokh supplies dozens of similar examples from state 
constitutions.37 
Of the twenty-nine U.S. Supreme Court opinions (including Miller) which 
have quoted the Second Amendment, twenty-three contain only a partial quote. 
This quoting pattern suggests that, generally speaking, Supreme Court justices 
have not considered the “purpose clause” at the beginning of the Second 
Amendment to be essential to the meaning of the main clause. 
 
Case name 
and year. 
Main issue in 
case 
Opinion by Type of 
opinion 
Supportive of 
individual right in 
2d Amendment? 
Main clause of 
2d A. quoted 
without 
introductory 
clause? 
Page of 
this 
article 
Spencer v. 
Kemna. 1998 
Article III case 
or controversy. 
Stevens Dissent 
from 
denial of 
cert. 
Yes, but could 
possibly be read as 
referring to rights 
under state 
constitutions 
No quote. 16 
Muscarello v. 
U.S. 1998 
Fed stat. interp. Ginsburg Dissent Yes. Partial quote. 20 
Printz v. U.S. 
1997 
Federalism Thomas Concur Says that Miller did 
not decide the 
issue. Thomas 
appears to support 
individual right. 
Full quote. 23 
Albright v. 
Oliver. 1994 
14th A. and § 
1983 
Stevens Dissent Yes. Partial quote. 27 
Planned 
Parenthood v. 
Casey. 1992. 
14th A. O’Connor Majority  Yes. Partial quote. 29 
 
 35. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 20 (1842). 
 36. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. XXXVI (1784). 
 37. Volokh, supra note 35, at 810. 
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U.S. v. 
Verdugo-
Urquidez. 
1990. 
 4th A. applied 
to foreign 
national. 
Rehnquist Majority  Yes. Partial quote. 30 
Lewis v. U.S. 
1980. 
Statutory 
interp. of Gun 
Control Act of 
1968  
Blackmun Majority Ambiguous, but 
probably not. If an 
individual right, 
less fundamental 
than some others. 
Full quote. 33 
Moore v. 
East 
Cleveland. 
1976. 
14th A. Powell Plurality Yes. (But contrary 
opinion expressed 
by Justice Powell 
after retirement.) 
Partial quote. 37 
“ “ “ “ White Dissent. Yes. Partial quote. 38 
Adams v. 
Williams. 
1972 
4th A.  Douglas Dissent No. Full quote. 41 
Roe v. Wade. 
1973 
14th A.  Stewart Concur Yes. Partial quote. 42 
Laird v. 
Tatum. 1972. 
Justiciability Douglas Dissent Ambiguous. Partial quote. 44 
Burton v. 
Sills. 1969. 
Challenge to 
state gun 
licensing law 
Per curiam Summary 
affirm. 
Ambiguous. No quote. 45 
Duncan v. 
Louisiana. 
1968. 
Incorporation 
of 6th 
Amendment. 
Black Concur Yes. Partial quote. 47 
Malloy v. 
Hogan. 1964. 
Incorporation 
of 5th Amend.  
Brennan Majority Yes.  No quote. 48 
Konigsberg 
v. State Bar. 
1961. 
1st Amendment Harlan Majority Yes. Partial quote. 49 
Poe v. 
Ullman. 
1961. 
14th 
Amendment 
Harlan Dissent Yes Partial quote. 50 
“ “ “ “ Douglas Dissent Yes, but implicitly 
abandoned in 
Adams. 
No quote. 52 
Knapp v. 
Schweitzer. 
1958. 
Incorp. of 5th 
Amendment 
Frankfurter Majority Yes Partial quote. 52 
Johnson v. 
Eisentrager. 
1950. 
5th A. applied 
to trial of 
enemy soldier. 
Jackson Majority Yes Partial quote. 53 
Adamson v. 
Calif. 1947. 
Incorp. of 5th 
Amendment 
Black Dissent Yes Partial quote. 57 
Hamilton v. 
Regents. 
1935. 
Conscientious 
objector. 
Butler Majority No, but not 
necessarily 
inconsistent with an 
individual right. 
No quote. 60 
U.S. v. 
Schwimmer. 
1929. 
Immigration 
laws 
Butler Majority  Ambiguous Full quote. 63 
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Stearns v. 
Wood. 1915. 
Article III case 
or controversy. 
McReynolds Majority Ambiguous, since 
court refuses to 
hear any of 
plaintiff’s claims 
No quote. 64 
Twining v. 
N.J. 1908. 
Incorp. of 5th A 
self-incrim. 
Moody Majority Yes. Partial quote 65 
Trono v. U.S. 
1905 
5th A. in the 
Philippines. 
Peckham Majority Yes. Partial quote. 66 
Kepner v. 
U.S. 1904. 
“ “ Day Majority Yes. Same as 
Trono. 
Partial quote. 66 
Maxwell v. 
Dow. 1899. 
Incorp. of 5th 
A. jury trial 
Peckham Majority Yes. Partial quote. 66 
Robertson v. 
Baldwin. 
1897. 
13th Amend. Brown Majority Yes. Partial quote. 68 
Brown v. 
Walker. 
1896. 
5th Amend. Field. Dissent Yes. Partial quote. 68 
Miller v. 
Texas. 1894. 
14th 
Amendment 
Brown Majority Yes. Partial quote. 70 
Logan v. U.S. 
1892. 
Cong. Power 
from 14th A. 
Gray Majority Yes. Partial quote. 73 
Presser v. 
Illinois. 1886. 
2d A. Woods Majority Yes. Full quote. 75 
U.S. v. 
Cruikshank 
1876. 
Cong. Power 
under 14th 
Amendment 
Waite Majority Yes. A basic 
human right which 
pre-exists the 
Constitution, and is 
guaranteed by the 
Constitution, 
exactly like the 1st 
A. right to 
assembly. 
No quote. 78 
Scott v. 
Sandford. 
1857. 
Citizenship; 
Cong. powers 
over territories. 
Taney Majority Yes. Partial quote. 80 
Houston v. 
Moore. 1820. 
State powers 
over militia. 
Story Dissent Yes, but also 
supportive of a 
state’s right. (A 
later treatise written 
by Story is for 
individual right 
only.) 
No quote. 83 
 
I. THE REHNQUIST COURT 
Since William Rehnquist was appointed Chief Justice in 1986, six different 
opinions have addressed the Second Amendment. The authors of the opinions 
include the small left wing of the Court (Justices Stevens and Ginsburg), the 
Court’s right wing (Justices Thomas and Rehnquist), and the Court’s centrist 
Justice O’Connor. Every one of the opinions treats the Second Amendment as 
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an individual right. Except for Justice Breyer, every sitting Supreme Court 
Justice has joined in at least one of these opinions—although this joinder does 
not prove that the joiner necessarily agreed with what the opinion said about 
the Second Amendment. Still, five of the current Justices have written an 
opinion in which the Second Amendment is considered an individual right, and 
three more Justices have joined such an opinion. 
A. Spencer v. Kemna 
After serving some time in state prison, Spencer was released on parole.38 
While free, he was accused but not convicted of rape, and his parole was 
revoked.39 He argued that his parole revocation was unconstitutional.40 But 
before his constitutional claim could be judicially resolved, his sentence ended, 
and he was released.41 The majority of the Supreme Court held that since 
Spencer was out of prison, his claim was moot, and he had no right to pursue 
his constitutional lawsuit. 
Justice Stevens, in dissent, argued that being found to have perpetrated a 
crime (such as the rape finding implicit in the revocation of Spencer’s parole) 
has consequences besides prison: 
An official determination that a person has committed a crime may cause two 
different kinds of injury. It may result in tangible harms such as imprisonment, 
loss of the right to vote or to bear arms, and the risk of greater punishment if 
another crime is committed. It may also severely injure the person’s reputation 
and good name.42 
A person can only lose a right upon conviction of a crime if a person had the 
right before conviction. Hence, if an individual can lose his right “to bear 
arms,” he must possess such a right. Justice Stevens did not specifically 
mention the Second Amendment, so it is possible that his reference to the right 
to bear arms was to a right created by state constitutions, rather than the federal 
one. (Forty-four states guarantee a right to arms in their state constitution.43) 
 
 38. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 4 (1998). 
 39. Id. at 5. 
 40. Id. at 10. 
 41. Id. at 36. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 42. Id. (emphasis added). Numerous state and federal statutes outlaw firearms possession by 
persons convicted of felonies or certain misdemeanors. Generally speaking, the federal 
prohibitions are broader than their state counterparts. 
 43. Alabama: “That every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and the 
state.” ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 26. 
  Alaska: “A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right 
of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.” ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 19. 
  Arizona: “The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of himself or the 
State shall not be impaired, but nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing indi-
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viduals or corporations to organize, maintain, or employ an armed body of men.” ARIZ. CONST. 
art. II, § 26. 
  Arkansas: “The citizens of this State shall have the right to keep and bear arms for their 
common defense.” ARK. CONST. art. II, § 5. 
  Colorado: “The right of no person to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person 
and property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned, shall be called in 
question; but nothing herein contained shall be construed to justify the practice of carrying 
concealed weapons.” COLO. CONST. art. II, § 13. 
  Connecticut: “Every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and the state.” 
CONN. CONST. art. I, § 15. 
  Florida: “The right of the people to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves and of 
the lawful authority of the state shall not be infringed, except that the manner of bearing arms 
may be regulated by law.” FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
  Georgia: “The right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed, but the 
General Assembly shall have the power to prescribe the manner in which arms may be borne.” 
GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 5. 
  Hawaii: “A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right 
of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.” HAWAII CONST. art. 1, § 15. 
  Idaho: “The people have the right to keep and bear arms, which right shall not be 
abridged; but this provision shall not prevent the passage of laws to govern the carrying of 
weapons concealed on the person nor prevent passage of legislation providing minimum 
sentences for crimes committed while in possession of a firearm, nor prevent the passage of 
legislation providing penalties for the possession of firearms by a convicted felon, nor prevent the 
passage of any legislation punishing the use of a firearm. No law shall impose licensure, reg-
istration or special taxation on the ownership or possession of firearms or ammunition. Nor shall 
any law permit the confiscation of firearms, except those actually used in the commission of a 
felony.” IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 11. 
  Illinois: “Subject only to the police power, the right of the individual citizen to keep and 
bear arms shall not be infringed.” ILL. CONST. art. I, § 22. 
Indiana: “The people shall have a right to bear arms, for the defense of themselves and the State.” 
IND. CONST. art. I, § 32. 
  Kansas: “The people have the right to bear arms for their defense and security; but 
standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and shall not be tolerated, and the 
military shall be in strict subordination to the civil power.” KAN. CONST., Bill of Rights, § 4. 
  Kentucky: “All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inherent and 
inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned: . . . Seventh: The right to bear arms in defense 
of themselves and of the State, subject to the power of the General Assembly to enact laws to 
prevent persons from carrying concealed weapons.” KY. CONST. § I, para. 7. 
  Louisiana: “The right of each citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be abridged, but 
this provision shall not prevent the passage of laws to prohibit the carrying of weapons concealed 
on the person.” LA. CONST. art. 1, § 11. 
  Maine: “Every citizen has a right to keep and bear arms for the common defense; and 
this right shall never be questioned.” ME. CONST. art. I, § 16. 
  Massachusetts: “The people have a right to keep and bear arms for the common defense. 
And as, in times of peace, armies are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be maintained 
without the consent of the legislature; and the military power shall always be held in an exact 
subordination to the civil authority, and be governed by it.” MASS. CONST. Pt. I, art. xvii. 
  Michigan: “Every person has a right to keep or bear arms for the defense of himself and 
the State.” MICH. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
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  Mississippi: “The right of every citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, 
person, or property, or in aid of the civil power where thereto legally summoned, shall not be 
called in question, but the legislature may regulate or forbid carrying concealed weapons.” MISS. 
CONST. art. III, § 12. 
  Missouri: “That the right of every citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, 
person and property, or when lawfully summoned in aid of the civil power, shall not be 
questioned; but this shall not justify the wearing of concealed Weapons.” MO. CONST. art. 1, § 23. 
  Montana: “The right of any person to keep or bear arms in defense of his own home, 
person, and property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned, shall not be 
called in question, but nothing herein contained shall be held to permit the carrying of concealed 
weapons.” MONT. CONST. art. II, § 12. 
  Nebraska: “All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain inherent and 
inalienable rights; among these are life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the right to keep and 
bear arms for security or defense of self, family, home, and others, and for lawful common 
defense, hunting, recreational use, and all other lawful purposes, and such rights shall not be 
denied or infringed by the state or any subdivision thereof. To secure these rights, and the 
protection of property, governments are instituted among people, deriving their just powers from 
the consent of the governed.” NEB. CONST. Art. I, § 1. 
  Nevada: “Every citizen has the right to keep and bear arms for security and defense, for 
lawful hunting and recreational use and for other lawful purposes.” NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 11(1). 
  New Hampshire: “All persons have the right to keep and bear arms in defense of 
themselves, their families, their property, and the State.” N.H. CONST. Pt. I, art. 2a. 
  New Mexico: “No law shall abridge the right of the citizen to keep and bear arms for 
security and defense, for lawful hunting and recreational use and for other lawful purposes, but 
nothing herein shall be held to permit the carrying of concealed weapons.” N.M. CONST. art. II, § 
6. 
  North Carolina: “A well regulated militia being necessary to be the security of a free 
State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; and, as standing armies 
in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they shall not be maintained, and the military shall be 
kept under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power. Nothing herein shall justify 
the practice of carrying concealed weapons, or prevent the General Assembly from enacting penal 
statutes against that practice.” N.C. CONST. art. I, § 30. 
  North Dakota: “All individuals are by nature equally free and independent and have 
certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; 
acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation; pursuing and obtaining safety and 
happiness; and to keep and bear arms for the defense of their person, family, property, and the 
state, and for lawful hunting, recreational, and other lawful purposes, which shall not be 
infringed.” N.D. CONST. Art. I, § 1. 
  Ohio: “The people have the right to bear arms for their defense and security; but standing 
armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and shall not be kept up; and the military shall 
be in strict subordination to the civil power.” OHIO CONST. art. I, § 4. 
  Oklahoma: “The right of a citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person, 
or property, or in aid of the civil power, when thereunto legally summoned, shall never be 
prohibited; but nothing herein contained shall prevent the Legislature from regulating the carrying 
of weapons.” OKLA. CONST. art. 11, § 26. 
  Oregon: “The people shall have the right to bear arms for the defence of themselves, and 
the State, but the Military shall be kept in strict subordination to the civil power.” OR. CONST. art. 
I, § 27. 
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When particular gun control laws are before the Supreme Court for either 
statutory or constitutional interpretation, Justice Stevens is a reliable vote to 
uphold the law in question, often with language detailing the harm of gun 
 
  Pennsylvania: “The right of the citizens to bear arms in defence of themselves and the 
State shall not be questioned.” PA. CONST. art. I, § 21. 
  Rhode Island: “The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.” R.I. 
CONST. art. 1, § 22. 
  South Carolina: “A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, 
the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. As, in times of peace, armies 
are dangerous to liberty, they shall not be maintained without the consent of the General 
Assembly. The military power of the State shall always be held in subordination to the civil 
authority and be governed by it. No soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in any house 
without the consent of the owner nor in time of war but in the manner prescribed by law.” S.C. 
CONST. art. I, § 20. 
  South Dakota: “The right of the citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the 
state shall not be denied.” S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 24. 
  Tennessee: “That the citizens of this State have a right to keep and bear arms for their 
common defense; but the Legislature shall have power, by law, to regulate the wearing of arms 
with a view to prevent crime.” TENN. CONST. art. I, § 26. 
  Texas: “Every citizen shall have the right to keep and bear arms in the lawful defence of 
himself or the State; but the Legislature shall have power, by law, to regulate the wearing of arms, 
with a view to prevent crime.” TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 23. 
  Utah: “The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and defense 
of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be 
infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms.” 
UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 6. 
  Vermont: “That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and 
the State-and as standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be 
kept up; and that the military should be kept under strict subordination to and governed by the 
civil power.” VT. CONST. Ch. I, art. 16. 
  Virginia: “That a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to 
arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defense of a free state, therefore, the right of the people to 
keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; that standing armies, in time of peace, should be 
avoided as dangerous to liberty; and that in all cases the military should be under strict 
subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.” VA. CONST. art. I, § 13. 
  Washington: “The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of himself, or 
the state, shall not be impaired, but nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing 
individuals or corporations to organize, maintain, or employ an armed body of Men.” WASH. 
CONST. art. I, § 24. 
  West Virginia: “A person has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of self, 
family, home and state, and for lawful hunting and recreational use.” W. VA. Art. III, § 22. 
  Wisconsin: “The people have the right to keep and bear arms for security, defense, 
hunting, recreation or any other lawful purpose.” WIS. CONST. Art. I, § 25. 
  Wyoming: “The right of citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and of the state 
shall not be denied.” WYO. CONST. art. I, § 24. 
  In addition, New York State’s Civil Right Law has a statutory provision which is a word 
for word copy of the Second Amendment. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS § 4. 
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violence.44 It is notable, then, that Justice Stevens recognizes a right to bear 
arms as an important constitutional right, whose deprivation should not be 
shielded from judicial review.45 
B. Muscarello v. United States 
Federal law provides a five year mandatory sentence for anyone who 
“carries a firearm” during a drug trafficking crime.46 Does the sentence 
enhancement apply when the gun is merely contained in an automobile in 
which a person commits a drug trafficking crime—such as when the gun is in 
the trunk? The Supreme Court majority said “yes.”47 In dissent, Justice 
Ginsburg—joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia48, and Souter—argued that 
“carries a firearm” means to carry it so that it is ready to use.49 In support for 
her view, Justice Ginsburg pointed to the Second Amendment “keep and bear 
arms” as an example of the ordinary meaning of carrying a firearm: 
It is uncontested that §924(c)(1) applies when the defendant bears a firearm, 
i.e. , carries the weapon on or about his person “for the purpose of being armed 
and ready for offensive or defensive action in case of a conflict.” Black’s Law 
Dictionary 214 (6th ed. 1990) (defining the phrase “carry arms or weapons”); 
see ante, at 5. The Court holds that, in addition, “carries a firearm,” in the 
context of §924(c)(1), means personally transporting, possessing, or keeping a 
firearm in a vehicle, anyplace in a vehicle. 
Without doubt, “carries” is a word of many meanings, definable to mean or 
include carting about in a vehicle. But that encompassing definition is not a 
 
 44. See United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505,526 (1992); Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. Lopez, 512 U.S. 
1286 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 45. Contrast Justice Stevens’ view with that of Justice Blackmun in the Lewis case, infra 
notes 94-113; the Blackmun opinion suggests that the right to arms is so unimportant that a 
person may be imprisoned for the exercise of that right after conviction of a crime—even if the 
conviction is concededly unconstitutional. 
 46. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). 
 47. United States v. Muscarello, 524 U.S. 125 (1998). 
 48. Justice Scalia has not written an opinion on the Second Amendment, but he has 
expressed his views out of court: 
So also, we value the right to bear arms less than did the Founders (who thought the right 
to self-defense to be absolutely fundamental), and there will be few tears shed if and when 
the Second Amendment is held to guarantee nothing more than the state National Guard. 
But this just shows the Founders were right when they feared that some (in their view 
misguided) future generation might wish to abandon liberties that they considered 
essential, and so sought to protect those liberties in a Bill of Rights. We may. . .like 
elimination of the right to bear arms; but let us not pretend that these are not reductions of 
rights. 
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 43 (1997). 
 49. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 139-50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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ubiquitously necessary one. Nor, in my judgment, is it a proper construction of 
“carries” as the term appears in §924(c)(1). In line with Bailey and the 
principle of lenity the Court has long followed, I would confine “carries a 
firearm,” for §924(c)(1) purposes, to the undoubted meaning of that expression 
in the relevant context. I would read the words to indicate not merely keeping 
arms on one’s premises or in one’s vehicle, but bearing them in such manner 
as to be ready for use as a weapon. 
. . . 
Unlike the Court, I do not think dictionaries, surveys of press reports, or the 
Bible tell us, dispositively, what “carries” means embedded in §924(c)(1). On 
definitions, “carry” in legal formulations could mean, inter alia, transport, 
possess, have in stock, prolong (carry over), be infectious, or wear or bear on 
one’s person. At issue here is not “carries” at large but “carries a firearm.” The 
Court’s computer search of newspapers is revealing in this light. Carrying guns 
in a car showed up as the meaning “perhaps more than one third” of the time. 
Ante, at 4. One is left to wonder what meaning showed up some two thirds of 
the time. Surely a most familiar meaning is, as the Constitution’s Second 
Amendment (“keep and bear Arms”) (emphasis added) and Black’s Law 
Dictionary, at 214, indicate: “wear, bear, or carry . . . upon the person or in the 
clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose . . . of being armed and ready for 
offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with another person.”50 
Perhaps no word in the Second Amendment is as hotly contested as the 
word “bear.” The Standard Model scholars, following the usage of Webster’s 
Dictionary,51 the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution,52 and the 1787 call for a Bill 
of Rights from the dissenters at the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention read 
the word “bear” as including ordinary types of carrying.53 Thus, a person 
carrying a gun for personal protection could be said to be bearing arms. If 
individuals can “bear arms,” then the right to “bear arms” must belong to 
individuals. 
In contrast, Garry Wills (who argues that the Second Amendment has “no 
real meaning”54) argues that “bear” has an exclusively military context.55 It is 
impossible, he writes, to “bear arms” unless once is engaged in active militia 
 
 50. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 51. First: “[t]o support; to sustain; as, to bear a weight or burden”  Second: “To carry; to 
convey; to support and remove from place to place”. 3:”[t]o wear; to bear as a mark of authority 
or distinction; as, to bear a sword, a badge, a name; to bear arms in a coat.” NOAH WEBSTER, AN 
AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828) (emphasis in originagl). 
 52. Volokh, supra note 35, at 810. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Garry Wills, Why We Have No Right to Bear Arms, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 21, 1995, at 
62. 
 55. Id. 
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service. Hence, the right to “bear arms” does not refer to a right of individuals 
to carry guns.56 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion plainly takes the former approach. She believes 
that “to bear arms” is to wear arms in an ordinary way.57 
 
 56. Id. at 64. 
 57. During the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s nomination 
to the Supreme Court, Senator Dianne Feinstein (a strong supporter of gun prohibition) asked 
Mrs. Ginsburg about the Second Amendment. Mrs. Ginsburg politely refused to say anything, 
except that the Amendment had not been incorporated. 
Sen. Feinstein: 
Let me begin with the Second Amendment. I first became concerned about what does the 
Second Amendment mean with respect to guns in 1962 [sic] when President Kennedy was 
assassinated. . . 
Judge Ginsburg: 
Senator Feinstein, I can say on the Second Amendment only what I said earlier, the one 
thing that the court has held, that it is not incorporated in the Bill of Rights [sic, 14th 
Amendment], it does not apply to the states. The last time the Supreme Court spoke to this 
question is in 1939. You summarized what that was and you also summarized the state of 
law in the lower courts. But this is a question that may well be before again, and all I can 
do is to acknowledge what I understand to be the current case law, that this is not 
incorporated in—that this is not one of the provisions binding on the states. The last time 
the Supreme Court spoke to it is in 1939, and because of where I sit, it would be 
inappropriate for me to say anything more than that. I would have to consider, as I’ve said 
many times today, the specific case, the briefs and the arguments that would be made, and 
it would be injudicious for me to say anything more with respect to the Second 
Amendment. 
. . . . 
Sen. Feinstein: 
[C]ould you talk at all about the methodology you might apply, what factors you might 
look at in discussing Second Amendment cases should Congress, say, pass a ban on 
assault weapons? 
Judge Ginsburg: 
I wish I could, Senator, but all I can tell you is that this is an amendment that has not been 
looked at the by the Supreme Court since 1939, and it—apart from the specific context, I 
can’t—I really can’t expound on it. It’s an area of law in which my court has had no 
business and one I had no acquaintance as a law teacher. So really feel that I’m not 
equipped beyond what I already told you, that it isn’t an incorporated amendment. The 
Supreme Court has not dealt with it since 1939. And I would proceed with the care I 
would give to any serious constitutional question. 
At Justice Breyer’s confirmation hearing, Senator Feinstein raised similar issues. He answered: 
As you recognize, Senator, the Second Amendment does—is in the Constitution. It 
provides a protection. As you also have recognized, the Supreme Court law on the subject 
is very, very, very few cases. This really hasn’t been gone into in any depth by the 
Supreme Court at all. Like you, I’ve never heard anyone even argue that there’s some 
kind of constitutional right to have guns in a school. And I know that every day—not 
every day; I don’t want to exaggerate—but every week or every month for the last 14 
years I’ve sat on case after case in which Congress has legislated rules, regulations, 
restrictions of all kinds on weapons. 
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C. Printz v. United States 
In Printz v. United States, the Supreme Court voted 5 to 4 to declare part of 
the Brady Act unconstitutional, because the Act ordered state and local law 
enforcement officials to perform a federal background check on handgun 
buyers.58 While the Printz decision was not a Second Amendment case, Printz 
did result in some Second Amendment language from Justice Clarence 
Thomas’s concurring opinion. 
Justice Thomas joined in Justice Scalia’s five-person majority opinion, but 
he also wrote a separate concurring opinion—an opinion which shows that all 
 
That is to say there are many, many circumstances in which carrying weapons of all kinds 
is punishable by very, very, very severe penalties. And Congress often—I mean by 
overwhelming majorities—has passed legislation imposing very severe additional 
penalties on people who commit all kinds of crimes with guns, even various people just 
possessing guns under certain circumstances. 
And in all those 14 years, I’ve never heard anyone seriously argue that any of those was 
unconstitutional in a serious way. I shouldn’t say never, because I don’t remember every 
case in 14 years. 
So, obviously, it’s fairly well conceded across the whole range of society, whatever their 
views about gun control legislatively and so forth that there’s a very, very large area for 
government to act. At the same time, as you concede and others, there’s some kind of 
protection given in the Second Amendment. 
Now that’s, it seems to me, where I have to stop, and the reason that I have to stop is 
we’re in a void in terms of what the Supreme Court has said. There is legislation likely to 
pass or has recently passed that will be challenged, and therefore I, if I am on that Court, 
have to listen with an open mind to the arguments that are made in the particular context. 
Sen. Feinstein: 
Well, would you hold that the 1939 decision [Miller] is good law? 
Justice Breyer: 
I’ve not heard it argued that it’s not, but I haven’t reviewed the case and I don’t know the 
argument that would really come up. I know that it’s been fairly limited, what the 
Supreme Court has said. And I know that it’s been fairly narrow. I also know that other 
people make an argument for a somewhat more expanded view. But nobody that I’ve 
heard makes the argument going into these areas where there is quite a lot of regulation 
already. I shouldn’t really underline no one, because you can find, you know, people who 
make different arguments. But it seems there’s a pretty broad consensus there. 
Sen. Feinstein: 
Would you attach any significance to the framers of the Second Amendment, where it 
puts certain things in capital letters? 
Justice Breyer: 
I’m sure when you interpret this you do go back from the text to the history and try to get 
an idea of what they had in mind. And if there is a capital letter there, you ask why is 
there this capital letter there, somebody had an idea, and you read and try to figure out 
what the importance of that was viewed at the time and if that’s changed over time. 
Sen. Judiciary Comm., Confirmation Hearing for Stephen Breyer, July 13, 1994, Federal News 
Service Lexis library. 
 58. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) 
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the Second Amendment scholarship in the legal journals is starting to be 
noticed by the Court. 
The Thomas concurrence began by saying that, even if the Brady Act did 
not intrude on state sovereignty, it would still be unconstitutional.59 The law 
was enacted under the congressional power “to regulate commerce. . .among 
the several states.”60 But the Brady Act applies to commerce that is purely 
intrastate—the sale of handgun by a gun store to a customer in the same 
state.61 Justice Thomas suggested that although the interstate commerce clause 
has, in recent decades, been interpreted to extend to purely intrastate 
transactions, that interpretation is wrong.62 
Even if the Brady Act were within the Congressional power over interstate 
commerce, Justice Thomas continued, the Act might violate the Second 
Amendment: 
. . . .Even if we construe Congress’ authority to regulate interstate commerce to 
encompass those intrastate transactions that “substantially affect” interstate 
commerce, I question whether Congress can regulate the particular transactions 
at issue here. The Constitution, in addition to delegating certain enumerated 
powers to Congress, places whole areas outside the reach of Congress’ 
regulatory authority. The First Amendment, for example, is fittingly celebrated 
for preventing Congress from “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion or 
“abridging the freedom of speech.” The Second Amendment similarly appears 
to contain an express limitation on the government’s authority. That 
Amendment provides: “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not 
be infringed.” This Court has not had recent occasion to consider the nature of 
the substantive right safeguarded by the Second Amendment. [n.1] If, however, 
the Second Amendment is read to confer63 a personal right to “keep and bear 
 
 59. Id. at 937 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 60. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 used the interstate commerce power to regulate parties to 
commercial transactions, such as hotel or restaurant guests and owners.  But the Brady Act 
attempted to expand the interstate commerce power even further, by forcing third parties to 
become involved in the commercial transaction. The Brady Act commandeered local sheriffs and 
police to perform background checks on a commercial act—the retail sale of a handgun. It was as 
if the Civil Rights Act had compelled state and local government employees to serve as race 
sensitivity mediators in hotel and restaurants. It was one thing to use the interstate commerce 
power to regulate commerce. It is another thing use that power to force people who are stranger to 
the commercial transaction to get involved.  See David B. Kopel, The Brady Bill Comes Due: The 
Printz Case and State Autonomy, GEO. MASON UNIV. CIV. RIGHTS L.J. 189 (1999). 
 61. Printz, 521 U.S. at 937-38 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 62. Id. 
 63. In contrast to the suggestion that the Bill of Rights might “confer” the right to bear arms, 
the Supreme Court in the 1875 case of United States v. Cruikshank stated that the Second 
Amendment, like the First Amendment, does not confer rights on anyone. Rather, those 
Amendments simply recognized and protected pre-existing human rights. See text at notes 321 to 
328. 
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arms,” a colorable argument exists that the Federal Government’s regulatory 
scheme, at least as it pertains to the purely intrastate sale or possession of 
firearms, runs afoul of that Amendment’s protections. [n.2] As the parties did 
not raise this argument, however, we need not consider it here. Perhaps, at 
some future date, this Court will have the opportunity to determine whether 
Justice Story was correct when he wrote that the right to bear arms “has justly 
been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a republic.” 3 J. Story, 
Commentaries §1890, p. 746 (1833). In the meantime, I join the Court’s 
opinion striking down the challenged provisions of the Brady Act as 
inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment.64 
There are several notable elements in the Thomas concurrence. First, 
Justice Thomas equates the Second Amendment with the First Amendment. 
This is consistent with the rule from the Valley Forge case that all parts of the 
Bill of Rights are on equal footing; none is preferred (or derogated).65 He 
implicitly rejected second-class citizenship for the Second Amendment. 
Justice Thomas then suggests that the Brady Act could be invalid under the 
Second Amendment.66 Regarding right to bear arms provisions in state 
constitutions, some state courts have upheld various gun restrictions as long as 
all guns are not banned.67 Justice Thomas plainly does not take such a weak 
position in defense of the Second Amendment.68 His implication is that by 
requiring government permission and a week-long prior restraint on the right to 
buy a handgun, the Brady Act infringed the Second Amendment. 
And of course by recognizing that handguns are a Second Amendment 
issue, Justice Thomas implicitly rejects the argument that the Second 
Amendment merely protects “sporting weapons” (usually defined as a subset 
of rifles and shotguns).69 
Noting that the Second Amendment was not at issue in the case before the 
Court (the case was brought by sheriffs who did not want to be subject to 
federal commands, rather by gun buyers or gun dealers), Justice Thomas gently 
urges the rest of the Court to take up a Second Amendment case in the future. 
And he leaves no doubt about his personal view of the issue, as he quotes the 
19th century legal scholar and Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, who saw 
the right to bear arms “as the palladium of the liberties of a republic.”70 
 
 64. Printz, 521 U.S. at 938-39 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 65. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982). 
 66. Printz, 521 U.S. at 938 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 67. See Robertson v. Denver, 874 P.2d 325 (Colo. 1994); Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 616 
N.E.2d 163 (Ohio 1993). For a discussion of these cases, see David Kopel, Clayton Cramer & 
Scott Hattrup, A Tale of Three Cities: The Right to Bear Arms in  State Supreme Courts, 68 
TEMP. L. REV. 1177 (1995). 
 68. Printz, 521 U.S. at 938-39 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 939 (citing 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES § 1890, p. 746 (1833)). 
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There are two footnotes in the Second Amendment portion of the Thomas 
concurrence. In the first footnote, the Justice states that the Supreme Court has 
not construed the Second Amendment since the 1939 case United States v. 
Miller (which upheld the National Firearms Act’s tax and registration 
requirement for short shotguns71). He added that the Supreme Court has never 
directly ruled on the individual rights issue. 
1 Our most recent treatment of the Second Amendment occurred in United 
States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), in which we reversed the District 
Court’s invalidation of the National Firearms Act, enacted in 1934. In Miller, 
we determined that the Second Amendment did not guarantee a citizen’s right 
to possess a sawed off shotgun because that weapon had not been shown to be 
“ordinary military equipment” that could “contribute to the common defense.” 
Id., at 178. The Court did not, however, attempt to define, or otherwise 
construe, the substantive right protected by the Second Amendment. 
The second footnote addressed the growing scholarship on the Second 
Amendment: 
2 Marshaling an impressive array of historical evidence, a growing body of 
scholarly commentary indicates that the “right to keep and bear arms” is, as the 
Amendment’s text suggests, a personal right. See, e.g., J. Malcolm, To Keep 
and Bear Arms: The Origins of an Anglo American Right 162 (1994); S. 
Halbrook, That Every Man Be Armed, The Evolution of a Constitutional Right 
(1984); Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 
43 Duke L. J. 1236 (1994); Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 101 Yale L. J. 1193 (1992); Cottrol & Diamond, The Second 
Amendment: Toward an Afro Americanist Reconsideration, 80 Geo. L. J. 309 
(1991); Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L. J. 637 
(1989); Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second 
Amendment, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 204 (1983). Other scholars, however, argue that 
the Second Amendment does not secure a personal right to keep or to bear 
arms. See, e.g., Bogus, Race, Riots, and Guns, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1365 (1993); 
Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second 
Amendment, 101 Yale L. J. 551 (1991); Brown, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia 
Mayors, and Civic Republicanism: On Sanford Levinson’s The Embarrassing 
Second Amendment, 99 Yale L. J. 661 (1989); Cress, An Armed Community: 
The Origins and Meaning of the Right to Bear Arms, 71 J. Am. Hist. 22 
(1984). Although somewhat overlooked in our jurisprudence, the Amendment 
has certainly engendered considerable academic, as well as public, debate. 
In the second footnote, Justice Thomas points out that the text of the 
Second Amendment (which refers to “the right of the people”) suggests that 
the Second Amendment right belongs to individuals, not the government. 
 
 71. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
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As Justice Thomas notes, a large body of legal scholarship in the last 
fifteen years has examined the historical evidence, and found very strong proof 
that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right.72 
The Supreme Court does not always follow the viewpoint of the legal 
academy. But for most of this century, the Court has always been influenced 
by the academy’s opinion. In the 1940s, for example, legal scholars paid 
almost no attention to the Second Amendment, and neither did the Supreme 
Court; in that decade, the Second Amendment was mentioned only once, and 
that mention was in a lone dissent.73 But starting in the late 1970s, a Second 
Amendment revolution began to take place in legal scholarship. That an 
intellectual revolution was in progress became undeniable after the Yale Law 
Journal published Sanford Levinson’s widely influential article The 
Embarrassing Second Amendment in 1989.74 Since then, scholarly attention to 
the Second Amendment has grown even more rapidly. And more importantly, 
for purposes of this article, the Supreme Court Justices have raised the Second 
Amendment in six different cases in 1990-98. Six mentions in nine years 
hardly puts the Second Amendment on the same plane as the First 
Amendment; but six times in one decade is a rate six times higher than in the 
1940s. 
D. Albright v. Oliver 
Albright involved a Section 1983 civil rights lawsuit growing out of a 
malicious decision to prosecute someone for conduct which was not crime 
under the relevant state law.75 The issue before the Supreme Court was 
whether the prosecutor’s action violated the defendant’s Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process rights. The majority said “no,” in part because the 
claim (growing out of the victim’s unlawful arrest) would be better presented 
as a Fourth Amendment claim.76 
Justice Stevens dissented, and was joined by Justice Blackmun; part of the 
dissent quoted Justice Harlan’s analysis of the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of the “right to keep 
and bear arms”: 
 
 72. Printz, 521 U.S. at 939 (Thomas, J., concurring).  See note 9 supra. 
 73. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 78 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 74. See Levinson, supra note 9. 
 75. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994). The only evidence against the person falsely 
accused came from a paid informant who had provided false information more than 50 times 
before. Id. at 292 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For more on the degradation of law enforcement 
caused by over-reliance on informants, especially in drug and gun cases, see generally David B. 
Kopel and Paul H. Blackman, The Unwarranted Warrant: The Waco Warrant and the Decline of 
Law Enforcement, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL 1 (1999). 
 76. Albright, 510 U.S. at 274-275. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
126 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:99 
At bottom, the plurality opinion seems to rest on one fundamental 
misunderstanding: that the incorporation cases have somehow “substituted” the 
specific provisions of the Bill of Rights for the “more generalized language 
contained in the earlier cases construing the Fourteenth Amendment.” Ante, at 
7. In fact, the incorporation cases themselves rely on the very “generalized 
language” the Chief Justice would have them displacing. Those cases add to 
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause most of the specific guarantees 
of the first eight Amendments, but they do not purport to take anything away; 
that a liberty interest is not the subject of an incorporated provision of the Bill 
of Rights does not remove it from the ambit of the Due Process Clause. I 
cannot improve on Justice Harlan’s statement of this settled proposition: 
“The full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause 
cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific 
guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This “liberty” is 
not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of 
property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep 
and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; 
and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes 
a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless 
restraints . . . and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and 
sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require particularly 
careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment.” 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (dissenting opinion).77 
I have no doubt that an official accusation of an infamous crime constitutes 
a deprivation of liberty worthy of constitutional protection. The Framers of 
the Bill of Rights so concluded, and there is no reason to believe that the 
sponsors of the Fourteenth Amendment held a different view. The Due 
Process Clause of that Amendment should therefore be construed to 
require a responsible determination of probable cause before such a 
deprivation is effected. 78 
In Poe v. Ullman, the second Justice Harlan construed the “liberty” 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.79 Although Justice Harlan’s words 
originally were written in dissent, they have been quoted in later cases as the 
opinion of the Court.80 Fourteenth Amendment “liberty” of course belongs to 
individuals, not to state governments. The point of the Fourteenth Amendment 
was to protect individual liberty from state infringement. 
This “liberty” is not limited to “the specific guarantees elsewhere provided 
in the Constitution” including “the right to keep and bear arms.” These 
 
 77. Id. at 306-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 78. Id. at 307 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote marker omitted) (emphasis added). 
 79. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 523 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 80. See discussions of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, infra text at notes 82-84; Moore v. East 
Cleveland, infra text at notes 115-36; Roe v. Wade, infra text at notes 146-53. 
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individual rights in the Harlan list, like other individual rights in the Bill of 
Rights, might be included in the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of 
“liberty” against state action. The point made by Justice Harlan (and Justice 
Stevens, quoting Justice Harlan), is that Fourteenth Amendment “liberty” 
includes things which are not part of the Bill of Rights, and does not 
necessarily include every individual right which is in the Bill of Rights. 
While the Harlan quote makes no direct claim about whether the individual 
Bill of Rights items should be incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Justice Harlan was plainly saying that simply because an individual right is 
protected in the Bill of Rights does not mean that it is protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. (Justice Black’s view was directly opposite.81) 
Therefore, although the Harlan quote is not dispositive, the quote could 
appropriately be used to argue against incorporating the Second Amendment 
into the Fourteenth. 
At the same time, the quote obviously treats the Second Amendment as an 
individual right. That is why Justice Harlan used the Second Amendment 
(along with the religion, speech, press, freedom from unreasonable searches, 
and property) to make a point about what kind of individual rights are 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
As we shall see below, Justice Harlan’s words are the words about the 
Second Amendment which the Supreme Court has quoted most often. 
E. Planned Parenthood v. Casey 
Planned Parenthood was a challenge to a Pennsylvania law imposing 
various restrictions on abortion.82 In discussing the scope of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s opinion for the Court 
approvingly quoted Justice Harlan’s earlier statement that “the right to keep 
and bear arms” is part of the “full scope of liberty” contained in the Bill of 
Rights, and made applicable to the state by the Fourteenth Amendment.83 
Although the Planned Parenthood decision was fractured, with various 
Justices joining only selected portions of each others’ opinions, the portion 
where Justice O’Connor quoted Justice Harlan about the Fourteenth and 
Second Amendments was joined by four other Justices, and represented the 
official opinion of the Court. 
Planned Parenthood is the second of the four Supreme Court opinions that 
quote the Harlan dissent in Poe. (The other two will be discussed infra.) Had 
the authors of those opinions chosen to delete the “right to keep and bear arms” 
words, by using ellipses, they certainly could have done so. As we shall see 
when we come to the original Harlan opinion in Poe v. Ullman, the full Harlan 
 
 81. Infra note 180. 
 82. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848-49 (1992). 
 83. Id. at 841. 
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analysis of the scope of Fourteenth Amendment liberty includes important 
material which later Justices carefully avoided quoting.84 
F. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez85 involved American drug agents’ 
warrantless search of a Mexican’s homes in Mexicali and San Felipe, Mexico. 
When Verdugo-Urquidez was prosecuted in a United States court for 
distribution of marijuana, his attorney argued that the evidence seized from his 
homes could not be used against him.86 If the homes in question had been 
located in the United States and owned by an American, the exclusionary rule 
clearly would have forbade the introduction of the evidence. But did the U.S. 
Fourth Amendment protect Mexican citizens in Mexico? 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion said “no.” Part of the Court’s 
analysis investigated who are “the people” protected by the Fourth 
Amendment: 
“[T]he people” seems to have been a term of art employed in select parts of the 
Constitution. The preamble declares that the Constitution is ordained and 
established by “the People of the United States.” The Second Amendment 
protects “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,” and the Ninth and 
Tenth Amendment provide that certain rights and power are retained by and 
reserved to “the people.” See also U.S. Const., Amdt. 1 (“Congress shall make 
no law. . .abridging. . .the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble”)(emphasis added); Art I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives 
shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the 
Several States”)(emphasis added). While this textual exegesis is by no means 
conclusive, it suggests that “the People” protected by the Fourth Amendment, 
and by the First and Second Amendment, and to whom rights are reserved in 
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a 
national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection 
with this country to be considered part of that community.87 
 
 84. Infra at notes 200 to 204. 
 85. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez , 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
 86. The evidence was some of Verdugo-Urquidez’s personal papers. Under the original 
intent of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the seizure of such papers would be seen as 
particularly inappropriate. The English government’s use of diaries and other personal papers in 
prosecution of dissidents was widely regarded in America as one of the great outrages of British 
despotism. See AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 65-67 (1998). Under Boyd v.United States, 
the Court affirmed that private papers could not be introduced against a defendant, because the 
use of such papers would violate the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616 (1886). Unfortunately, a later Supreme Court abandoned this rule; thus, Independent 
Counsel Kenneth Starr was well within the letter of the law when his staff subpoenaed and read 
the diaries of Monica Lewinsky and her friends. 
 87. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265. 
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By implication therefore, if “the people” whose right to arms is protected 
by the Second Amendment are American people, then “the right of the people” 
in the Second Amendment does not mean “the right of the states.”88 To adopt 
 
 88. Verdugo is of course a Fourth Amendment case, not a Second Amendment case. But there is 
no reason to believe that the Court did not mean what it said about the Second Amendment in 
Verdugo. 
  Oddly, some of the same persons who want the public to ignore what the Supreme Court 
said about the Second Amendment in the Verdugo case instead want the public to rely on what a 
retired justice said about the Second Amendment in a forum with much less precedential value than a 
Supreme Court decision or a law journal: an article in Parade magazine. 
  While on the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Warren Burger never wrote a word about the 
Second Amendment. After retirement, he wrote an article for Parade magazine that is the only 
extended analysis by any Supreme Court Justice of why the Second Amendment does not guarantee 
an individual right. Warren Burger, The Right to Bear Arms, PARADE, Jan. 14, 1990, at 4-6. 
  Chief Justice Burger argued that the Second Amendment is obsolete because we “need” 
a large standing army, rather than a well-armed citizenry. But the notion that constitutional rights 
can be discarded because someone thinks they are obsolete is anathema to a written Constitution. 
If a right is thought “obsolete,” the proper approach is to amend the Constitution and remove it. 
After all, the Seventh Amendment guarantees a right to a jury trial in all cases involving more 
than twenty dollars. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. In 1791, twenty dollars was a lot of money; today it 
is little more than pocket change. Nevertheless, courts must (and do) enforce the Seventh 
Amendment fully. 
  And while the Second Amendment certainly drew much of its original support from fear 
of standing armies, its language is not limited to that issue. “Legislation, both statutory and 
constitutional, is enacted,. . .from an experience of evils. . .its general language should not, 
therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that evil had heretofore taken. . .[A] principle to be 
vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.” Weems v. 
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). 
  Yet after attacking the Second Amendment as obsolete, Chief Justice Burger’s essay 
affirmed that “Americans have a right to defend their homes.” If this right does not derive from 
the Second Amendment, does it come from the Ninth Amendment, as Nicholas Johnson has 
argued?  See Nicholas Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment: An Individual Right to Arms 
Viewed Through the Ninth Amendment, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 49 (1992). The Burger essay does 
not say. 
  Next comes the real shocker: “Nor does anyone seriously question that the Constitution 
protects the right of hunters to own and keep sporting guns for hunting game any more than 
anyone would challenge the right to own and keep fishing rods and other equipment for fishing—
or to own automobiles.” 
  In a single sentence, the former Chief Justice asserts that three “Constitutional rights”—
hunting, fishing, and buying cars—are so firmly guaranteed as to be beyond question. Yet no 
Supreme Court case has ever held any of these activities to be Constitutionally protected. 
  What part of the Constitution protects the right to fish? The 1776 Pennsylvania 
Constitution guaranteed a right to fish and hunt, and the minority report from the 1789 
Pennsylvania ratifying convention made a similar call. Various common law sources (such as St. 
George Tucker’s enormously influential American edition of Blackstone) likewise support 
hunting rights. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 414 n.3 (St. George Tucker ed., 
Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 1996) (1803). And some state Constitutions guarantee a right to arms 
for hunting, among other purposes.  See, e.g,, the state constitutions of New Mexico, Nevada, 
West Virginia, and Wisconsin, supra note 43. 
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the Henigan/Bogus theory, and find that the Second Amendment “right of the 
people” belongs to state governments would require a rejection of Verdugo’s 
explication of who are “the people” of the Second Amendment and the rest of 
the Constitution. 
The dissent by Justice Brennan would have given “the people” a broader 
reading: “‘The People’ are ‘the governed.’”89 The dissent’s reading is likewise 
consistent only with the Standard Model, and not with the State’s Rights view. 
If “the people” of the Second Amendment are “the governed,” then the “right 
of the people” must belong to people who are governed, and not to 
governments.90 
 
  But the Supreme Court has never recognized such a right, and its lone decision on the 
subject is to the contrary. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914) (ban on possession of 
hunting guns by aliens is legitimate, because the ban does not interfere with gun possession for 
self-defense; the Court did not discuss the Second Amendment). 
  Similarly, the “right” to own automobiles could, arguably, be derived from the right to 
interstate travel but it is hardly a settled matter of law, despite what the Chief Justice seemed to 
say. 
  Chief Justice Burger contrasted “recreational hunting” guns with “Saturday Night 
Specials” and “machine guns,” implying that the latter two are beyond the pale of the 
Constitution. Thus, according to the Parade essay, some unidentified part of the Constitution (but 
not the Second Amendment) guarantees a right to own guns for home defense, a right to own 
hunting guns, a right to fishing equipment, and a right to buy automobiles. But the Constitution 
does not guarantee the right to own inexpensive handguns or machine guns. 
  Chief Justice Burger’s “machine gun” comment was particularly odd in light of what he 
was pictured holding on the front cover of Parade: an assault weapon. The Chief Justice 
displayed his grandfather’s rifled musket, with which his grandfather had killed or attempted to 
kill people during the Civil War. While the musket seems quaint and non-threatening today, it 
was a state of the art assault weapon in its time. Under the Miller test (arms suitable for militia 
use; see supra text at note 19), the nineteenth century rifled musket and the twentieth century 
machine gun would seem to be much closer to the core of the Second Amendment than would 
“recreational hunting guns.” 
  After writing the Parade essay, Chief Justice Burger participated in an advertising 
campaign for Handgun Control, Inc., in which he called the NRA’s view of the Second 
Amendment “a fraud.” Given that the Chief Justice agreed with the NRA that the Constitution 
protects a right to own home defense guns and recreational sporting guns, and disagreed with the 
NRA about “Saturday Night Specials,” the “fraud” rhetoric was rather extreme. Was it reasonable 
to call the NRA fraudulent for locating the right in the Second Amendment, as opposed to the 
other (unknown) part of the Constitution that the Chief Justice would prefer? 
 89. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 282 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 90. Handgun Control explains Verdugo thusly: 
But the issue of whether the right to bear arms is granted to “the people” only in 
connection with militia service is not even addressed in the Verdugo-Urquidez decision. 
At most, the decision implies that the Second Amendment right extends only to U.S. 
citizens; it does not address the precise scope of the right granted. In no way does the 
Court’s ruling contradict the idea that the right of the people to bear arms is exercised 
only through membership in a “well regulated Militia.” 
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Interestingly, the majority opinion’s analysis of “the people” protected by 
the Bill of Rights was an elaboration of a point made by the dissenting opinion 
from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, when the majority had held that Mr. 
Verdugo was entitled to Fourth Amendment protections.91 When the Verdugo 
case went to the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General’s office quoted from 
Ninth Circuit’s dissent, but used ellipses to remove the dissent’s reference to 
the Second Amendment.92 The Supreme Court majority, of course, put the 
Second Amendment back in. 
II. THE BURGER COURT 
The Second Amendment record of the Burger Court is more complex than 
that of the Rehnquist Court. The Rehnquist Court dicta about the Second 
Amendment points exclusively to the Second Amendment as an individual 
right. Indeed, except for Justice Thomas’s observation that Miller did not 
resolve the individual rights issue, nothing in the Rehnquist Court’s record 
contains even a hint that the Second Amendment might not be an individual 
right. In contrast, the Burger Court’s dicta are not so consistent. 
A. Lewis v. United States 
The one Supreme Court majority opinion which is fully consistent with the 
Henigan/Bogus state’s rights theory is Lewis v. United States.93 Interestingly, 
the same advocates who dismiss Verdugo because it was not a Second 
Amendment case rely heavily on Lewis even though it too is not a Second 
 
Handgun Control, Exploding the NRA’s Second Amendment Indeology: A Guide for Gun Control 
Advocates, http://www.handguncontrol.org/legalaction/C2/C2myth.htm. Here, Henigan is 
apparently adopting an alternative theory of the Second Amendment. Rather than the Second 
Amendment guaranteeing a right to state governments (as Henigan claimed in his law review 
articles), the Second Amendment is now a right that does belong to people (rather than to state 
governments), but this right only applies to people in a well-regulated militia. This is also the 
view of Herz. See generally Herz, supra note 6. But neither Henigan nor Herz explain what this 
right might mean. Does a National Guardsman have a legal cause of action when the federal 
government takes away his rifle? Even though the rifle is owned by the federal government? See 
32 U.S.C. § 105(a)(1). 
  If a disarmed National Guardsman does not have a cause of action, then who else could 
exercise the Second Amendment right to be armed in “a well-regulated militia”? The fundamental 
problem with Henigan’s theories (and with those of his followers) is that the theories are not 
meant as an actual explanation of anything. They are meant to convince people that the Second 
Amendment places no restraint on gun control, but the theories are not meant to describe what the 
Second Amendment does protect. 
 91. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F. 2d 1214, 1239 (9th Cir. 1988) (Wallace, J., 
dissenting), rev’d 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (“Besides the fourth amendment, the name of ‘the people’ 
is specifically invoked in the first, second, ninth, and tenth amendment. Presumably, ‘the people’ 
identified in each amendment is coextensive with ‘the people’ cited in the other amendments.”) 
 92. 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
 93. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980). 
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Amendment case. The issue in Lewis was primarily statutory interpretation, 
and secondarily the Sixth Amendment. A federal statute imposes severe 
penalties on persons who possess a firearm after conviction for a felony.94 In 
1961, Lewis had been convicted of burglary in Florida95; since Lewis was not 
provided with counsel, his conviction was invalid under the rule of Gideon v. 
Wainright.96 The question for the Court was whether Congress, in enacting the 
1968 law barring gun possession by a person who “has been convicted by a 
court of the United States or of a State. . .of a felony,” meant to include persons 
whose convictions had been rendered invalid by the 1963 Gideon case. Writing 
for a six-justice majority, Justice Blackmun held that the statutory language did 
apply to person with convictions invalid under Gideon.97 
Given the non-existent legislative history on the point, Justice Blackmun 
was forced to be rather aggressive in his reading of Congressional intent. For 
example, Senator Russell Long, the chief sponsor of the Gun Control Act of 
1968, had explained that “every citizen could possess a gun until the 
commission of his first felony. Upon his conviction, however, Title VII would 
deny. . .the right to possess a firearm. . . .”98 This supposedly showed 
Congressional intent to disarm people like Lewis, since the Senator had 
“stressed conviction, not a ‘valid’ conviction.”99 By this reasoning, the Gun 
Control Act of 1968 would likewise apply to Scottsboro Boys; they had been 
tortured into confessing a crime which they did not commit, but they did 
indeed have a “conviction” for murder, even if not “a valid conviction.”100 
Justice Brennan’s dissent pointed out that the majority’s reasoning would 
impose the Gun Control Act even on people whose convictions had been 
overturned by an appellate court.101 
Did the Gun Control Act (as interpreted by the Court) violate equal 
protection? 
Congress could rationally conclude that any felony conviction, even an 
allegedly invalid one, is a sufficient basis on which to prohibit possession of a 
firearm. See, e.g., United States v. Ransom, 515 F.2d 885, 891-892 (CA5 
1975), cert. Denied, 424 U.S. 944 (1976). This Court has repeatedly 
recognized that a legislature constitutionally may prohibit a convicted felon 
from engaging in activities far more fundamental than the possession of a 
firearm. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974)(disenfranchisement); 
De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 363 U.S. 144 (1960)(proscription against 
 
 94. 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a)(1). 
 95. Lewis, 445 U.S. at 57-58. 
 96. Id. (citing Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)). 
 97. Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963). 
 98. Lewis, 445 U.S. at 62-63 (citing 114 CONG. REC. 14773 (1968)). 
 99. Id. at 62. 
 100. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 101. Lewis, 445 U.S. at 69 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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holding office in a waterfront labor organization); Hawker v. New York, 170 
U.S. 189 (1898)(prohibition against the practice of medicine).102 
From this, it is reasonable to infer that possession of a firearm is a “right,” 
but a right which is far less “fundamental” than voting, serving as an officer in 
a union, or practicing medicine. As to whether possessing a firearm is a 
constitutional right, the opinion does not say. But the opinion could certainly 
be cited for support that arms possession is not “fundamental” enough to be 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. 
In a footnote of the section supporting the rationality of a statute disarming 
convicted felons, Justice Blackmun wrote: 
These legislative restrictions on the use of firearms are neither based upon 
constitutionally suspect criteria, nor do they trench upon any constitutionally 
protected liberties. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (the Second 
Amendment guarantees no right to keep and bear a firearm that does not have 
“some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-
regulated militia”); United States v. Three Winchester 30-30 Caliber Lever 
Action Carbines, 504 F. 2d 1288, 1290, n. 5 (CA7 1974); United States v. 
Johnson, 497 F.2d 548 (CA4 1974); Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34 (CA8), 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1010 (1972)(the latter three cases holding, respectively, 
that 1202(a)(1), 922(g), and 922(a)(6) do not violate the Second 
Amendment).103 
Attorney Stephen Halbrook (the successful plaintiffs’ attorney in the 
Supreme Court gun cases of Printz v. United States104, and United States v. 
Thompson/Center105) reads Lewis as reflecting the principle that since a 
legislature may deprive a felon “of other civil liberties, and may even deprive a 
felon of life itself—felons have no fundamental right to keep and bear 
arms.”106 
As a matter of formal linguistics, Halbrook’s reading of Lewis is not 
impermissible. But it is also possible to read the Lewis opinion as saying, in 
effect, “since no-one has a right to have a gun, a law against felons owning 
guns does not infringe on Constitutional rights.” 
What of the three Court of Appeals cases cited by Justice Blackmun? 
 
 102. Id. at 66. 
 103. Id. at 65-66, n. 8 
 104. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) 
 105. United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505 (1992) (statutory 
interpretation case holding that a handgun and rifle kit was not subject to a National Firearms Act 
tax applicable to short rifles; that a buyer could illegally assemble certain parts to create a short 
rifle did not bring the lawful sale of rifle and handgun components within the terms of the tax 
statute). 
 106. STEPHEN HALBROOK, FIREARMS LAW DESKBOOK 1-11 to 1-12 (1999 ed.) 
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The Three Winchester 30-30 Caliber Lever Action Carbines case upholds 
the forfeiture of guns possessed by a convicted felon. The footnote cited by the 
Supreme Court states: 
Apparently at the district court level the defendant argued that 18 U.S.C. 
App. § 1202 was invalid as an “infringement of the second amendment’s 
protection of the right to bear arms, the first amendment’s prohibition of bills 
of attainder and ex post facto laws, and the fourteenth amendment’s due 
process clause.” These arguments were appropriately rejected. [citations 
omitted]107 
The Cody108 case upheld the conviction of a felon who falsified a federal 
gun registration form and falsely claimed that he had no felony conviction. 
Regarding Cody’s Second Amendment claim, the Eighth Circuit stated: 
It has been settled that the Second Amendment is not an absolute bar to 
congressional regulation of the use or possession of firearms. The Second 
Amendment’s guarantee extends only to use or possession which “has some 
reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated 
militia.” Id [Miller]. At 178, 59 S. Ct. at 818. See United States v. Synnes, 438 
F.2d 764, 772 (8th Cir. 1971), vacated on other grounds, 404 U.S. 1009, 92 S. 
Ct. 687, 30 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1972); Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st 
Cir. 1942), cert. denied sub nom., Velazquez v. United States, 319 U.S. 770, 63 
S. Ct. 1431, 87 L. Ed. 1718 (1943).109 We find no evidence that the prohibition 
of § 922(a) (6) obstructs the maintenance of a well regulated militia.110 
In Johnson, the Fourth Circuit upheld the Gun Control Act as applied to a 
convicted felon who transported a firearm in interstate commerce.111 
Regarding Johnson’s Second Amendment claim, the Circuit wrote that “The 
courts have consistently held that the Second Amendment only confers a 
collective right of keeping and bearing arms which must bear a ‘reasonable 
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.’”112 
Now a “collective right” can be read two ways: it can be like “collective 
property” in a Communist property; since it belongs to all the people 
collectively, it belongs only to the government. Alternatively, a “collective 
right” to arms can be a right of all the people to have a militia, and for this 
 
 107. United States v. Three Winchester 30-30 Caliber Lever Action Carbines, 363 F. Supp. 
322, 323 (E.D. Wis. 1973). 
 108. Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1972). 
 109. As in this quote from Cody, the First Circuit’s 1943 Cases decision is sometimes cited as 
a lower court following Miller. See Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942).  To the 
contrary, Cases limits Miller to its facts, and refuses to apply the Miller relationship-to-the-militia 
test. The Miller test, explained the Cases judges, would allow “private citizens” to possess 
machine guns and other destructive weapons.  Cases upholds a federal gun control law while 
acknowledging that the law limits the exercise of Second Amendment rights. 
 110. Cody, 460 F.2d at 36. 
 111. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938). 
 112. See. e.g., Miller, 307 U.S. at 178. 
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purpose, each person has a right to possess arms for militia purposes (but not to 
possess arms for other purposes, such as self-defense).113 Indeed, this is the 
approach taken by Aymette, the Tennessee Supreme Court case which is the 
sole citation for the rule of decision in Miller; Aymette states that the Second 
Amendment protects individual possession of militia-type arms, so that those 
individuals may collectively exercise their rights in a militia.114 
Neither Lewis nor its three cited Court of Appeals cases claim that the 
Second Amendment right belongs to state governments. And none of them 
goes so far as to claim that law-abiding American citizens have no Second 
Amendment right to possess arms. But Lewis and its cited cases, especially 
Johnson, certainly come close to that proposition. Although Halbrook’s reading 
of Lewis is not formally wrong, the spirit of Lewis has little in common with 
the Standard Model of the Second Amendment. 
If Lewis were the Supreme Court’s last word on the Second Amendment, 
the Standard Model, no matter how accurate in its assessment of original 
intent, would seem on shaky ground as a description of contemporary Supreme 
Court doctrine. But Lewis, while not ancient, is no longer contemporary. As 
discussed above, six subsequent Supreme Court cases have addressed the 
Second Amendment as an individual right. Only two justices from the Lewis 
majority remain on the Court, and both of those justices (Rehnquist and 
Stevens) have written 1990s opinions which regard the Second Amendment as 
an individual right. 
The Rehnquist cases suggest that it is unlikely that the current Court would 
read Lewis’s hostile but ambiguous language as negating an individual right. 
B. Moore v. East Cleveland 
Not only do the Rehnquist cases impede any effort to read Lewis as the 
definitive state’s right case, so does a case decided four years before Lewis. 
The Moore v. East Cleveland litigation arose out of a zoning regulation which 
made it illegal for extended families to live together.115 The plurality opinion 
by Justice Powell found in the Fourteenth Amendment a general protection for 
families to make their own living arrangements.116 Thus, the East Cleveland 
law, which, for example, forbade two minor cousins to live with their 
grandmother, 117 was unconstitutional. 
 
 113. See, e.g., Cockrum v. State, 24 Tex. 394, 397 (1859). 
 114. Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840) (right to arms is for defense against 
tyranny, not for “private” defense; while “The citizens have the unqualified right to keep the 
weapon”, the legislature can restrict the carrying of firearms) (emphasis in original). 
 115. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 495-96 (1976). 
 116. Id. at 505-06. 
 117. Id. at 496-97. 
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In discussing the boundaries of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Powell 
plurality opinion for the Court quoted from Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe v. 
Ullman. This was the same language that was later quoted by Justice 
O’Connor’s majority opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,118 and by 
Justice Stevens’ dissent in Albright v. Oliver119: 
But unless we close our eyes to the basic reasons why certain rights associated 
with the family have been accorded shelter under the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause, we cannot avoid applying the force and rationale of these 
precedents to the family choice involved in this case. 
Understanding those reasons requires careful attention to this Court’s function 
under the Due Process clause. Mr. Justice Harlan described it eloquently: 
Due process cannot be reduced to any formula; its content cannot be 
determined by reference to any code. . .The balance of which I speak is the 
balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are 
the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which 
it broke. That tradition is a living thing. . . . 
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause 
cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific 
guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This ‘liberty” is not a 
series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the 
freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the 
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is a 
rational continuum which broadly speaking, includes freedom from all 
substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints” Poe v. 
Ullman, supra, at 542-543 (dissenting opinion).120 
In dissent, Justice White also quoted from Justice Harlan’s words in Poe. 
While Justice White included the language about the Second Amendment, he 
did not include the preceding paragraph about tradition.121 
Since the Fourteenth Amendment belongs exclusively to individuals, and 
not to state governments, the only possible reading of Moore v. East Cleveland 
is that the Second Amendment protects an individual right. 
The “tradition” paragraph from Justice Harlan, quoted by Justice Powell, 
strengthens an argument for incorporating the Second Amendment. The right 
to arms had roots as one of the “rights of Englishmen” recognized by the 
English 1689 Bill of Rights,122 and was adopted in nine of the first fifteen 
 
 118. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 119. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 306-08 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 120. Moore, 431 U.S. at 502. 
 121. Id. at 542 (White, J., dissenting). 
 122. 1 Wm. & Mary sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689); see also MALCOLM, supra note 9. 
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states’ constitutions.123 When the Constitution was proposed, five state 
ratifying conventions called for a right to arms—more than for any other single 
right that became part of the Bill of Rights.124 With the exception of a single 
concurring opinion by an Arkansas judge in 1842,125 every known judicial 
opinion and scholarly commentary from the nineteenth century treated the 
Second Amendment as an individual right.126 
Justice Harlan’s “tradition is a living thing” analysis also looks at whether 
the right in question is supported by modern “tradition.” The right to arms 
fares well under this analysis too. Between a third and a half of all American 
households choose to own firearms,127 and many others own other types of 
“arms” (such as edged weapons) which might fall within the scope of protected 
“arms.”128 Today, forty-four state constitutions guarantee a right to arms129; in 
15 states in the last three decades, voters have added or strengthened an arms 
right to their state constitution, always by a very large majority.130 Twenty 
years ago, only a few states allowed ordinary citizens to obtain a permit carry a 
concealed handgun for protection; now twenty-nine states have “shall issue” 
laws, and two states require no permit at all.131 
Contrast all the “traditional” support for the right to arms with the absence 
of such support for the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against the taking of 
property without due process and just compensation. No state ratifying 
convention had demanded such a clause, and no such right was recognized in 
 
 123. EUGENE VOLOKH, SOURCES ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND RIGHTS TO KEEP AND 
BEAR ARMS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS, pt. I <http://www.law.ucla.edu/faculty/volokh/ 2amteach/ 
sources.htm#TOC1>; DAVID YOUNG, THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT (1991). 
 124. See YOUNG, supra note 123. 
 125. Buzzard v. State, 20 Ark. 106 (1842). 
 126. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the 19th Century, supra note 10. 
 127. GARY KLECK, TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL (1997). 
 128. The dominant line of traditional cases limits the scope of “arms” protected by the Second 
Amendment to arms which an individual could use in a militia; in the nineteenth century, rifles 
and swords were the paradigm of such weapons. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the 19th 
Century, supra note 10. A minority line of cases goes further, and protects weapons which could 
be useful for personal defense, even if not useful for militia service. See, e.g., State v. Kessler, 
614 P.2d 94 (Or. 1980) (billy club); State v. Delgado, 692 P.2d 610 (Or. 1984) (switchblade 
knife). 
 129. In one state, Massachusetts, the highest court has construed the right as belonging to the 
state government, rather than to individuals.  Commonwealth v. Davis, 369 Mass. 886, 343 
N.E.2d 847 (1976).  But see Commonwealth v. Murphy 166 Mass. 171, 44 N.E. 138 (1896).  In 
Kansas, a 1905 case held that the right in the state constitution belonged to the state government, 
and not to the people.  City of Salinas v. Blaksley, 72 Kan. 230, 83 P. 619 (1905) This holding 
was implicitly rejected in a later case.  Junction City v. Mevis, 226 Kan. 526, 601 P.2d 1145 
(1979). 
 130. JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN-
CONTROL LAWS. (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1998). 
 131. Vermont and Idaho (outside Boise, where a permit is required and readily obtainable). 
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the English Bill of Rights.132 If the just compensation is “traditional” enough to 
have been incorporated, as it has been,133 the argument for incorporating the 
Second Amendment is all the stronger. 
But while the Harlan language quoted in East Cleveland has favorable 
implications for Second Amendment incorporation, East Cleveland does not 
itself perform the incorporation.134 
And while East Cleveland’s implication for the Second Amendment as an 
individual right seems clear enough under its own terms, Justice Powell’s 
personal views appear to have changed after 1976. After retiring from the 
Court, in 1988 he gave a speech to the American Bar Association in which he 
said that the Constitution should not be construed to guarantee a right to own 
handguns135; this speech was not necessarily inconsistent with East Cleveland, 
since a Second Amendment right to arms might exclude some types of arms. 
But in 1993, Justice Powell went even further, suggesting in a television 
interview that the Constitution should not be read to as guaranteeing a right to 
own even sporting guns.136 
 
 132. AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 77-78 (1998). 
 133. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
 134. Moore, 431 U.S. at 502. 
 135. “With respect to handguns . . . it is not easy to understand why the Second Amendment, 
or the notion of liberty, should be viewed as creating a right to own and carry a weapon that 
contributes so directly to the shocking numbers of murders in the United States.” American Bar 
Association Speech, Toronto, Canada, Aug. 7, 1988. 
 136. The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour, Mar.16, 1989, trans. no. #3389, Lexis Transcripts 
library: 
MR. LEHRER: Another issue that was before the court and is still before the nation as we 
go into a new year is the subject of gun control. You have said that the constitution does 
not guarantee the right to bear arms. Explain that. 
JUSTICE POWELL: Have you read the second amendment? 
MR. LEHRER: Well, I think I have but be my guest. 
JUSTICE POWELL: Well, it talks about militia. In the days that the amendment was 
adopted in 1791, each state had an organized militia. The states distrusted the national 
government, didn’t believe a national government had the authority or the ability to 
protect their liberties, so the militia was a very important factor to the states. This court 
decided a case that I haven’t seen decided, I’m not a hundred percent sure, I think it was 
the United States against Miller decided back in the late 30’s, in which the question 
involved a sawed off shot gun. I won’t go into the details of the opinion, but in essence, 
there’s language in that that suggests what I believe, and that is that the second 
amendment was never intended to apply to hand guns or, indeed to sporting rifles and shot 
guns. I’ve had a shot gun since I was 12 years old and I still occasionally like to shoot 
birds, but hand guns certainly were not even dreamed of in the sense that they now exist at 
the time the second amendment was adopted. 
  Actually, handguns had been invented and were well known by 1789. See IAN V. HOGG, 
THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYLOPEDIA OF FIREARMS (1978). Handguns were common enough in the 
early sixteenth century so that proposed legislation as early as 1518 addressed them. Id. at 16-17. 
By the latter part of the 1500s, handguns had become standard cavalry weapons. Id. at 17.  When 
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Whatever the evolution of Justice Powell’s thoughts about gun rights, the 
only words he ever put in the United States Reports treat the Second 
Amendment as an individual right. 
C. Adams v. Williams 
The only written opinion from a Supreme Court Justice which plainly 
rejects an individual right came from Justice Douglas, dissenting in the 1972 
case of Adams v. Williams.137 Acting on a tip, a police officer stopped a 
motorist for questioning, and then grabbed a revolver hidden in the driver’s 
waistband.138 The Supreme Court majority upheld the officer’s actions as a 
reasonable effort to protect his safety.139 
Justice Douglas, a strong defender of the Fourth Amendment right to be 
free from unreasonable searches, dissented.140 After discussing Fourth 
Amendment issues, Justice Douglas then editorialized in favor of handgun 
control and prohibition, and asserted that the Second Amendment posed no 
barrier to severe gun laws: 
The police problem is an acute one not because of the Fourth Amendment, but 
because of the ease with which anyone can acquire a pistol. A powerful lobby 
dins into the ears of our citizenry that these gun purchases are constitutional 
rights protected by the Second Amendment, which reads, “A well regulated 
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to 
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” 
There is under our decisions no reason why stiff state laws governing the 
purchase and possession of pistols may not be enacted. There is no reason why 
pistols may not be barred from anyone with a police record. There is no reason 
why a State may not require a purchaser of a pistol to pass a psychiatric test. 
There is no reason why all pistols should not be barred to everyone except the 
police. 
The leading case is United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, upholding a federal 
law making criminal the shipment in interstate commerce of a sawed-off 
shotgun. The law was upheld, there being no evidence that a sawed-off 
shotgun had “some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of 
a well regulated militia.” Id., at 178. The Second Amendment, it was held, 
“must be interpreted and applied” with the view of maintaining a “militia.” 
“The Militia which the States were expected to maintain and train is set in 
contrast with Troops which they were forbidden to keep without the 
 
the Second Amendment was ratified, state militia laws requiring most men to supply their own 
firearms required officers to supply their own pistols. 
 137. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). 
 138. Id. at 144-45. 
 139. Id. at 149. 
 140. Id. at 149 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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consent of Congress. The sentiment of the time strongly disfavored 
standing armies; the common view was that adequate defense of country 
and laws could be secured through the Militia - civilians primarily, soldiers 
on occasion.” Id., at 178-179. 
Critics say that proposals like this water down the Second Amendment. Our 
decisions belie that argument, for the Second Amendment, as noted, was 
designed to keep alive the militia. But if watering-down is the mood of the day, 
I would prefer to water down the Second rather than the Fourth Amendment. I 
share with Judge Friendly a concern that the easy extension of Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, to “possessory offenses” is a serious intrusion on Fourth 
Amendment safeguards. “If it is to be extended to the latter at all, this should 
be only where observation by the officer himself or well authenticated 
information shows ‘that criminal activity may be afoot.’” 436 F.2d, at 39, 
quoting Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 30.141 
Justice Douglas’s statement is a clear affirmation of the anti-individual 
interpretation of the Second Amendment which is espoused by the anti-gun 
lobbies. Since Justice Douglas was writing in dissent, his opinion creates no 
legal precedent. Nevertheless, the opinion is emblematic of the belief of some 
civil libertarians that the move to “water down” the Fourth Amendment can be 
forestalled by watering down the Second Amendment. 
Justice Brennan did not join the Douglas dissent, but instead wrote his 
own. Justice Brennan presciently noted that the Court’s loose standard for 
“stop and frisk” would become a tool for police officers to search people at 
will, with officer safety often serving as a mere pretext.142 (Adams v. Williams 
is one of the key cases opening the door to the broad variety of warrantless 
searches which are now allowed.) Justice Brennan also noted the illogic of 
allowing stop-and-frisk for guns in a state which allows citizens to carry 
concealed handguns.143 (Connecticut was one of the first states to adopt “shall 
issue” laws for concealed handgun permits; now, thirty-one states have such 
laws.144) 
Justice Marshall’s dissent made a similar point, noting that after the officer 
discovered the gun, he immediately arrested Williams, without asking if 
Williams had a permit.145 
D. Roe v. Wade 
 
 141. Id. at 150-51. Justice Douglas was a newly-appointed member of the Court that decided 
Miller, but he did not participate in the case, having joined the Court after the case was argued. 
Justice Black (whose views on the Second Amendment are found infra at notes 179-82, 194-96, 
221-28) did serve on the Miller Court, and joined in the unanimous decision. 
 142. Id. at 153 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 143. Id. at 151-52. 
 144. See Lott, supra note 130. 
 145. Adams, at 153 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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The year after Justice Douglas took a clear stand against individual Second 
Amendment rights in Adams, Justice Stewart authored an opinion in the 
opposite direction. 
The majority opinion in Roe v. Wade,146 written by Justice Harry 
Blackmun, has been justly criticized for having no connection with the text of 
the Constitution, and only a tenuous connection with the prior precedents of 
the Supreme Court.147 Justice Potter Stewart, perhaps recognizing the 
weakness of the Blackmun opinion, authored a concurring opinion coming to 
the same result as Justice Blackmun, but attempting to ground the result more 
firmly in precedent.148 As part of the analysis arguing that the right to abortion 
was part of the “liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice 
Stewart quoted Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman149, which 
had listed the right to keep and bear arms as among the liberties guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment: 
As Mr. Justice Harlan once wrote: “[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed 
by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms 
of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This ‘liberty’ 
is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of property; 
the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the 
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational 
continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial 
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints . . . and which also recognizes, 
what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require 
particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their 
abridgment.” Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (opinion dissenting from 
dismissal of appeal) (citations omitted). In the words of Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter, “Great concepts like . . . ‘liberty’ . . . were purposely left to gather 
meaning from experience. For they relate to the whole domain of social and 
economic fact, and the statesmen who founded this Nation knew too well that 
only a stagnant society remains unchanged.” National Mutual Ins. Co. v. 
Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (dissenting opinion).150 
Thus, the Harlan dissenting language about the Second Amendment, from 
Poe v. Ullman, has been quoted in one majority opinion (Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey151), one plurality opinion (Moore v. East Cleveland152), two dissents 
 
 146. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 147. See, e.g., William Van Alstyne, Closing The Circle Of Constitutional Review from 
Griswold v. Connecticut To Roe v. Wade: An Outline Of A Decision Merely Overruling Roe, 
1989 DUKE L.J. 1677. 
 148. Roe, 410 U.S. at 167-68 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 149. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 523 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 150. Id. at 167.  Roe, 410 U.S. 113. 
 151. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848-49 (1992). 
 152. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1976). 
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(Albright v. Oliver and Moore v. East153), and one concurrence (Roe v. 
Wade154). In contrast, the Douglas dissenting language about the Second 
Amendment, from Adams v. Williams,155 has never been quoted in an opinion 
by any Justice. 
E. Laird v. Tatum 
During the Cold War and the Vietnam War, the United States Army 
illegally spied on American anti-war critics.156 When the Army’s conduct was 
to discovered, a group of individuals who had been spied upon brought suit in 
federal court.157 In a sharply divided five-four decision, the Supreme Court 
majority held that the suit was not justiciable.158 The plaintiffs could not show 
that they had been harmed by the Army, or that there was a realistic prospect 
of future harm, and hence there was no genuine controversy for a federal court 
to hear.159 Justice Douglas (joined by Justice Marshal) penned a fiery dissent, 
invoking the long struggle to free civil life from military domination.160 
Justice Douglas began by examining the power which the Constitution 
grants Congress over the standing army and over the militia.161 Since Congress 
is not granted any power to use the army or militia for domestic surveillance, it 
necessarily follows that the army has no power on its own to begin a program 
of domestic surveillance.162 
Moving onto a broader discussion of the dangers of military dictatorship, 
Justice Douglas quoted an article which Chief Justice Earl Warren had written 
in the New York University Law Review, which mentioned the Second 
Amendment as one of the safeguards intended to protect America from rule by 
a standing army.163 
As Chief Justice Warren has observed, the safeguards in the main body of the 
Constitution did not satisfy the people on their fear and concern of military 
dominance: 
“They were reluctant to ratify the Constitution without further assurances, 
and thus we find in the Bill of Rights Amendments 2 and 3, specifically 
authorizing a decentralized militia, guaranteeing the right of the people to 
keep and bear arms, and prohibiting the quartering of troops in any house 
 
 153. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994); Moore, 410 U.S. at 542. 
 154. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169 (1973). 
 155. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). 
 156. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1972). 
 157. Id. at 3. 
 158. Id. at 15-16. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 16-17 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 17-18. 
 163. Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 185 (1962). 
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in time of peace without the consent of the owner. Other Amendments 
guarantee the right of the people to assemble, to be secure in their homes 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and in criminal cases to be 
accorded a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury after indictment in 
the district and state wherein the crime was committed. The only 
exceptions made to these civilian trial procedures are for cases arising in 
the land and naval forces. Although there is undoubtedly room for 
argument based on the frequently conflicting sources of history, it is not 
unreasonable to believe that our Founders’ determination to guarantee the 
preeminence of civil over military power was an important element that 
prompted adoption of the Constitutional Amendments we call the Bill of 
Rights.”164 
The Earl Warren law review language is, on its face, consistent with 
individual rights. He listed the right to arms among other individual rights, and 
he treated the Second Amendment’s subordinate clause (about the importance 
of well-regulated militia) as protecting something distinct from the Second 
Amendment’s main clause (the right of the people to keep and bear arms).165 
But based on Justice Douglas’s dissent the same year in Adams, we cannot 
ascribe to Justice Douglas the full implication of what Chief Justice Warren 
wrote in the N.Y.U. Law Review. And while Chief Justice Warren’s N.Y.U. 
article is interesting, Chief Justice Warren never wrote anything about the 
Second Amendment in a Supreme Court opinion. 
III. THE WARREN, VINSON, AND HUGHES COURTS 
During the tenure of Chief Justices Earl Warren (1953-69) and Fred 
Vinson (1946-53), opinions in nine cases addressed the Second Amendment. 
Seven of those opinions (majority opinions by Justices Brennan, Frankfurter, 
Harlan, and Jackson; a concurrence by Justice Black; and dissents by Justices 
Black and Harlan) recognized an individual right in the Second Amendment. 
The eighth case, an “appeal dismissed” contained no explanation, and thus was 
consistent with both the Standard Model individual right and the 
Henigan/Bogus state’s right. The earliest case in this period was a 1934 
decision that used the Second Amendment to support a state’s right to control 
its militia.166 
A. Burton v. Sills 
 
 164. Laird, 408 U.S. at 22-23, quoting Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, supra 
note 163. (emphasis added). 
 165. For the best analysis of how Madison synthesized two different traditions in the Second 
Amendment (the republican militia theory in the purpose clause, and the human rights theory in 
the main clause), see Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of the 
Second Amendment, supra note 9. 
 166. Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934). 
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Burton v. Sills involved a challenge to the then-new gun licensing law in 
New Jersey.167 The law did not ban any guns, but established a licensing 
system intended to screen out people with serious criminal convictions, 
substance abusers, and the like. After the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected a 
Second Amendment challenge to the law168, the plaintiffs asked the Supreme 
Court to review the case; the request came in the form of an “appeal,” rather 
than a petition for a writ of certiorari.169 
The United States Supreme Court declined to hear the case.170 Since the 
case had come by appeal, rather than petition for a writ, the Court wrote the 
standard phrase used at the time in denying an appeal: “The motion to dismiss 
is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal 
question.”171 
The Supreme Court has explained that dismissals such as the one in Burton 
have some value in guiding lower courts: 
Summary affirmances and dismissals for want of a substantial federal question 
without doubt reject the specific challenges presented in the statement of 
jurisdiction and do leave undisturbed the judgment appealed from. They do 
prevent lower courts from coming to opposite conclusions on the precise issues 
presented and necessarily decided by those actions. After Salera, for example, 
other courts were not free to conclude that the Pennsylvania provision 
invalidated was nevertheless constitutional. Summary actions, however, 
including Salera, should not be understood as breaking new ground but as 
applying principles established by prior decisions to the particular facts 
involved.172 
Thus, following the appeal dismissal in Burton v. Sills, a lower federal 
court could not conclude that the New Jersey gun licensing law violated the 
Second Amendment. 
The appeal dismissal does not necessarily endorse the reasoning of the 
state court against which the appeal was taken. (The New Jersey Supreme 
Court had said that the Second Amendment is not an individual right.173) 
 
 167. Burton v. Sills, 394 U.S. 812 (1969). 
 168. Burton v. Sills, 248 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1968). 
 169. Burton, 394 U.S. at 812. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. The decision was per curiam, with Justice Brennan not participating. 
 172. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977). 
 173. The New Jersey court in Burton could never be charged with excessive regard for 
individual rights, for the court wrote, “the common good takes precedence over private 
rights. . .Our basic freedoms may be curtailed if sufficient reason exists therefor. Only in a very 
limited sense is a person free to do as he pleases in our modern American society.” Burton v. 
Sills, 240 A.2d 432, 434 (N.J. 1968). In contrast, the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1925 had 
recognized “The right of a citizen to bear arms,” but had explained that the right “is not 
unrestricted.” Hence, a law requiring a license to carry a concealed revolver was not 
unconstitutional. State v.  Angelo, 3 N.J. Misc. 1014 (Sup. Ct. 1925). Since New Jersey is one of 
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The plaintiffs in Burton had conceded that prior Supreme Court cases 
(particularly the 1886 Presser case) had said that the Second Amendment 
limits only the federal government, and not state governments.174 The plaintiffs 
invited the courts to use the Burton case as an opportunity to reverse prior 
precedent.175 The appeal dismissal in Burton may be read as the Court’s 
declining the invitation to re-open the issue decided by Presser. 
Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Printz,176 suggesting that the Brady Act 
waiting period may violate the Second Amendment, implies he would not read 
Burton as asserting that a New Jersey-style gun licensing system would be 
constitutional if enacted by the Congress. Reading Burton as an authorization 
for sweeping federal gun licensing would be inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court’s teaching that appeal dismissals “should not be understood as breaking 
new ground.”177 
Given the plaintiffs’ requested grounds for Supreme Court review (to 
overturn Presser) it is logical to view Burton as a re-affirmance of Presser.178 
On the other hand, since Burton contains no explicit reasoning, the case is 
not directly contradictory to the Henigan/Bogus theory. 
B. Duncan v. Louisiana 
In this case, the Supreme Court incorporated the Sixth Amendment right to 
jury trial, as part of the Fourteenth Amendment’s “due process” guarantee.179 
Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, concurred, and restated his argument 
from Adamson v. California180 (infra) that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
“privileges and immunities” clause should be read to include everything in the 
first eight Amendments.181 He quoted a statement made on the Senate floor by 
Senator Jacob Howard, one of the lead sponsors of the Fourteenth 
Amendment: 
Such is the character of the privileges and immunities spoken of in the second 
section of the fourth article of the Constitution. . .To these privileges and 
immunities, whatever they may be—for they are not and cannot be fully 
defined in their entire extent and precise nature—to these should be added the 
personal rights guaranteed and secured by the first eight amendments of the 
Constitution; such as the freedom of speech and of the press; the right of the 
 
the few states without a state constitutional right to arms, the court’s reference to the “right of the 
citizen” must have been a reference to the Second Amendment. 
 174. For Presser see infra text at notes 310-20. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 937 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 177. Mandel, 432 U.S. at 176. 
 178. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886). 
 179. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
 180. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-78 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 181. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 164-65 (Black, J., concurring). 
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people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances, a right appertaining to each and all the people; the right to keep 
and bear arms; the right to be exempted from the quartering of soldiers in a 
house without consent of the owner. . . .182 
Justice Black’s use in Duncan of the quote describing “the right to keep 
and bear arms” as one of “the personal rights guaranteed and secured by the 
first eight amendments” is fully consistent with his writing on the bench and in 
legal scholarship that the Second Amendment right to arms was one of the 
individual rights which the Fourteenth Amendment (properly interpreted) 
makes into a limit on state action.183 
C. Malloy v. Hogan 
This 1964 case used the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause to 
incorporate the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.184 
Discussing the history of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, Justice 
Brennan listed various “Decisions that particular guarantees were not 
safeguarded against state action by the Privileges and Immunities Clause or 
other provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.”185 Among these were “Presser 
v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (Second Amendment),”186 along with various 
other cases, almost of which had been, or would be, repudiated by later 
decisions on incorporation.187 
As discussed above, any discussion of the Second Amendment as 
something which could be incorporated, even if no incorporation has been 
performed, necessarily presumes that the Second Amendment is an individual 
right. Justice Brennan’s explication of Presser as a case which rejects 
privileges and immunities incorporation is of  some significance as a modern 
interpretation of Presser, since, as we shall discuss infra, the years after the 
 
 182. Id. at 166-67 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2765-66 (1866)) (emphasis 
added). 
 183. Infra notes 194-97, 221-28. 
 184. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
 185. Id. at 5 n. 2. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551 (1875) (right to assemble); Prudential 
Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922) (First Amendment); Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (Fourth Amendment); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) 
(Fifth Amendment requirement of grand jury indictments); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 
328 (1937) (Fifth Amendment double jeopardy); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 595 (1900) 
(Sixth Amendment jury trial); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1875) (Seventh Amendment 
jury trial); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual 
punishment, electrocution) ; McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155 (1891); O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 
U.S. 323, 332 (1892) (Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).  
Except for Hurtardo and Walker, of these cases have been undone by later cases. 
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1886 Presser decision generated a variety of opinions about whether Presser 
actually had rejected incorporation. 
D. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California 
In Konigsberg, the Court majority upheld the state of California’s refusal 
to admit to the practice of law an applicant who refused answer questions 
about his beliefs regarding communism.188 In dissent, Justice Black argued that 
First Amendment rights were absolute and that the inquiry into the prospective 
lawyer’s political beliefs was therefore a violation of the First Amendment.189 
Justice Harlan’s majority opinion rejected Justice Black’s standard of 
constitutional absolutism.190 The Harlan majority opinion is one of the classic 
examples of the “balancing” methodology of jurisprudence.191 Justice Harlan 
pointed to libel laws as laws which restrict speech, but which do not infringe 
the First Amendment.192 Similarly, he pointed to the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
United States v. Miller as an example of a law which restricted the absolute 
exercise of rights, but which had been held not to be unconstitutional.193 
Justice Harlan thereby treated the First and Second Amendment as 
constitutionally identical: guaranteeing an individual right, but not an absolute 
right. 
n. 10. That view, which of course cannot be reconciled with the law relating to 
libel, slander, misrepresentation, obscenity, perjury, false advertising, 
solicitation of crime, complicity by encouragement, conspiracy, and the like, is 
said to be compelled by the fact that the commands of the First Amendment 
are stated in unqualified terms: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble . . . .” But as Mr. Justice Holmes once said: “[T]he provisions of the 
Constitution are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form; 
they are organic living institutions transplanted from English soil. Their 
significance is vital not formal; it is to be gathered not simply by taking the 
words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line of their 
growth.” Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610. In this connection also 
compare the equally unqualified command of the Second Amendment: “the 
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.” And see 
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174.194 
The year before Justice Black’s absolutist interpretative model was 
rejected by the majority of the Court, Justice Black had detailed the absolutist 
 
 188. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) 
 189. Id. at 57-58 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 190. Id. at 44. 
 191. See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 433 (1985). 
 192. Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 49-50. 
 193. Id. at 51. 
 194. Id. at 49-50 (emphasis added). 
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theory in the first annual James Madison lecture at the New York University 
School of Law.195 Discussing each part of the Bill of Rights, Justice Black 
explained how each guarantee was unequivocal and absolute. For example, 
under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant had a “definite and absolute” right to 
confront the witnesses against him.196 Regarding the Second Amendment, 
Justice Black explained: 
Amendment Two provides that: 
A well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the 
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. 
Although the Supreme Court has held this Amendment to include only arms 
necessary to a well-regulated militia, as so construed, its prohibition is 
absolute.197 
Did Justice Black mean that individuals have an absolute right to possess 
militia-type arms, or did Justice Black mean that state governments have an 
absolute right to arm the state militias as the state governments see fit? His 
view is particularly important, because he served on the Court that decided 
Miller, and he joined in the Court’s unanimous opinion. 
Throughout the New York University speech, Justice Black referred 
exclusively to individual rights, and never to state’s rights. For example, he 
began his speech by explaining “I prefer to think of our Bill of Rights as 
including all provisions of the original Constitution and Amendments that 
protect individual liberty. . .”198 If Justice Black thought that the Second 
Amendment protected state power, rather than individual liberty, he would not 
have included the Second Amendment in his litany of “absolute” guarantees in 
the Bill of Rights. In the discussion of Adamson v. California, infra, we will 
see “definite and absolute” proof that Justice Black considered the Second 
Amendment an individual right. 
E. Poe v. Ullman 
In the 1961 case Poe v. Ullman, the Court considered whether married 
persons had a right to use contraceptives.199 The majority said “no,” but the 
second Justice Harlan, in a dissent (which gained ascendancy a few years later 
in Griswold v. Connecticut), wrote that the Fourteenth Amendment did 
guarantee a right of privacy. In developing a theory of exactly what the 
Fourteenth Amendment due process clause did protect, Justice Harlan wrote 
that the clause was not limited exclusively to “the precise terms of the specific 
 
 195. Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865 (1960). 
 196. Id. at 872. 
 197. Id. at 873. 
 198. Id. at 865. 
 199. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
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guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution,” such as “the freedom of 
speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”200 
It is impossible to read Justice Harlan’s words as anything other than a 
recognition that the Second Amendment protects the right of individual 
Americans to possess firearms. The due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, obviously, protects a right of individuals against governments; it 
does not protect governments, nor is it some kind of “collective” right. It is 
also notable that Justice Harlan felt no need to defend or elaborate his position 
that the Second Amendment guaranteed an individual right. Despite the 
Henigan claim that the non-individual nature of the Second Amendment is 
“well-settled,” it was unremarkable to Justice Harlan that the Second 
Amendment guaranteed the right of individual people to keep and bear arms. 
Like the Brandeis and Holmes dissents in the early free speech cases, the 
Harlan dissent in Poe today seems to be a correct statement of the law. 
Some parts of the Harlan dissent, however, have not been quoted by future 
courts. For example, even though later opinions have quoted approvingly the 
Harlan language that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids “all substantial 
arbitrary impositions,”201 those quotations omit the list of cases that Justice 
Harlan cited for the proposition. That list included Allgeyer v. Louisiana202 and 
Nebbia v. New York,203 both of which used the Fourteenth Amendment in 
defense of economic liberty. But Justice Harlan was certainly right that modern 
use of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect non-enumerated rights has its 
roots in the liberty of contract due process cases from the turn of the century. 
Although it is not currently respectable to say so in a Supreme Court opinion, 
cases such as Allgeyer and its progeny have as much a logical claim to be part 
of the Fourteenth Amendment as do Griswold204 and its progeny; both lines of 
cases protect personal freedom from “substantial arbitrary impositions.” 
But the fact that Allgeyer and Nebbia end up trimmed in later quotations of 
Justice Harlan’s words shows that the Justices who used the quote later 
(Stevens, O’Connor, Powell, and Stewart) were not just quoting without 
thought; they knew how to excise parts of Harlan’s language that they did not 
agree with, such as the references to economic liberty. That economic liberty 
was excised, while the Second Amendment stayed in, may, therefore, be 
plausibly considered as the writer’s decision. 
 
 200. Id. at 542-43 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 201. Albright v. Oliver, supra note 78; Planned Parenthood v. Casey, supra note 83; Moore v. 
East Cleveland, supra notes 120-21. 
 202. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). 
 203. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
 204. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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Also unquoted by later Courts has been Justice Harlan’s statement, “Again 
and again this Court has resisted the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment is 
no more than a shorthand reference to what is explicitly set out elsewhere in 
the Bill of Rights.”205 In support of this proposition, he cited, inter alia, 
Presser v. Illinois, a nineteenth century case which will be discussed infra. 
Interestingly, Justice Douglas wrote his own dissent, in which he stated 
that the Fourteenth Amendment must protect “all” the Bill of Rights.206 This 
implies that the Second Amendment is an individual right, if it can be 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. But Justice Douglas later rejected 
this view, in his Adams v. Williams dissent.207 
F. Knapp v. Schweitzer 
Knapp involved the applicability of the Fifth Amendment’s self-
incrimination clause to the states.208 Justice Frankfurter’s majority opinion 
refused to enforce the clause against the states. In support of his position, the 
Justice reeled off a list of nineteenth century cases, including Cruikshank 
(discussed infra) which he cited for the proposition that it was well-settled 
almost all of the individual rights guarantees in the Bill of Rights were not 
applicable to the states: 
n. 5. By 1900 the applicability of the Bill of Rights to the States had been 
rejected in cases involving claims based on virtually every provision in the first 
eight Articles of Amendment. See, e. g., Article I: Permoli v. Municipality No. 
1, 3 How. 589, 609 (free exercise of religion); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 
U.S. 542, 552 (right to assemble and petition the Government); Article II: 
United States v. Cruikshank, supra, at 553 (right to keep and bear arms); 
Article IV: Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71, 76 (no warrant except on probable 
cause); Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131, 166 (security against unreasonable 
searches and seizures); Article V: Barron v. Baltimore, note 2, supra, at 247 
(taking without just compensation); Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410, 434 (former 
jeopardy); Twitchell v. Pennsylvania, 7 Wall. 321, 325-327 (deprivation of life 
without due process of law); Spies v. Illinois, supra, at 166 (compulsory self-
 
 205. Poe, 367 U.S. at 541. 
 206. Id. at 516 (Douglas, J., dissenting): 
When the Framers wrote the Bill of Rights they enshrined in the form of constitutional 
guarantees those rights—in part substantive, in part procedural—which experience 
indicated were indispensible to a free society. . . .[T]he constitutional conception of “due 
process” must, in my view, include them all until and unless there are amendments that 
remove them. That has indeed been the view of a full court of nine Justices, though the 
members who make up that court unfortunately did not sit at the same time. 
  Justice Douglas’s list of Justices who favored full incorporation of the Bill of Rights 
named Bradley, Swayne, Field, Clifford, the first Harlan, Brewer, Black, Murphy, Rutledge, and 
Douglas. Id. at 516 n.8. 
 207. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 208. Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958). 
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incrimination); Eilenbecker v. Plymouth County, 134 U.S. 31, 34-35 
(presentment or indictment by grand jury); Article VI: Twitchell v. 
Pennsylvania, supra, at 325-327 (right to be informed of nature and cause of 
accusation); Spies v. Illinois, supra, at 166 (speedy and public trial by impartial 
jury); In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 219 (compulsory process); Eilenbecker v. 
Plymouth County, supra, at 34-35 (confrontation of witnesses); Article VII: 
Livingston’s Lessee v. Moore, 7 Pet. 469, 551-552 (right of jury trial in civil 
cases); Justices v. Murray, 9 Wall. 274, 278 (re-examination of facts tried by 
jury); Article VIII: Pervear v. Massachusetts, 5 Wall. 475, 479-480 (excessive 
fines, cruel and unusual punishments).209 
Here again, the Court majority treated the Second Amendment right to arms as 
simply one of the many individual rights guarantees contained in the Bill of 
Rights. 
G. Johnson v. Eisentrager 
After the surrender of Germany during World War II, some German 
soldiers in China aided the Japanese army, in the months that Japan continued 
to fight alone.210 The American army captured them, and tried them by court-
martial in China as war criminals.211 The Germans argued that the trial violated 
their Fifth Amendment rights, and pointed out that the Fifth Amendment is not 
by its terms limited to American citizens.212 
Justice Jackson’s majority opinion held that Germans had no Fifth 
Amendment rights.213 He pointed out that if Germans could invoke the Fifth 
Amendment, they could invoke the rest of the Bill of Rights.214 This would 
lead to the absurd result of American soldiers, in obedience to the Second 
Amendment, being forbidden to disarm the enemy: 
If the Fifth Amendment confers its rights on all the world except Americans 
engaged in defending it,215 the same must be true of the companion civil- 
rights Amendments, for none of them is limited by its express terms, 
territorially or as to persons. Such a construction would mean that during 
military occupation irreconcilable enemy elements, guerrilla fighters, and 
“were-wolves” could require the American Judiciary to assure them freedoms 
of speech, press, and assembly as in the First Amendment, right to bear arms 
as in the Second, security against “unreasonable” searches and seizures as in 
 
 209. Id. at 378-79. 
 210. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
 211. Id. at 765-66. 
 212. Id. at 776. 
 213. Id. at 782. 
 214. Id. 
 215. The Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on trial by court martial does not, by its own terms, 
apply to soldiers in the standing army (or to militiamen engaged in militia duty). 
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the Fourth, as well as rights to jury trial as in the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments.216 
The “irreconcilable enemy elements, guerrilla fighters, and ‘were-wolves’” in 
Justice Jackson’s hypothetical are obviously not American state governments. 
Instead they are individuals and as individuals would have Second Amendment 
rights, if the Second Amendment were to apply to non-Americans.217 
Interestingly, Justice Jackson’s reasoning echoed an argument made in Ex 
Parte Milligan by the Attorney General: the Fifth Amendment must contain 
implicit exceptions, which allow trial of civilians under martial law; the whole 
Bill of Rights contains implicit exceptions, for without such exceptions, it 
would be a violation of the Second Amendment to disarm rebels, and the 
former slave states’ forbidding the slaves to own guns would likewise have 
been unconstitutional.218 
 
 216. Id. at 784 (emphasis added). 
 217. The characters in the hypothetical are not militia members either. A militia is an 
organized force under government control. In contrast, “guerrilla fighters” or “were-wolves” are 
small groups or individuals functioning in enemy territory beyond the reach of any friendly 
government. The legal distinction was of great importance during World War II. Switzerland, for 
example, made extensive plans for its militia forces (consisting of almost the entire able-bodied 
adult male population) to resist a German invasion to the last man. But the Swiss government also 
warned its citizens not to engage in guerrilla warfare on their own; the militiamen fighting the 
Germans would be entitled to the protection of the rules of war and international conventions, but 
guerrillas would not. See STEPHEN HALBROOK, TARGET SWITZERLAND (1998). Having served as 
a judge of the Nuremburg Trials, Justice Jackson was presumably familiar with the distinctions in 
the international law of war between guerillas and soldiers/militia. 
 218. During the Civil War, in 1864, an Indiana man Lambdin P. Milligan was charged with 
aiding the southern rebellion against the national government. Although Indiana was under full 
union control, and courts in Indiana were functioning, Milligan was tried before a military court 
martial and sentenced to death. In 1866, a unanimous Supreme Court overturned Milligan’s 
conviction, holding that martial law can only be applied in theaters of war, and not in areas where 
the civil courts were functioning. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
  The Court did not discuss the Second Amendment, but in argument to the Court, the 
Attorney General of the United States did.  During the argument before the Court, Milligan’s 
lawyers had claimed that Congress could never impose martial law. They pointed out that the 
Fourth Amendment (no searches without warrants), the Fifth Amendment (no criminal trials 
without due process), and the Sixth Amendment (criminal defendants always have a right to a 
jury trial) do not contain any exceptions for wartime. 
  The Attorney General, who was defending the legality of Milligan’s having been 
sentenced to death by court martial, retorted that under conditions of war, the protections of the 
Bill of Rights do not apply. Thus, the federal government could disarm a rebel, without violating 
his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. The Attorney General urged the Court to 
construe the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments in pari materia: 
  After war is originated, whether by declaration, invasion, or insurrection, the whole 
power of conducting it, as to manner, and as to all the means and appliances by which war 
is carried on by civilized nations, is given to the President. He is the sole judge of the 
exigencies, necessities, and duties of the occasion, their extent and duration. . . . . 
  Much of the argument on the side of the petitioner will rest, perhaps, upon certain 
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provisions not in the Constitution itself, and as originally made, but now seen in the 
Amendments made in 1789: the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments. They may as well be 
here set out: 
  4. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall 
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 
  5. No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land 
or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger; 
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use without just compensation. 
  6. In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, . . . and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence. 
  In addition to these, there are two preceding amendments which we may also 
mention, to wit: the second and third. They are thus: 
  2. A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of 
the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. 
  3. No soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in any house without the consent of 
the owner, nor in time of war but in a manner to be prescribed by law. 
  It will be argued that the fourth, fifth, and sixth articles, as above given, are restraints 
upon the war-making power; but we deny this. All these amendments are in pari materia, 
and if either is a restraint upon the President in carrying on war, in favor of the citizen, it 
is difficult to see why all of them are not. Yet will it be argued that the fifth article would 
be violated in “depriving if life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” armed 
rebels marching to attack the capital? Or that the fourth would be violated by searching 
and seizing the papers and houses of persons in open insurrection and war against the 
government? It cannot properly be so argued, any more than it could be that it was 
intended by the second article (declaring that “the right of the people to keep and bear 
arms shall not be infringed”) to hinder the President from disarming insurrectionists, 
rebels, and traitors in arms while he was carrying on war against them. 
  These, in truth, are all peace provisions of the Constitution and, like all other 
conventional and legislative laws and enactments, are silent amidst arms, and when the 
safety of the people becomes the supreme law. 
  By the Constitution, as originally adopted, no limitations were put upon the war-
making and war-conducting powers of Congress and the President; and after discussion, 
and after the attention of the country was called to the subject, no other limitation by 
subsequent amendment has been made, except by the Third Article, which prescribes that 
“no soldier shall be quartered in any house in time of peace without consent of the owner, 
or in time of war, except in a manner prescribed by law.” 
  This, then, is the only expressed constitutional restraint upon the President as to the 
manner of carrying on war. There would seem to be no implied one; on the contrary, 
while carefully providing for the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in time of peace, 
the Constitution takes it for granted that it will be suspended “in case of rebellion or 
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invasion (i. e., in time of war), when the public safety requires it.” 
Id. at 29-33. 
  Thus, the Attorney General explained, the Second Amendment belongs to individuals, 
but if a Confederate rebel were disarmed, his Second Amendment right would not be violated, 
since the Second Amendment would not apply to him—even though the Second Amendment has 
no explicit exception for wartime. Likewise, if Congress declared martial law in a region, a 
civilian would be subjected to a court martial, rather than trial by jury, even though the Sixth 
Amendment (which guarantees jury trials) has no explicit exception for wartime. The Attorney 
General plainly saw the Second Amendment as guaranteeing an individual right. 
  The United States government also made another argument showing that the Second 
Amendment belongs to individuals. On behalf of Milligan, attorney David Dudley Field had 
presented a passionate and superb argument, explaining that the ultimate issue at bar was the 
supremacy of the civil power over the military, a principle at the very heart of Anglo-American 
liberty and republican government. 
  Field had made much of the fact that the Fifth Amendment’s requirement that persons 
could only be tried if they had first been indicted by a grand jury had an explicit exception for 
military circumstances (“except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when 
in actual service in time of war or public danger”). Field pointed out that Milligan (an Indiana 
civilian with Confederate sympathies) was obviously not within the terms of the exception. 
  In response, the Attorney General turned the argument over to Benjamin Franklin Butler. 
A very successful lawyer, Butler had been one of the most prominent Union Generals during the 
Civil War; a few months after his Supreme Court argument, Butler would be elected to Congress 
from Massachusetts, and would become one of the leading Radical Republicans. 
  Butler told the Supreme Court that the whole Bill of Rights contained implicit exceptions 
which were not stated in the text. For example, despite the literal language of the Fifth 
Amendment and the Second Amendment, slaves in antebellum America had been deprived of 
liberty without due process and had been forbidden to possess arms: 
  . . .the constitution provides that “no person” shall be deprived of liberty without due 
process of law. And yet, as we know, whole generations of people in this land—as many 
as four millions of them at one time—people described in the Constitution by this same 
word, “persons,” have been till lately deprived of liberty ever since the adoption of the 
Constitution, without any process of law whatever. 
  The Constitution provides, also, that no “person’s” right to bear arms shall be 
infringed; yet these same people, described elsewhere in the Constitutions as “persons,” 
have been deprived of their arms whenever they had them.” 
Id. at 178-79. 
  Butler’s point, presented on behalf of the Attorney General, was that the right to arms 
and the right not to be deprived of liberty without due process were individual rights guaranteed 
to all “persons.” Yet despite the literal guarantee to all “persons,” slaves had been deprived of 
their liberty without a fair trial, and had not been allowed to own or carry guns. Thus, there must 
an implicit “slavery exception” in the Second Amendment and the Fifth Amendment. And if there 
could be an unstated “slavery exception,” there could also be an unstated “in time of war” 
exception. 
  Butler’s argument is totally incompatible with the claim that the Second Amendment 
right does not belong to individuals. According to Henigan and Bogus, the Second Amendment 
can only be violated when the federal government interferes with state militias. But there were no 
federal laws forbidding states to enroll slaves in the state militias. (The federal Militia Act of 
1792 enrolled whites only, but the Act did not prevent the states from structuring their own 
militias as they saw fit.) Although there were no federal law interfering with state militias, there 
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H. Adamson v. California 
In the Adamson case, the defendant was convicted after a trial in a 
California state court; California law allowed the judge to instruct the jury that 
the jury could draw adverse inferences from a defendant’s failure to testify.219 
This jury instruction was plainly inconsistent with established Fifth 
Amendment doctrine;220 but did the Fifth Amendment apply in state courts, or 
only in federal courts? 
The Adamson majority held that the Fifth Amendment’s protection against 
compelled self-incrimination was not made enforceable in state courts by the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s command that states not deprive a person of life, 
liberty, or property without “due process of law.”221 
In dissent, Justice Black (joined by Justice Douglas) argued that the 
Fourteenth Amendment made all of the Bill of Rights enforceable against the 
states, via the Amendment’s mandate: “No state shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States.”222 Listing a series of 19th century cases in which the Supreme Court 
had refused to make certain individual rights from the Bill of Rights 
enforceable against the states (including Presser, involving the right to keep 
and bear arms), Justice Black argued that the Court’s prior cases had not been 
so explicit as to foreclose the current Court from considering the issue: 
Later, but prior to the Twining case, this Court decided that the following were 
not “privileges or immunities” of national citizenship, so as to make them 
immune against state invasion: the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment, In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436; the Seventh 
Amendment’s guarantee of a jury trial in civil cases, Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 
U.S. 90; the Second Amendment’s ‘right of the people to keep and bear 
arms. . .,’ Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 584; the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments’ requirements for indictment in capital or other infamous crimes, 
and for trial by jury in criminal prosecutions, Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581. 
While it can be argued that these cases implied that no one of the provisions of 
the Bill of Rights was made applicable to the states as attributes of national 
citizenship, no one of them expressly so decided. In fact, the Court in Maxwell 
v. Dow, supra, 176 U.S. at pages 597, 598, 20 S.Ct. at page 455, concluded no 
more than that ‘the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States 
do not necessarily include all the rights protected by the first eight amendments 
 
were state laws forbidding individual blacks to possess arms. So Butler’s argument assumed that 
the Second Amendment right to arms inhered in individuals (including slaves, if the Amendment 
were read literally, with no implied exception for slavery). 
 219. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 48 (1947). 
 220. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 221. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 58-59. (Adamson was overruled by the Supreme Court in the 1964 
decision Malloy v. Hogan, infra note 183). 
 222. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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to the Federal Constitution against the powers of the Federal government.’ Cf. 
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 329, 153. 223 
Thus, Justice Black put the Second Amendment in the same boat as 
Amendments Five, Six, Seven, and Eight: individual rights which prior Courts 
had declined to enforce against the states, but which the present Court still had 
the choice to incorporate. 
In a lengthy Appendix, Justice Black set forth the history of the creation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, quoting at length from congressional proponents 
of the Amendment, who indicated that the Amendment was intended to make 
all of the rights in the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights enforceable 
against the states.224 This view, held by Justice Black and many of the backers 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, is of course inconsistent with the idea that the 
Second Amendment guarantees only a right of state governments. The point of 
the Fourteenth Amendment is to make individual rights enforceable against 
state governments. 
First, the Appendix set forth the background to the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Congress had enacted the Civil Rights Bill in response to 
problems in states such as Mississippi, where, Senator Trumball (Chairman of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee) explained, there was a statute to “prohibit any 
negro or mulatto from having firearms. . .”225 When the Civil Rights Bill went 
to the House, Rep. Raymond, who opposed the Bill “conceded that it would 
guarantee to the negro ‘the right of free passage. . .He has a defined status. . . .a 
right to defend himself. . .to bear arms. . . .to testify in the Federal courts.”226 
Then, 
On May 23, 1866, Senator Howard introduced the proposed amendment to the 
Senate in the absence of Senator Fessenden who was sick. Senator Howard 
prefaced his remarks by stating: 
“I. . .present to the Senate. . .the views and the motives [of the Reconstruction 
Committee]. . . .One result of their investigation has been the joint resolution 
for the amendment of the Constitution of the United States now under 
consideration. . . . 
“The first section of the amendment. . .submitted for the consideration of the 
two Houses, relates to the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several 
States, and to the rights and privileges of all persons, whether citizens or 
others, under the laws of the United States. . . . 
. . . 
 
 223. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 70-71 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 224. Id. at 92-124. 
 225. Id. at 93  (citing Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1865) 474). 
 226. Id. (citing Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1865) 474). 
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“Such is the character of the privileges and immunities spoken of in the second 
section of the fourth article of the Constitution. To these privileges and 
immunities, whatever they may be—for they are not and cannot be fully 
defined in their entire extent and precise nature—to these should be added the 
personal rights guarantied and secured by the first eight amendments of the 
Constitution; such as the freedom of speech and of the press; the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances, a right appertaining to each and all the people; the right to keep 
and to bear arms; the right to be exempted from the quartering of soldiers in a 
house without the consent of the owner; the right to be exempt from 
unreasonable searches and seizures, and from any search or seizure except by 
virtue of a warrant issued upon a formal oath or affidavit; the right of an 
accused person to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him, and 
his right to be tried by an impartial jury of the vicinage; and also the right to be 
secure against excessive bail and against cruel and unusual punishments.227 
Later in the Appendix, Justice Black quoted Rep. Dawes’s statement that 
by the Constitution the American citizen 
“secured the free exercise of his religious belief, and freedom of speech and of 
the press. Then again he had secured to him the right to keep and bear arms in 
his defense. Then, after that, his home was secured in time of peace from the 
presence of a soldier. . . .”228 
. . . . 
“It is all these, Mr. Speaker, which are comprehended in the words ‘American 
citizen,’ and it is to protect and to secure him in these rights, privileges, and 
immunities this bill is before the House. And the question to be settled is, 
whether by the Constitution, in which these provisions are inserted, there is 
also power to guard, protect, and enforce these rights of the citizens; whether 
they are more, indeed, than a mere declaration of rights, carrying with it no 
power of enforcement. . . .” Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. Part I (1871) 
475, 476.229 
Also dissenting, Justice Murphy wrote “that the specific guarantees of the 
Bill of Rights should be carried over intact into the first Section of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”230 The Second Amendment implications of his 
statement are the same as for Justice Black’s longer exposition, although 
Justice Murphy did not enumerate the Second Amendment, or any other right. 
Senator Howard, quoted by Justice Black, listed the individual right to 
arms in its natural order among the other individual rights listed in the Bill of 
 
 227. Id. at 104-07 (emphasis added). 
 228. Id. at 119 (emphasis added). 
 229. Id. at 120. 
 230. Id. at 124 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
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Rights.231 The Henigan/Bogus state’s right theory, however, requires us to 
believe that when Congress sent the Bill of Rights to the states, Congress first 
listed four individual rights (in the First Amendment), then created a state’s 
right (in the Second Amendment), and then reverted to a litany of individual 
rights (Amendments Three through Eight).232 Finally, Congress explicitly 
guaranteed a state’s right in the Tenth Amendment.233 While Congress used 
“the people” to refer to people in the First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments, 
Congress used “the people” to mean “state governments” in the Second 
Amendment.234 Finally, even though Congress had used “the people” in the 
Second Amendment to mean “the states,” Congress in the Tenth Amendment 
explicitly distinguished “the people” from “the states,” reserving powers “to 
the States respectively, or to the people.”235 
Which reading is more sensible: The Black/Howard/Dawes reading, under 
which “the people” means the same thing throughout the Bill of Rights, and 
which makes all of the first eight amendments into a straightforward list of 
individual rights, or the Henigan/Bogus theory, which requires that “the 
people” change meanings repeatedly, and which inserts a state’s right in the 
middle of a litany of individual rights? 
H. Hamilton v. Regents 
This case has been almost entirely overlooked by Second Amendment 
scholarship.236 Hamilton’s obscurity is especially surprising, since it is the one 
Supreme Court case which actually uses the Second Amendment in the way 
that we would expect the Amendment to be used if it were a state’s right: to 
bolster state authority over the militia. 
Two University of California students, the sons of pacifist ministers, sued 
to obtain an exemption from participation in the University of California’s 
mandatory military training program.237 The two students did not contest the 
state of California’s authority to force them to participate in state militia 
exercises, but they argued, in part, that the university’s training program was 
so closely connected with the U.S. War Department as to not really be a militia 
program.238 A unanimous Court disagreed, and stated that California’s 
acceptance of federal assistance in militia training did not transform the 
 
 231. Supra note 228. 
 232. Id. at 73. 
 233. Id. at 74. 
 234. Id. at 76. 
 235. Id. at 77. 
 236. Stephen Halbrook cites the case, but for another point. See STEPHEN HALBROOK, 
FIREARMS LAW DESKBOOK, supra note 106, at 8-44 n.131. 
 237. Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934). 
 238. Id. at 250-51. 
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training program into an arm of the standing army. States had the authority to 
made their own judgements about training: 
So long as [the state’s] action is within retained powers and not inconsistent 
with any exertion of the authority of the national government, and transgresses 
no right safeguarded to the citizen by the Federal Constitution, the State is the 
sole judge of the means to be employed and the amount of training to be 
exacted for the effective accomplishment of these ends. Second Amendment. 
Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 16-17, Dunne v. People, (1879) 94 Ill. 120, 
129. 1 Kent’s Commentaries 265, 389. Cf. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252.239 
Thus, the Court used the Second Amendment to support of a point about a 
state government’s power over its militia. 
This usage was not consistent with a meaningful state’s right theory. A 
state’s right Second Amendment, to have any legal content, would have to give 
the state some exemption from the exercise of federal powers.240 But the Court 
wrote that the state’s discretion in militia training must be “not inconsistent 
with any exertion of the authority of the national government.”241 
Another way to read Hamilton’s Second Amendment citation would be as 
a reminder of the expectation by all the Founders that states would supervise 
the militia. This reminder would be consistent with the state’s rights theory and 
with the standard model. 
The authorities cited along with “Second Amendment” by the Hamilton 
Court do not support a reading of the Second Amendment as guaranteeing a 
state’s right, but instead support an individual right. 
Houston v. Moore (to be discussed in more detail below), involved the 
state of Pennsylvania’s authority to punish a man for evading service in the 
federal militia, which had been called to fight the war of 1812.242 The report of 
the attorneys’ arguments, on both sides, shows that the Second Amendment 
was not raised as an issue.243 The Houston pages which were cited by the 
Hamilton Court contain the statement, spanning the two pages, that “[A]s state 
militia, the power of the state governments to legislate on the same subjects 
[organizing, arming, disciplining, training, and officering the militia], having 
existed prior to the formation of the constitution, and not having been 
prohibited by that instrument, it remains with the states, subordinate 
nevertheless to the paramount law of the general government, operating on the 
same subject.”244 In other words, state militia powers were inherent in the 
 
 239. Id. at 260-61. 
 240. For a discussion of this point, see Glenn Harlan Reynolds & Don B. Kates, The Second 
Amendment and States’ Rights: A Thought Experiment, supra note 7. 
 241. Hamilton, 293 U.S. at 260. 
 242. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).  See infra text at notes 343-53. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 16-17. 
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nature of state sovereignty, and continue to exist except to the extent limited by 
Congress under its Constitutional militia powers. 
In Dunne v. People, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the centrality of 
state power over the militia, citing the Tenth Amendment and the Houston v. 
Moore precedent.245 The Dunne court also explained how a state’s 
constitutional duty to operate a militia was complemented by the right of the 
state’s citizens to have arms: 
“A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State,” the 
States, by an amendment to the constitution, have imposed a restriction that 
Congress shall not infringe the right of the “people to keep and bear arms.” 
The chief executive officer of the State is given power by the constitution to 
call out the militia “to execute the laws, suppress insurrection and repel 
invasion.”246 This would be a mere barren grant of power unless the State had 
power to organize its own militia for its own purposes. Unorganized, the 
militia would be of no practical aid to the executive in maintaining order and in 
protecting life and property within the limits of the State. These are duties that 
devolve on the State, and unless these rights are secured to the citizen, of what 
worth is the State government?247 
The cited pages of Kent’s Commentaries discuss state versus federal 
powers over the militia.  Chancellor Kent uses Martin v. Mott248 to show that a 
President’s decision that there is a need to call out the militia is final. Houston 
v. Moore249 (state authority to prosecute a person for refusing a federal militia 
call) is used to show that if the federal government neglects its constitutional 
duty to organize, arm, and discipline the militia, the states have the inherent 
authority to do so. The Second Amendment was not used by Kent or by Kent’s 
cited cases to support his propositions. 
Presser v. Illinois will be discussed below; the case affirmed a state’s 
authority to make a gun control law (a ban on armed parades in public) which 
contained an exemption for the state’s organized militia.250 
Later in the opinion, the Hamilton Court quoted United States v. 
Schwimmer, a 1929 decision which held that an immigrant pacifist’s refusal to 
bear arms in the army or in the Second Amendment’s well-regulated militia 
proved that the immigrant was not fit for citizenship.251 
 
 245. Dunne v. People, 94 Ill. 120 (1879). 
 246. The court was quoting language from Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which 
gives such authority to Congress. This grant is not inconsistent with pre-existent state authority, 
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 248. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 19 (1827). 
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IV. THE TAFT, FULLER, AND WAITE COURTS 
Between the end of Reconstruction and the New Deal, there were eleven 
opinions (all but one a majority opinion) touching on the Second Amendment. 
Most involved the scope of the “privileges and immunities” which the 
Fourteenth Amendment protected from state interference. Nine of the opinions 
(including the one dissent) treated the Second Amendment as an individual 
right, while the tenth was ambiguous, and the eleventh refused to address any 
of a plaintiff’s arguments (of which the Second Amendment was one) because 
of a lack of injury and hence a lack of standing. 
A. United States v. Schwimmer 
A divided Supreme Court held that a female pacifist who wished to 
become a United States citizen could be denied citizenship because of her 
energetic advocacy of pacifism.252 The Court majority found the promotion of 
pacifism inconsistent with good citizenship because it dissuaded people from 
performing their civic duties, including the duty to bear arms in a well 
regulated militia.253 Since it is agreed by Standard Modelers and their critics 
alike that the federal and state governments have the authority to compel 
citizens to perform militia service, the Schwimmer opinion does not help 
resolve the individual rights controversy: 
That it is the duty of citizens by force of arms to defend our government 
against all enemies whenever necessity arises is a fundamental principle of the 
Constitution. 
The common defense was one of the purposes for which the people ordained 
and established the Constitution. It empowers Congress to provide for such 
defense, to declare war, to raise and support armies, to maintain a navy, to 
make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces, to 
provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for calling it 
forth to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel 
invasions; it makes the President commander in chief of the army and navy 
and of the militia of the several states when called into the service of the 
United States; it declares that, a well-regulated militia being necessary to the 
security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not 
be infringed. We need not refer to the numerous statutes that contemplate 
defense of the United States, its Constitution and laws, by armed citizens. This 
court, in the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, page 378, 38 S. Ct. 159, 
161 (62 L. Ed. 349, L. R. A. 1918C, 361, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 856), speaking 
through Chief Justice White, said that “the very conception of a just 
government and its duty to the citizen includes the reciprocal obligation of the 
citizen to render military service in case of need. . . .” 
 
 252. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929). 
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Whatever tends to lessen the willingness of citizens to discharge their duty to 
bear arms in the country’s defense detracts from the strength and safety of the 
Government. . . .The influence of conscientious objectors against the use of 
military force in defense of the principles of our Government is apt to be more 
detrimental than their mere refusal to bear arms. . .her objection to military 
service rests on reasons other than mere inability because of her sex and age 
personally to bear arms.254 
Schwimmer illustrates two points about which the Standard Model authors 
agree with Bogus and Henigan: first, the phrase “bear arms” in the Second 
Amendment can have militia service connotations. The Standard Modelers 
(and Justice Ginsburg)255, however, disagree with Bogus and Henigan’s claim 
that “bear arms” always has a militia/military meaning, and never any other. 
Second, Schwimmer illustrates that bearing arms can be a duty of citizenship 
which the government can impose on the citizen. While opponents of the 
standard model use this fact to argue that the Second Amendment is about a 
duty, and not about an individual right,256 the Standard Model professors 
respond by pointing to jury service, to show that an individual constitutional 
right (the right to be eligible for jury service257) can also be a duty. 
B. Stearns v. Wood 
This case came to the Court after World War I had broken out in 
Europe.258 The U.S. War Department had sent “Circular 8” to the various 
National Guards, putting restrictions on promotion. Plaintiff Stearns, a Major 
in the Ohio National Guard, was thereby deprived of any opportunity to win 
promotion above the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.259 Stearns argued that 
Circular 8 violated the Preamble to the Constitution, Article One’s 
specification of Congressional powers over the militia, Article One’s grant of 
army powers to the Congress, Article Two’s making the President the 
Commander in Chief of the militia when called into federal service, the Second 
Amendment, and the Tenth Amendment.260 
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice McReynolds contemptuously 
dismissed Stearns’ claim without reaching the merits.261 Since Stearns’ present 
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rank of Major was undisturbed, there was no genuine controversy for the Court 
to consider, and the Court would not render advisory opinions.262 
Even though the Court never reached the merits of the Second Amendment 
argument, it is possible to draw some inferences simply from the fact that the 
Second Amendment argument was made in the case. First of all, Major 
Stearns’ argument shows that using the Second Amendment to criticize federal 
control of the National Guard was not an absurd argument—or at least no more 
absurd than using the Preamble to the Constitution for the same purpose. And 
after the 1905 Kansas Supreme Court case Salina v. Blaksley ruled that the 
Kansas constitution’s right to arms (and, by analogy, the U.S. Second 
Amendment) protected the state government, and not the citizen of Kansas,263 
Stearns’ attorney’s argument did have some foundation in case law. 
C. Twining v. New Jersey 
In Twining, the Supreme Court (with the first Harlan in dissent) refused to 
make the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination guarantee in the Bill of Rights 
applicable to state trials, via the Fourteenth Amendment.264 In support of this 
result, the majority listed other individual rights which had not been made 
enforceable against the states, under the Privileges and Immunities clause: 
The right to trial by jury in civil cases, guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment 
(Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90), and the right to bear arms guaranteed by the 
Second Amendment (Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252) have been distinctly 
held not to be privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by the States, 
and in effect the same decision was made in respect of the guarantee against 
prosecution, except by indictment of a grand jury, contained in the Fifth 
Amendment (Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516), and in respect to the right 
to be confronted with witnesses, contained in the Sixth Amendment. West v. 
Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258. In Maxwell v. Dow, supra. . .it was held that 
indictment, made indispensable by the Fifth Amendment, and the trial by jury 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, were not privileges and immunities of 
citizens of the United States.265 
The Second Amendment here appears—along with Seventh Amendment 
civil juries, Sixth Amendment confrontation, and Fifth Amendment grand 
juries—as a right of individuals, but a right only enforceable against the federal 
government. As we shall see below, the exact meaning of the 1886 Presser 
case was subject to dispute; some argued that the case simply upheld a 
particular gun control as not being in violation of the Second Amendment, 
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while others argued that Presser held that the Second Amendment was not one 
of the “Privileges and Immunities” which the Fourteenth Amendment protects 
against state action. Twining clearly takes the latter view. 
D. Maxwell v. Dow 
Maxwell was the majority’s decision (again, over Harlan’s dissent) not to 
make the right to a jury in a criminal case into one of the Privileges or 
Immunities protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.266 Regarding the Second 
Amendment and Presser, the Court wrote: 
In Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, it was held that the Second Amendment to 
the Constitution, in regard to the right of the people to bear arms, is a 
limitation only on the power of the Congress and the National Government, 
and not of the States. It was therein said, however, that as all citizens capable 
of bearing arms constitute the reserved military force of the National 
Government, the States could not prohibit the people from keeping and bearing 
arms, so as to deprive the United States of their rightful resource for 
maintaining the public security, and disable the people from performing their 
duty to the General Government.267 
The Maxwell description of Presser was somewhat narrower than 
Twining’s description. Maxwell used Presser only to show that the Second 
Amendment does not in itself apply to the states; Twining used Presser to 
show that the Fourteenth Amendment privileges and immunities clause did not 
make the Second Amendment indirectly applicable to the states. 
E. Trono v. United States, and Kepner v. United States 
After the United States won the Spanish-American War, the Philippines 
were ceded to the United States. American control was successfully imposed 
only after several years of hard warfare suppressed Filipinos fighting for 
independence.268 Congress in 1902 enacted legislation imposing most, but not 
all of the Bill of Rights on the Territorial Government of the Philippines. The 
1905 Trono269 case and the 1904 Kepner270 case both grew out of criminal 
prosecutions in the Philippines in which the defendant claimed his rights had 
been violated. 
In Trono, at the beginning of the Justice Peckham’s majority opinion, the 
Congressional act imposing the Bill of Rights was summarized: 
 
 266. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1899). 
 267. Id. at 597. 
 268. The war led to the development of the Colt .45 self-loading pistols, since smaller pistol 
rounds often had insufficient stopping power against the Filipino warriors. 
 269. Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905). 
 270. Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904). 
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The whole language [of the Act] is substantially taken from the Bill of Rights 
set forth in the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, omitting 
the provisions in regard to the right of trial by jury and the right of the people 
to bear arms, and containing the prohibition of the 13th Amendment, and also 
prohibiting the passage of bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.271 
As with other cases, the “right of the people” to arms is listed in a litany of 
other rights which are universally acknowledged to be individual rights, not 
state’s rights.272 
It could be argued that the Second Amendment was omitted from the 
Congressional Act because the Amendment is a state’s right, and there was no 
point in putting a state’s right item into laws governing a territory. Indeed, the 
omission of the Tenth Amendment from the Congressional 1902 Act is 
perfectly explicable on the grounds that the Tenth Amendment protects 
federalism, but does not control a territorial or state government’s dealings 
with its citizens.273 
And thus, when the Supreme Court listed the individual rights which were 
not included in the 1902 Act, the Court did not note the omission of the Tenth 
Amendment; there was no possibility that Congress could have included the 
Tenth Amendment, since it would have no application to the territorial 
government’s actions against the Filipino people.274 
In contrast, the Court did note the omission of “the right of trial by jury 
and the right of the people to bear arms.”275 The logical implication, then, is 
that jury trial and the right to arms (unlike the Tenth Amendment) are 
individual rights which Congress could have required the Territorial 
Government to respect in the Philippines.276 
The 1904 United States v. Kepner case involved a similar issue. 277 There, 
the Court described the 1902 Act in more detail. The description of items 
omitted from the Act was nearly identical to the Trono language.278 
 
 271. Trono, 199 U.S. at 528. 
 272. Id.  
 273. 32 Stat. 691 (1902). 
 274. Trono, 199 U.S. at 528. 
 275. Id. 
 276. See id. 
 277. Kepner, 195 U.S. at 123-24. 
 278. Id.  They are the familiar language of the Bill of Rights, slightly changed in form, but not 
in substance, as found in the first nine amendments to the Constitution of the United States, with 
the omission of the provision preserving the right of trial by jury and the right of the people to 
bear arms, and adding the prohibition of the 13th Amendment against slavery or involuntary 
servitude except as punishment for crime, and that of Article I, Section 9, to the passage of bills 
of attainder and ex post facto laws. 
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F. Robertson v. Baldwin 
In 1897, the Court refused to apply the Thirteenth Amendment to merchant 
seamen who had jumped ship, been caught, and been impressed back into 
maritime service without due process.279 The Court explained that Thirteenth 
Amendment’s ban on involuntary servitude, even though absolute on its face, 
contained various implicit exceptions.280 In support of the finding of an 
exception to the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court argued that the Bill of 
Rights also contained unstated exceptions: 
The law is perfectly well settled that the first ten Amendments to the 
constitution, commonly known as the Bill of Rights, were not intended to lay 
down any novel principles of government, but simply to embody certain 
guarantees and immunities which we had inherited from our English ancestors, 
and which from time immemorial had been subject to certain well-recognized 
exceptions arising from the necessities of the case. In incorporating these 
principles into the fundamental law, there was no intention of disregarding the 
exceptions, which continued to be recognized as if they had been formally 
expressed. Thus, the freedom of speech and of the press (article 1) does not 
permit the publication of libels, blasphemous or indecent articles, or other 
publications injurious to public morals or private reputation; the right of the 
people to keep and bear arms (article 2) is not infringed by law prohibiting the 
carrying of concealed weapons; the provision that no person shall be twice put 
in jeopardy (art. 5) does not prevent a second trial, if upon the first trial the 
jury failed to agree, or the verdict was set aside upon the defendant’s 
motion. . . .281 
Likewise, the self-incrimination clause did not bar a person from being 
compelled to testify against himself if he were immune from prosecution; and 
the confrontation clause did not bar the admission of dying declarations.282 
In 1897, state laws which barred individuals from carrying concealed 
weapons were common, and usually upheld by state supreme courts283; the 
laws did not forbid state militias from carrying concealed weapons. The 
prohibitions on concealed carry are the exceptions that prove the rule. Only if 
the Second Amendment is an individual right does the Court’s invocation of a 
concealed carry exception make any sense. 
 
 279. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 277 (1897). 
 280. Id. at 281. 
 281. Id. at 281-82. 
 282. Id. at 282. 
 283. See, e.g., State v. Workman, 35 W. Va. 367 (1891). See generally, Kopel, The Second 
Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, supra note 9; Cramer, For the Defense of Themselves and 
the State, supra note 9. 
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G. Brown v. Walker 
When a witness before an Interstate Commerce Commission investigation 
invoked the Fifth Amendment to refuse to answer questions under oath, the 
majority of the Supreme Court ruled against his invocation of the privilege 
against self-incrimination.284 The majority pointed out that a Congressional 
statute protected the witness from any criminal prosecution growing out of the 
testimony. 285 
Dissenting, Justice Stephen Field (perhaps the strongest civil liberties 
advocate on the Court during the nineteenth century) contended that the 
“infamy and disgrace” which might result from the testimony was justification 
enough not to testify, even if there could be no criminal prosecution.286 Justice 
Field’s opinion carefully analyzed English and early American precedent, 
reflecting Field’s vivid appreciation of the long Anglo-American struggle for 
liberty against arbitrary government.287 Law and order was less important than 
Constitutional law, he continued, for the claim that “the proof of offenses like 
those prescribed by the interstate commerce act will be difficult and probably 
impossible, ought not to have a feather’s weight against the abuses which 
would follow necessarily the enforcement of incriminating testimony.”288 All 
Constitutional rights ought to be liberally construed, for: 
As said by counsel for the appellant: “The freedom of thought, of speech, and 
of the press; the right to bear arms; exemption from military dictation; security 
of the person and of the home; the right to speedy and public trial by jury; 
protection against oppressive bail and cruel punishment,—are, together with 
exemption from self-crimination, the essential and inseparable features of 
English liberty. Each one of these features had been involved in the struggle 
above referred to in England within the century and a half immediately 
preceding the adoption of the constitution, and the contests were fresh in the 
memories and traditions of the people at that time.”289 
This is just the opposite of Dennis Henigan’s assertion that the Second 
Amendment is written so as to be less fundamental than the first.290 Justice 
Field’s paragraph is not a list of state powers, it is a list of personal rights won 
 
 284. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). 
 285. The Presser case, discussed infra at notes 310-20, appears in the Justice Brown’s 
majority opinion, as part of a string cite for the proposition, “the first eight amendments are 
limitations only upon the powers of congress and the federal courts, and are not applicable to the 
several states, except so far as the fourteenth amendment may have made them applicable.” Id. at 
606. 
 286. Id. at 631 (Field, J., dissenting). 
 287. Id. at 632. 
 288. Id. at 635. 
 289. Id. (em phases added). 
 290. Henigan, Guns and the Constitution, supra note 4. 
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at great cost—rights which may never be trumped by the legislature’s 
perceived needs of the moment. 
H. Miller v. Texas 
Franklin P. Miller was a white man in Dallas who fell in love with a 
woman whom local newspapers would later call “a greasy negress.” In 
response to a rumor that Miller was carrying a handgun without a license, a 
gang of Dallas police officers, after some hard drinking at a local tavern, 
invaded Miller’s store with guns drawn. A shoot-out ensued, and the evidence 
was conflicting as to who fired first, and whether Miller realized that the 
invaders were police officers. But Miller was stone cold sober, and the police 
gang was not; thus, Miller killed one of the intruders during the shoot-out, 
although the gang’s superior numbers resulted in Miller’s capture. 
During Miller’s murder trial, the prosecutor asserted to the jury that Miller 
had been carrying a gun illegally. Upon conviction of murdering the police 
officer, Miller appealed to various courts, and lost every time. 
Appealing to the Supreme Court in 1894, Miller alleged violations of his 
Second Amendment, Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.291 Regarding the Second Amendment, Miller claimed that 
it negated the Texas statute against concealed carrying of a weapon.292 
A unanimous Court rejected Miller’s contentions: A “state law forbidding 
the carrying of dangerous weapons on the person. . . does not abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”293 This statement 
about concealed weapons laws was consistent with what the Court would say 
about such laws three years later, in the Robertson case.294 
Moreover, the Second Amendment, like the rest of the Bill of Rights, only 
operated directly on the federal government, and not on the states: “the 
restrictions of these amendments [Second, Fourth, and Fifth] operate only upon 
the Federal power.”295 
But did the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Second, Fourth, and Fifth 
Amendments applicable to the states? Here, the Miller Court was agnostic: “If 
the Fourteenth Amendment limited the power of the States as to such rights, as 
pertaining to the citizens of the United States, we think it was fatal to this 
claim that it was not set up in the trial court.”296 
Just eight years before, in Presser the Court had said that the Second 
Amendment does not apply directly to the states; Miller reaffirmed this part of 
 
 291. Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894). 
 292. Id. at 538. 
 293. Id. at 539. 
 294. Robertson, 165 U.S. at 281-82, supra text at notes 280-82. 
 295. Id. at 538. 
 296. Id. 
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the Presser. Another part of Presser had implied that the right to arms was not 
one of the “privileges or immunities” of American citizenship, although the 
Presser Court did not explicitly mention the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In Miller v. Texas, the Court suggested that Miller might have had a 
Fourteenth Amendment argument, if he had raised the issue properly at trial.297 
If Presser foreclosed any possibility that Second Amendment rights could be 
enforced via the Fourteenth Amendment, then the Miller Court’s statement 
would make no sense. Was Miller an early hint that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s due process clause might protect substantive elements of the 
Bill of Rights? Three years later, the Court used the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
due process clause for the first time to apply part of the Bill of Rights against a 
state.298 
A decade after Miller, Twining in 1908 did claim that Presser stood for the 
Second Amendment not being a Fourteenth Amendment privilege or 
immunity. But between Presser in 1886 and Twining in 1908, other readings 
were permissible. Not only does Miller in 1894 appear to invite such readings, 
but so does the 1887 case Spies v. Illinois, which involved the murder 
prosecutions arising out of the Haymarket Riot.299 John Randolph Tucker 
represented the defendants. Tucker, an eminent Congressman, author of an 
important treatise on constitutional law, a future President of the American Bar 
Association, and a leading law professor at Washington and Lee300—argued 
that the whole Bill of Rights was enforceable against the states, including the 
right to arms.301 
 
 297. Miller, 153 U.S. at 538. 
 298. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (takings clause). 
 299. Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887). See generally PAUL AVRICH, THE HAYMARKET 
TRAGEDY (1986). 
 300. JOHN RANDOLPH TUCKER, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (Fred B. 
Rothman & Co. 1981) (1899); William G. Bean, John Randolph Tucker, in THE DICTIONARY OF 
AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY (CD-Rom ed. 1997). 
 301.  
I hold the privilege and immunity of a citizen of the United States to be such as have their 
recognition in or guaranty from the Constitution of the United States. Take then the 
declared object of the Preamble, “to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our 
posterity,” we ordain this Constitution—that is, we grant powers, declare rights, and 
create a Union of States. See the provisions as to personal liberty in the States guarded by 
provision as to ex post facto laws, &c.; as to contract rights—against States’ power to 
impair them, and as to legal tender; the security for habeas corpus; the limits imposed on 
Federal power in the Amendments and in the original Constitution as to trial by jury, &c.; 
the Declaration of Rights—the privilege of freedom of speech and press—of peaceable 
assemblages of the people—of keeping and bearing arms—of immunity from search and 
seizure—immunity from self-accusation, from second trial—and privilege of trial by due 
process of law. In these last we find the privileges and immunities secured to the citizen 
by the Constitution. It may have been that the States did not secure them to all men. It is 
true that they did not. Being secured by the Constitution of the United States to all, when 
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Tucker argued that all “these ten Amendments” were “privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the United States, which the Fourteenth Amendment 
forbids every State to abridge,” and cited Cruikshank in support.302 As for 
Presser, that case “did not decide that the right to keep and bear arms was not a 
privilege of a citizen of the United States which a State might therefore 
abridge, but that a State could under its police power forbid organizations of 
armed men, dangerous to the public peace.”303 
Chief Justice Waite’s majority opinion in Spies cited Cruikshank and 
Presser (along with many other cases) only for the proposition that the first ten 
Amendments do not apply directly to the states.304 (An 1890 opinion, 
Eilenbecker, again cited Cruikshank and Presser as holding that the Bill of 
Rights does not apply directly to the states.305) The Spies’ defendants’ 
substantive claims (relating to the criminal procedure and jury portions of the 
Bill of Rights) were rejected as either incorrect (e.g., the jury was not biased) 
or as not properly raised at trial, and thus not appropriate for appeal.306 
Tucker’s reading of Presser is not the only possible one, but Tucker—one 
of the most distinguished lawyers of his time—was far too competent to make 
an argument in a capital case before the Supreme Court that was contrary to 
Supreme Court precedent from only a year before. It may be permissible to 
read Presser the same way that John Randolph Tucker did (as upholding a 
particular gun control law), or as Spies, Maxwell, and Eilenbecker did (as 
 
they were not, and were not required to be, secured by every State, they are, as said in the 
Slaughter-House Cases, privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. 
The position I take is this: Though originally the first ten Amendments were adopted as 
limitations on Federal power, yet in so far as they secure and recognize fundamental 
rights—common law rights—of the man, they make them privileges and immunities of 
the man as citizen of the United States, and cannot now be abridged by a State under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In other words, while the ten Amendments, as limitations on 
power, only apply to the Federal government, and not to the States, yet in so far as they 
declare or recognize rights of persons, these rights are theirs, as citizens of the United 
States, and the Fourteenth Amendment as to such rights limits state power, as the ten 
Amendments had limited Federal power. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Spies, 123 U.S. at 166. 
 305. Eilenbecker v. District Court of Plymouth County, 134 U.S. 131 (1890): 
The first three of these assignments of error, as we have stated them, being the first and 
second and fourth of the assignments as numbered in the brief of the plaintiffs in error, are 
disposed of at once by the principle often decided by this court, that the first eight articles 
of the amendments to the Constitution have reference to powers exercised by the 
government of the United States and not to those of the States. Livingston v. Moore, 7 
Pet. 469; The Justices v. Murray, 9 Wall. 274; Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. 532; United 
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542; Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90; Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 
410; Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540; Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252. 
 306. Spies, 123 U.S. at 168. 
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stating that the Second Amendment does not by its own power apply to the 
states), or as Twining and Malloy v. Hogan did (as rejecting incorporation of 
the Second Amendment via the Privileges and Immunities clause). We will get 
to Presser soon, so that the reader can supply her own interpretations.307 
Whatever Miller v. Texas implies about the Fourteenth Amendment, its 
Second Amendment lessons are easy. First, the Amendment does not directly 
limit the states. Second, the Amendment protects an individual right. Miller 
was a private citizen, and never claimed any right as a member of the Texas 
Militia. But according to the Court, Miller’s problem was the Second 
Amendment was raised against the wrong government (Texas, rather than the 
federal government), and at the wrong time (on appeal, rather than at trial). If 
the Henigan/Bogus state’s right theory were correct, then the Court should 
have rejected Miller’s Second Amendment claim because Miller was an 
individual rather than the government of Texas. Instead, the Court treated the 
Second Amendment exactly like the Fourth and the Fifth, which were also at 
issue: all three amendments protected individual rights, but only against the 
federal government; while the Fourteenth Amendment might, arguably, make 
these rights enforceable against the states, Miller’s failure to raise the issue at 
trial precluded further inquiry. 
I. Logan v. United States 
This case arose out of a prosecution under the Enforcement Act, a 
Congressional statute outlawing private conspiracies against the exercise of 
civil rights.308 The Enforcement Act was also as issue in Cruikshank, infra. In 
Logan, a mob had kidnapped a group of prisoners who were being held in the 
custody of federal law enforcement.309 The issue before the Court was whether 
the prisoners, by action of the mob, had been deprived of any of their federal 
civil rights. 
Logan affirmed Cruikshank’s position that the First and Second 
Amendments recognize preexisting fundamental human rights, rather than 
creating new rights. The First Amendment right of assembly and the Second 
 
 307. During the nineteenth century, the official Supreme Court reports included summaries of 
counsels’ arguments. Besides Tucker’s argument in Spies, there are two other nineteenth century 
cases which record use by counsel of the Second Amendment; both uses were by the Attorney 
General’s office, and both regarded the Second Amendment as an individual right. In the 
argument for In re Rapier, Assistant Attorney General Maury defended a federal ban on the 
mailing of lottery tickets: “Freedom of the press, like freedom of speech, and ‘the right to keep 
and bear arms,’ admits of and requires regulation, which is the law of liberty that prevents these 
rights from running into license.” In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110, 131 (1892). The other argument 
came from the Attorney General in Ex Parte Milligan. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 
(1866); supra note 217. 
 308. Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1892). 
 309. Id. at 285-86. 
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Amendment right to arms are construed in pari materia, suggesting that they 
both protect individual rights: 
In U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, as the same term, in which also the 
opinion was delivered by the chief justice, the indictment was on section 6 of 
the enforcement act of 1870, (re-enacted in Rev. St. 5508, under which the 
present conviction was had,) and the points adjudged on the construction of the 
constitution and the extent of the powers of congress were as follows: 
(1) It was held that the first amendment of the constitution, by which it was 
ordained that congress should make no law abridging the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of 
grievances, did not grant to the people the right peaceably to assemble for 
lawful purposes, but recognized that right as already existing, and did not 
guaranty its continuance except as against acts of congress; and therefore the 
general right was not a right secured by the constitution of the United States. 
But the court added: “The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the 
purpose of petitioning congress for a redress of grievances, or for anything else 
connected with the powers or the duties of the national government, is an 
attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under the protection of, and 
guarantied by, the United States. The very idea of a government, republican in 
form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for 
consultation in respect to public affairs, and to petition for a redress of 
grievances. If it had been alleged in these counts that the object of the 
defendants was to prevent a meeting for such a purpose, the cause would have 
been within the statute, and within the scope of the sovereignty of the United 
States.” 92 U.S. 552, 553. 
(2) It was held that the second amendment of the constitution, declaring that 
“the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed,” was 
equally limited in its scope. 92 U.S. 553. 
(3) It was held that a conspiracy of individuals to injure, oppress, and 
intimidate citizens of the United States, with intent to deprive them of life and 
liberty without due process of law, did not come within the statute, nor under 
the power of congress, because the rights of life and liberty were not granted 
by the constitution, but were natural and inalienable rights of man; and that the 
fourteenth amendment of the constitution, declaring that no state shall deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, added 
nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another, but simply furnished an 
additional guaranty against any encroachment by the states upon the 
fundamental rights which belong to every citizen as a member of society. It 
was of these fundamental rights of life and liberty, not created by or dependent 
on the constitution, that the court said: “Sovereignty, for this purpose, rests 
alone with the states. It is no more the duty or within the power of the United 
States to punish for a conspiracy to falsely imprison or murder within a state 
than it would be to punish for false imprisonment or murder itself.” 92 U.S. 
553, 554. 
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4th. It was held that the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment forbidding any 
State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws, gave no greater power to Congress. 92 U.S. 555. 
5th. It was held, in accordance with United States v. Reese, above cited, that the 
counts for conspiracy to prevent and hinder citizens of the African race in the 
free exercise and enjoyment of the right to vote at state elections, or to injure 
and oppress them for having voted at such election, not alleging that this was 
on account of their race, or color, or previous condition of servitude, could not 
be maintained; that court stating: “The right to vote in the States comes from 
the States; but the right of exemption from prohibited discrimination comes 
from the United States. The first has not been granted or secured by the 
Constitution of the United States, but the last has been.” 92 U.S. 556 
Nothing else was decided in United States v. Cruikshank, except questions of 
the technical sufficiency of the indictment, having no bearing upon the larger 
questions.310 
Thus, to the Logan Court, the First Amendment right to assemble and the 
Second Amendment right to arms are identical: both are individual rights; both 
pre-exist the Constitution; both are protected by the Constitution, rather than 
created by the Constitution; both rights are protected only against government 
interference, not against the interference of private conspirators. 
J. Presser v. Illinois 
In the late 19th century, many state governments violently suppressed 
peaceful attempts by workingmen to exercise their economic and collective 
bargaining rights. In response to the violent state action, some workers created 
self-defense organizations. In response to the self-defense organizations, some 
state governments, such as Illinois’s, enacted laws against armed public 
parades.311 
Defying the Illinois Statue, a self-defense organization composed of 
German working-class immigrants defied the law, and held a parade in which 
one of the leaders carried an unloaded rifle. At trial, the leader—Herman 
Presser—argued that the Illinois law violated the Second Amendment. 
The Supreme Court ruled against him unanimously. First, the Court held 
that the Illinois ban on armed parades “does not infringe the right of the people 
to keep and bear arms.”312 This holding was consistent with traditional 
 
 310. Id. at 286-88. 
 311. See Levinson, supra note 9; Stephen Halbrook, The Right of Workers to Assemble and to 
Bear Arms: Presser v. Illinois, Last Holdout Against Application of the Bill of Rights to the 
States, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. (1999, forthcoming). 
 312. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886). 
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common law boundaries on the right to arms, which prohibited terrifyingly 
large assemblies of armed men.313 
Further, the Second Amendment by its own force “is a limitation only 
upon the power of Congress and the National Government, and not upon that 
of the States.”314 
Did some other part of the Constitution make the Second Amendment 
enforceable against the states? The Court added that the Illinois law did not 
appear to interfere with any of the “privileges or immunities” of citizens of the 
United States.315 Although the Court never actually used the words “Fourteenth 
Amendment,” it is reasonable to read Presser as holding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities clause does not restrict state 
interference with keeping and bearing arms. This reading is consistent with all 
the other Fourteenth Amendment cases from the Supreme Court in the 1870s 
and 1880s, which consistently reject the proposition that any part of the Bill of 
Rights is among the “Privileges and Immunities” protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.316 
As to whether the Second Amendment might be protected by another part 
of the Fourteenth Amendment—the clause forbidding states to deprive a 
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law317—the Court 
had nothing to say. The theory that the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment might protect substantive constitutional rights had not yet been 
invented. Most of what the Waite Court had to say about Bill of Rights 
incorporation has long since been repudiated (although not always formally 
overruled) by subsequent courts, via the Due Process clause. 
It is true that some modern lower courts cling to Presser and claim that 
Presser prevents them from addressing a litigant’s claim that a state statute 
violates the Second Amendment.318 It is hard to take such judicial arguments 
seriously. An 1886 decision about Privileges and Immunities is hardly binding 
precedent for 1990s Due Process. The dicta from the modern Supreme Court 
about the Second Amendment as a possible Fourteenth Amendment liberty 
interest is incompatible with the claim that Presser forecloses any possible 
theory of incorporating the Second Amendment. At most, Presser rejects 
Privileges and Immunities incorporation, but the case cannot be read to address 
a legal theory (Due Process incorporation) which did not exist at the time the 
case was decided. 
 
 313. 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 126 (Garland Publ. 
1978) (1716) (A Justice of the Peace may require surety from persons who “go about with 
unusual Weapons or Attendants, to the Terror of the People.”) 
 314. Presser, 116 U.S. at 265. 
 315. Id. at 266. 
 316. Id. 
 317. U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1. 
 318. E.g., Fresno Rifle Club v. Van de Kamp, 965 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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Interestingly, Presser does offer another theory on which the United States 
Constitution might restrict state anti-gun laws. Article I, section 8, clauses 15 
and 16 give Congress various powers over the militia.319 States may not 
interfere with these Congressional militia powers; so in dicta, the Presser 
Court stated that the states could not disarm the public so as to deprive the 
federal government of its militia: 
It is undoubtedly true that all citizens capable of bearing arms constitute the 
reserved military force or reserve militia of the United States, and, in view of 
this prerogative of the general government. . .the States cannot, even laying the 
Constitutional provision in question [the Second Amendment] out of view, 
prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United 
States of their rightful resource for maintaining the public security, and disable 
the people from performing their duty to the general government. But, as 
already stated, we think it clear that the sections under consideration do not 
have this effect.320 
So according to Presser, the constitutional militia includes “all citizens capable 
of bearing arms.”321 But this statement is not directly about the Second 
Amendment; it is about Congressional powers to use the militia under Article 
I, section 8, clauses 15 and 16. 
V. THE CHASE, TANEY, AND MARSHALL COURTS 
The majority of the Chase Court was just as hostile to a broad reading of 
the Fourteenth Amendment as was the Waite Court; unsurprisingly, the Chase 
Court rejected the idea that Congress could use the Fourteenth Amendment to 
legislate against private interference with First or Second Amendment rights. 
At the same time, the Chase Court described the First Amendment assembly 
right and the Second Amendment arms rights as fundamental human rights 
which pre-existed the Constitution. 
 
 319. Id. at 265. 
 320. Id. at 265-66. 
 321. Id.   For the subsequent interpretation of Presser, see Malloy v. Hogan, supra note 184 
(Second Amendment is not a Fourteenth Amendment Privilege or Immunity); Poe v. Ullman, 
supra note 204 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (Fourteenth Amendment liberty is not co-extensive with 
Bill of Rights); Adamson v. California, supra note 222 (Black, J., dissenting) (Second 
Amendment not directly applicable against states); Twining v. New Jersey, supra note 264 
(Second Amendment not a Fourteenth Amendment Privilege or Immunity); Maxwell v. Dow, 
supra note 266 (Second Amendment not directly applicable to states); Brown v. Walker, supra 
note 284 (same); Miller v. Texas, supra notes 291-96 (Second Amendment not directly 
applicable, not a Privilege or Immunity) but enforcement against states via Fourteenth 
Amendment is an open question; Spies v. Illinois, supra note 303 (Second Amendment not 
directly applicable against states); Eilenbecker, supra note 304 (same). 
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One of the most notable cases of the nineteenth century, Dred Scott, used 
the Second Amendment to support arguments about other subjects; the 
arguments recognized the Second Amendment right as an individual one. 
And the very first Supreme Court opinion to mention the Second 
Amendment—Justice Story’s dissent in Houston v. Moore—is so obscure that 
even most Second Amendment specialists are unfamiliar with it. It is 
analogous to the Hamilton case, in that it uses the Second Amendment to 
underscore state militia powers. 
A. United States v. Cruikshank 
An important part of Congress’s work during Reconstruction was the 
Enforcement Acts, which criminalized private conspiracies to violate civil 
rights. 322 Among the civil rights violations which especially concerned 
Congress was the disarmament of Freedmen by the Ku Klux Klan and similar 
gangs.323 
After a rioting band of whites burned down a Louisiana courthouse which 
was occupied by group of armed blacks (following the disputed 1872 
elections), the whites and their leader, Klansman William Cruikshank, were 
prosecuted under the Enforcement Acts. Cruikshank was convicted of 
conspiring to deprive the blacks of the rights they had been granted by the 
Constitution, including the right peaceably to assemble and the right to bear 
arms.324 
In United States v. Cruikshank, the Supreme Court held the Enforcement 
Acts unconstitutional. The Fourteenth Amendment did give Congress the 
power to prevent interference with rights granted by the Constitution, said the 
Court. But the right to assemble and the right to arms were not rights granted 
or created by the Constitution, because they were fundamental human rights 
that pre-existed the Constitution: 
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for lawful purposes existed long 
before the adoption of the Constitution of the United States. In fact, it is, and 
always has been, one of the attributes of citizenship under a free government. 
It “derives its source,” to use the language of Chief Justice Marshall, in 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 211, “from those laws whose authority is 
 
 322. 16 Stat. 140 § 6 (1870); 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242: “That if two or more persons shall band 
or conspire together, or go in disguise upon the public highway, or upon the premises of 
another. . .or intimidate any citizen with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise and 
enjoyment of any right or privilege secured or granted him by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States. . . .” 
 323. STEPHEN HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, FIREARMS, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
(1998); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 258-59 (1988); Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John 
Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment , 103 Yale L.J. 57 (1993). 
 324. GEORGE C. RABLE, BUT THERE WAS NO PEACE: THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE IN THE 
POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION 125-29 (Athens Univ. of Georgia Pr., 1984). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1999] THE SUPREME COURT’S THIRTY-FIVE OTHER GUN CASES 177 
acknowledged by civilized man throughout the world.” It is found wherever 
civilization exists. It was not, therefore, a right granted to the people by the 
Constitution. The government of the United States when established found it in 
existence, with the obligation on the part of the States to afford it protection.325 
A few pages later, the Court made the same point about the right to arms as 
a fundamental human right: 
The right. . . of bearing arms for a lawful purpose. . . is not a right granted by 
the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent on that instrument for 
its existence. The second amendment declares that it shall not be infringed; but 
this. . . means no more than it shall not be infringed by Congress. . . leaving the 
people to look for their protection against any violation by their fellow citizens 
of the rights it recognizes, to what is called . . .the “powers which relate to 
merely municipal legislation. . . .”326 
According to Cruikshank, the individual’s right to arms is protected by the 
Second Amendment, but not created by it, because the right derives from 
natural law. The Court’s statement that the freedmen must “look for their 
protection against any violation by their fellow citizens of the rights” that the 
Second Amendment recognizes is comprehensible only under the individual 
rights view. If individuals have a right to own a gun, then individuals can ask 
local governments to protect them against “fellow citizens” who attempt to 
disarm them. In contrast, if the Second Amendment right belongs to the state 
governments as protection against federal interference, then mere “fellow 
citizens” could not infringe that right by disarming mere individuals. 
Cruikshank has occasionally been cited (without explanation) for the 
proposition that the Second Amendment right belongs only to the state militias, 
although Cruikshank has nothing to say about states or militias.327 
Cruikshank was also cited in dicta in later cases as supporting the theory 
that the Second Amendment and the rest of Bill of Rights are not enforceable 
against the states328 (even though the facts of Cruikshank involve private 
 
 325. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551 (1875) (emphasis added). 
 326. Id. at 553 quoting New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 125, 139 (1837). Cf. Bliss v. 
Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90, 92, 13 Am. Dec. 251, 253 (“The right [to arms in the 
Kentucky Constitution] existed at the adoption of the constitution; it had no limits short of the 
moral power of the citizens to exercise it, and it in fact consisted in nothing else but the liberty of 
the citizens to bear arms.”). 
 327. “The Second Amendment protects only the right of the states to maintain and equip a 
militia and does not guarantee individuals the right to bear arms; United States v. Cruikshank 
(1875).” C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 397 n. 1 (2d ed. McGraw-Hill, 
1968). 
 328. Malloy v. Hogan, supra note 186; Knapp v. Schweitzer, supra note 208.  For different 
interpretations of Cruiksbank, see Spies v. Illinois, supra note 303 (Second Amendment not 
directly applicable to states); Eilenbecker, supra note 304 (same); Logon v. United States, supra 
note 309 (First Amendment assembly right and Second Amendment arms right are similar; Bill of 
Rights protects neither against private interference). 
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actors, not state actors). That theory, obviously, has long since been abandoned 
by the Supreme Court. Among the earlier cases to reject non-incorporation was 
DeJonge v. Oregon, holding that the right peaceably to assemble (one of the 
two rights at issue in Cruikshank) was guaranteed by the 14th Amendment.329 
And as discussed above, Cruikshank’s dicta about the Fourteenth Amendment 
“Privileges and Immunities” is no more binding on modern courts than is 
Presser’s statement on the same subject several years later. 
B.  Scott v. Sandford 
Holding that a free black could not be an American citizen,330 the Dred 
Scott majority opinion listed the unacceptable consequences of black 
 
 329. DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). 
 330. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). Among Chief Justice Taney’s proofs 
that free blacks were not citizens was the fact that blacks were often excluded from militia 
service. The Taney opinion explained that the parties to the original American social compact 
were only those “who, at that time [American independence], were recognized as the people or 
citizens of a State, whose rights and liberties had been outraged by the English Government; and 
who declared their independence, and assumed the powers of Government to defend their rights 
by force of arms.” Id. at 407. The new nation’s federal militia law of 1792 had enrolled only free 
white males in the militia of the United States, and blacks had been excluded from the New 
Hampshire militia. Id. at 420. These facts suggested to Chief Justice Taney that free blacks were 
not recognized as citizens, since they were not in the militia. 
  Justice Curtis retorted by pointing to the language of the 1792 Militia Act, which 
enrolled “every free, able-bodied, white male citizen.” Justice Curtis pointed out the implication 
of the language that “citizens” included people who were not able-bodied, were not male, or were 
not white; otherwise, there would have been no need to limit militia membership of able-bodied 
white males. Id. at 442 (Curtis, J., dissenting). But Justice Curtis’s argument had one problem: the 
use of the word “free” in the Militia Act. It was undisputed that slaves were not citizens, since 
they were deprived of all rights of citizenship. The Militia Act enrolled only “free, able-bodied, 
white male citizens.” If we follow Justice Curtis’s logic to conclude that the Militia Act proves 
that non-whites could be citizens, then the same logic would show that unfree persons could be 
citizens. 
  The stronger part of the Curtis dissent was his evidence showing that many of the 
thirteen original states did recognize blacks as citizens. The Taney majority never directly 
addressed this part of the Curtis argument, except by listing various disabilities (such as 
prohibitions on racial intermarriage, or bans on operating schools for blacks) which even anti-
slavery states like Massachusetts and Connecticut imposed on free blacks. Thus, in a bizarre way, 
the Taney majority (despite its pro-slavery taint) pre-figures twentieth century Supreme Court 
jurisprudence that there can be no second-class citizens in the United States. The Curtis opinion 
argues that various civil disabilities (including exclusion from the militia) are consistent with 
citizenship. For the Taney majority, citizenship is all or nothing; exclusion from education, from 
intermarriage with whites, or from the militia are all incompatible with citizenship. Thus, once a 
constitutional amendment conclusively declared that blacks are citizens, the logic of the Dred 
Scott majority leads to the results in Brown v. Board, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (racial discrimination 
in schooling is incompatible with citizenship rights); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (laws 
against intermarriage are incompatible with citizenship rights); and Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 
226, 260 (1964) (segregation in restaurants and lunch counters “is a badge of second-class 
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citizenship: Black citizens would have the right to enter any state, to stay there 
as long as they pleased, and within that state they could go where they wanted 
at any hour of the day or night, unless they committed some act for which a 
white person could be punished.331 Further, black citizens would have “the 
right to. . .full liberty of speech in public and private upon all subjects which [a 
state’s] own citizens might meet; to hold public meetings upon political affairs, 
and to keep and carry arms wherever they went.”332 
Thus, Chief Justice Taney claimed that the “right to. . .keep and carry 
arms” (like “the right to. . .full liberty of speech,” and like the right to interstate 
travel without molestation, and like the “the right to. . .hold public meetings on 
political affairs”) was a right of American citizenship. The only logical source 
of these rights is the United States Constitution. While the right to travel is not 
textually stated in the Constitution, it has been found there by implication.333 
As for the rest of the rights mentioned by the Taney majority, they appear to be 
rephrasings of explicit rights contained in the Bill of Rights. Instead of 
“freedom of speech,” Justice Taney discussed “liberty of speech”; instead of 
the right “peaceably to assemble”, he discussed the right “to hold meetings”, 
and instead of the right to “keep and bear arms,” he discussed the right to 
“keep and carry arms.”334 
Although resolution of the citizenship issue was sufficient to end the Dred 
Scott case, the Taney majority decided to address what it considered to be an 
error in the opinion of the circuit court. Much more than the citizenship 
holding, the part of Dred Scott that created a firestorm of opposition among the 
northern white population was Dred Scott’s conclusion that Congress had no 
power to outlaw slavery in a territory, as Congress had done in the 1820 
Missouri Compromise, for the future Territory of Nebraska.335 Chief Justice 
Taney’s treatment of the question began with the universal assumption that the 
Bill of Rights constrained Congressional legislation in the territories. 
No one, we presume, will contend that Congress can make any law in a 
territory respecting the establishment of religion, or the free exercise thereof, 
or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or the right of the people of 
the territory peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress 
of grievances. 
 
citizenship.”); Id at 288 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments do not permit Negroes to be considered as second-class citizens in any aspect of our 
public life.”).  In contrast, the Curtis dissent (while laudably humane in its anti-slavery 
sentiments) allows for second-class citizenship on the basis of race. 
 331. Id. at 417. 
 332. Id. 
 333. See, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 168 (1994) (Douglas, J., concurring); 
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873). 
 334. Scott, 60 U.S. at 417. 
 335. Act of Mar. 6, 1820, ch. 22, 8, 3 Stat. 545, 548. 
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Nor can Congress deny to the people the right to keep and bear arms, nor the 
right to trial by jury, nor compel anyone to be a witness against itself in a 
criminal proceeding.336 
From the universal assumption that Congress could not infringe the Bill of 
Rights in the territories, Taney concluded that Congress could not infringe the 
property rights of slave-owners by abolishing slavery in the territories.337 
The Taney Court obviously considered the Second Amendment as one of 
the constitutional rights belonging to individual Americans. The Henigan 
“state’s rights” Second Amendment could have no application in a territory, 
since a territorial government is by definition not a state government. And 
since Chief Justice Taney was discussing individual rights which Congress 
could not infringe, the only reasonable way to read the Chief Justice’s 
reference to the Second Amendment is as a reference to an individual right. 
Nor can the opinion of Chief Justice Taney (which was shared by six members 
of the Court on the citizenship issue, and by five on the Territories issue) be 
dismissed as casual dicta. The Court knew that Dred Scott would be one the 
most momentous cases ever decided, as the Court deliberately thrust itself in 
the raging national controversy over slavery. The case was argued in two 
different terms, and the Chief Justice’s opinion began by noting that “the 
questions in controversy are of the highest importance.”338 
And unlike most Supreme Court cases, Dred Scott became widely known 
among the general population. The majority’s statement listing the right to 
arms as one of several individual constitutional rights which Congress could 
not infringe was widely quoted during antebellum debates regarding 
Congressional power over slavery.339 
Dred Scott’s holding about black citizenship was overruled by the first 
sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, which states that all persons born in 
the Untied States are citizens of the United States.340 Dred Scott, which had 
exacerbated rather than cooled the North-South anger which eventually caused 
the Civil War, became so universally despised that many people forgot the 
details of what the case actually said. After the Spanish-American War, the 
United States acquired the new territories of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the 
Philippines, and acquired Hawaii after that nation’s government was 
overthrown in a coup orchestrated by American farming interests. Thus, the 
Supreme Court, in The Insular Cases, was forced to determine the 
 
 336. Scott, 60 U.S. at 450. 
 337. Id. at 450-51. 
 338. Id. at 399. 
 339. See, e.g., Stephen Douglas, The Dividing Line Between Federal and Local Authority: 
Popular Sovereignty in the Territories, HARPER’S (Sept. 1859)  519, 530. 
 340. U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the Untied States and of the State wherein they 
reside.”) 
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constitutional status of the new imperial territories.341 In Downes v. Bidwell, 
the Court majority held that, despite the constitutional requirement that taxes 
imposed by Congress be uniform throughout the United States, Puerto Rico 
could be taxed at a different rate; Justice Henry Billings Brown’s five-man 
majority explicitly worried that a contrary result would force the Bill of Rights 
to be applied in the new territories. Writing to Justice John Harlan to applaud 
Harlan’s dissenting opinion,342 a New York attorney exclaimed that the 
majority opinion was “the Dred Scott of Imperialism!”343 But if the Insular 
Cases Court had followed Dred Scott, then Justice Harlan and the other three 
dissenters would have been in the majority; for Dred Scott stated that the Bill 
of Rights did apply in the territories. 
Although the citizenship holding in Dred Scott was so controversial that it 
was repudiated by a constitutional amendment, the case’s treatment of the 
Second Amendment as an individual right was not; in each of the six times that 
the Court addressed the Second Amendment in the rest of the nineteenth 
century, the Court always treated the Second Amendment as an individual 
right. 
C. Houston v. Moore 
The very first case in which a Supreme Court opinion mentioned the 
Second Amendment was Houston v. Moore, an 1821 case so obscure that even 
modern scholars of the Second Amendment are often unaware of it.344 Part of 
the reason is that, thanks to a small error, the case cannot be discovered via a 
Lexis or Westlaw search for “Second Amendment.” 
The Houston case grew out of a Pennsylvania man’s refusal to appear for 
federal militia duty during the War of 1812. The failure to appear violated a 
federal statute, as well as a Pennsylvania statute that was a direct copy of the 
federal statute. When Mr. Houston was prosecuted and convicted in a 
Pennsylvania court martial for violating the Pennsylvania statute, his attorney 
argued that only the federal government, not Pennsylvania, had the authority to 
 
 341. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903) 
(Sixth Amendment requirement for unanimous jury not applicable in territory of Hawaii; only 
“fundamental” constitutional rights apply in the territories); De Lima v. Bidwell 182 U.S. 1 
(1901) (Puerto Rican goods imported to the states are not subject to the tariff applicable to foreign 
imports); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901) (goods transported from the states to 
Puerto Rico not subject to tariff applicable to foreign imports to Puerto Rico); Downes v. 
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) (In taxing imports from Puerto Rico to the states, Congress need 
not obey the constitutional requirement that taxes imposed by Congress be uniform throughout 
the United States). 
 342. Downes, 182 U.S. at 379 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 343. Richard Warren Barkley, letter of May 28, 1901, to John Marshall Harlan, quoted in 
TINSLEY E. YARBOROUGH, JUDICIAL ENIGMA: THE FIRST JUSTICE HARLAN 197 (1995) 
 344. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820). 
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bring a prosecution; the Pennsylvania statute was alleged to be a state 
infringement of the federal powers over the militia. 
When the case reached the Supreme Court, both sides offered extensive 
arguments over Article I, section 8, clauses 15 and 16, in the Constitution, 
which grant Congress certain powers over the militia. 345 Responding to 
Houston’s argument that Congressional power over the national militia is 
plenary (and therefore Pennsylvania had no authority to punish someone for 
failing to perform federal militia service), the State of Pennsylvania lawyers 
retorted that Congressional power over the militia was concurrent with state 
power, not exclusive.346 In support of this theory, they pointed to the Tenth 
Amendment, which reserves to states all powers not granted to the federal 
government.347 
If, as Henigan, Bogus, and some other modern writers claim, the only 
purpose of the Second Amendment were to guard state government control 
over the militia, then the Second Amendment ought to have been the heart of 
the State of Pennsylvania’s argument. But instead, Pennsylvania resorted to the 
Tenth Amendment to make the “state’s right” argument. There are two 
possibilities to explain the State of Pennsylvania’s lawyering. First, the 
Pennsylvania attorneys committed malpractice, by failing to cite the 
Constitutional provision that was directly on point (the Second Amendment’s 
supposed guarantee of state government control of the militia). Instead, the 
Pennsylvania lawyers cited a Constitutional provision which made the state’s 
right argument only in a general sense, rather than in relation to the militia. 
The other possibility is that the State of Pennsylvania lawyers were competent, 
and they relied on the Tenth Amendment, rather than the Second, because the 
Tenth guarantees state’s rights, and the Second guarantees an individual right. 
Justice Bushrod Washington delivered the opinion of the Court, holding 
that the Pennsylvania law was constitutional, because Congress had not 
forbidden the states to enact such laws enforcing the federal militia statute.348 
Moreover, because Houston had never showed up for the militia muster, he 
had never entered federal service; thus, Houston was still under the jurisdiction 
of the State of Pennsylvania.349 Justice William Johnson concurred; he argued 
 
 345. “To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress 
Insurrections and repel Invasions.” “To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the 
Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United 
States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of 
training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.” 
 346. Houston, 18 U.S. at 6. 
 347. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 348. Houston, 18 U.S.at 46-47. 
 349. Id. 
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that Houston could not be prosecuted for violating the federal law; 
accordingly, he could be prosecuted for violating the state law.350 
The Washington and Johnson opinions, therefore, upheld a state’s 
authority over militiaman Houston. Like the attorneys on both sides of the 
case, neither Justice Washington nor Justice Johnson suggested that the Second 
Amendment had anything to do with the case. 
Justice Joseph Story, a consistent supporter of federal government 
authority, dissented.351 He argued that the Congressional legislation punishing 
militia resisters was exclusive, and left the states no room to act.352 
Deep in the lengthy dissent, Justice Story raised a hypothetical: What if 
Congress had not used its militia powers? If Congress were inert, and ignored 
the militia, could the states act? “Yes,” he answered: 
If, therefore, the present case turned upon the question, whether a state might 
organize, arm and discipline its own militia, in the absence of, or subordinate 
to, the regulations of congress, I am certainly not prepared to deny the 
legitimacy of such an exercise of authority. It does not seem repugnant in its 
nature to the grant of a like paramount authority to congress; and if not, then it 
is retained by the states. The fifth [sic] amendment to the constitution, 
declaring that “a well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free 
state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed,” may 
not, perhaps, be thought to have any important bearing on this point. If it have, 
it confirms and illustrates, rather than impugns, the reasoning already 
suggested.353 
After acknowledging that the Second Amendment (mislabeled the “fifth” 
amendment in a typo) was probably irrelevant, Justice Story suggested that to 
the extent the Second Amendment did matter, it supported his position. 
Justice Story’s dissent is inconsistent with the Henigan/Bogus theory that 
Second Amendment somehow reduces Congress’s militia powers. 
Immediately, after the Second Amendment hypothetical, Justice Story stated 
that if Congress actually did use its Article I powers over the militia, then 
Congressional power was exclusive. There could be no state control, “however 
small.”354 If federal militia powers, when exercised, are absolute, then the 
Henigan/Bogus theory that the Second Amendment limits federal militia 
powers is incorrect. 
 
 350. Id. 
 351. This was the only time that Justice Story dissented from a constitutional decision in 
which Chief Justice Marshall was in the majority. JAMES MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 311 n. 161 (2d ed. 1990). 
 352. Houston, 18 U.S. at 46-47. 
 353. Id. at 47-48 (Story, J., dissenting).. 
 354. The Supreme Court decided one other militia case during this period. Writing for a 
unanimous Court, Justice Story held that the President’s determination of the need for a militia 
call-out was not subject to judicial review. See Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827). 
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The Story dissent in Houston does not address the issue of individual 
Second Amendment rights. Justice Story laid out a fuller explication of the 
Second Amendment in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United 
States, and his Familiar Exposition of the Constitution of the United States. 
The Familiar Exposition has the longest analysis of the Second Amendment: 
The next amendment is, “A well-regulated militia being necessary to the 
security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not 
be infringed.” One of the ordinary modes, by which tyrants accomplish their 
purposes without resistance, is, by disarming the people, and making it an 
offence to keep arms, and by substituting a regular army in the stead of a resort 
to the militia. The friends of a free government cannot be too watchful, to 
overcome the dangerous tendency of the public mind to sacrifice, for the sake 
of mere private convenience, this powerful check upon the designs of 
ambitious men. 
The importance of this article will scarcely be doubted by any persons, who 
have duly reflected upon the subject. The militia is the natural defence of a free 
country against sudden foreign invasions, domestic insurrections, and domestic 
usurpations of power by rulers. It is against sound policy for a free people to 
keep up large military establishments and standing armies in time of peace, 
both from the enormous expenses, with which they are attended, and the facile 
means, which they afford to ambitious and unprincipled rulers, to subvert the 
government, or trample upon the rights of the people. The right of the citizens 
to keep and bear arms has justly been considered, as the palladium of the 
liberties of a republic; since it offers a strong moral check against the 
usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers; and will generally, even if these are 
successful in the first instance, enable the people to resist and triumph over 
them. And yet, though this truth would seem so clear, and the importance of a 
well regulated militia would seem so undeniable, it cannot be disguised, that 
among the American people there is a growing indifference to any system of 
militia discipline, and a strong disposition, from a sense of its burthens, to be 
rid of all regulations. How it is practicable to keep the people duly armed 
without some organization, it is difficult to see. There is certainly no small 
danger, that indifference may lead to disgust, and disgust to contempt; and thus 
gradually undermine all the protection intended by this clause of our national 
bill of rights.355 
The Justice’s Second Amendment is obviously an individual right, 
intended to prevent the tyrannical tactic of “making it an offence to keep 
arms.” The purpose of arms possession is to facilitate a militia, and the purpose 
of the militia is to suppress disorder from below (in the form of riots) and from 
above (in the form of tyranny). In contrast to some twentieth century 
 
 355. JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 264-65 (1842) For more on Justice Story’s thoughts about the Second Amendment, see 
Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, supra note 4, at 119-20. 
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commentators,356 Justice Story shared the conventional wisdom of the 
nineteenth century357: removing a tyrannical government would not be 
“insurrection” but instead would be the restoration of constitutional law and 
order. 
CONCLUSION 
In addition to the oft-debated case of United States v. Miller,358 the 
Supreme Court has mentioned or quoted the Second Amendment in thirty-
seven opinions in thirty-five other cases, almost always in dicta. One of the 
opinions, Justice Douglas’s dissent in Adams v. Williams, explicitly claims that 
the Second Amendment is not an individual right.359 Three majority opinions 
of the Court (the 1980 Lewis case,360 the 1934 Hamilton case,361 and the 1929 
Schwimmer case362), plus one appeal dismissal (Burton v. Sills, 1969363), and 
one dissent (Douglas in Laird364) are consistent with either the individual rights 
or the states rights theory, although Lewis is better read as not supportive of an 
individual right, or not supportive of an individual right worthy of any serious 
protection. (And knowing of Justice Douglas’s later dissent in Adams, his 
Laird dissent should not be construed as supportive of an individual right.) 
Spencer v. Kemna refers to right to bear arms as an individual right, but the 
opinion does not specifically mention the Second Amendment, and so the 
reference could, perhaps, be to the right established by state constitutions.365 
Two other cases are complicated by off-the-bench statements of the 
Justices. The 1976 Moore v. East Cleveland plurality opinion supports the 
individual right,366 but in 1989 the opinion’s author, retired Justice Powell, told 
a television interviewer that there was no right to own a firearm. In an 1820 
dissent, Justice Story pointed to the Second Amendment to make a point about 
state authority over the militia (although this would not necessarily be to the 
exclusion of an individual right).367 Justice Story’s later scholarly 
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commentaries on the Second Amendment only addressed the individual right, 
and did not investigate the Amendment as a basis of state authority.368 
Concurring in Printz, Justice Thomas stated that United States v. Miller 
had not resolved the individual rights question; the tone of the concurrence 
suggested that Justice Thomas considered the Second Amendment to be an 
important individual right.369 
Twenty-eight opinions remain, including nineteen majority opinions. Each 
of these opinions treats the Second Amendment a right of individual American 
citizens. Of these twenty-eight opinions, five come from the present Rehnquist 
Court, and on the Rehnquist Court there has been no disagreement that the 
Second Amendment is an individual right. 
Of course that fact that a right exists does not mean that every proposed 
gun control would violate that right; indeed, many of the opinions explicitly or 
implicitly endorse various controls, and, except for Justice Black, none of the 
authors of the opinions claim that the right is absolute.370 
In the face of this Supreme Court record, is it accurate for gun control 
advocates to claim that the non-individual nature of the Second Amendment is 
“perhaps the most well-settled” point in all of American constitutional law?371 
The extravagant claim cannot survive a reading of what the Supreme Court has 
actually said about the Second Amendment. In the written opinions of the 
Justices of the United States Supreme Court, the Second Amendment does 
appear to be reasonably well-settled—as an individual right. The argument that 
a particular Supreme Court opinion’s language about the Second Amendment 
does not reflect what the author “really” thought about the Second Amendment 
cannot be used to ignore all these written opinions—unless we presume that 
Supreme Court Justices throughout the Republic’s history have written things 
about the Second Amendment that they did not mean. 
While the Warren Court and the Burger Court offered mixed records on 
the Second Amendment, the opinions from the Rehnquist Court (including 
from the Court’s “liberals” Ginsburg and Stevens) are just as clear as were the 
opinions from the Supreme Court Justices of the nineteenth century: “the right 
of the people to keep and bear arms” is a right that belongs to individual 
American citizens. Although the boundaries of the Second Amendment have 
only partially been addressed by Supreme Court jurisprudence, the core of the 
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Second Amendment is clear: the Second Amendment—like the First, Third, 
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments—belongs to “the people”, 
not the government. 
 
